ISLAM IN "LIBERAL" EUROPE

Freedom, Equality, and Intolerance

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SOCIETY

[2.0]   Having discussed the problems of liberal democracy, we turn now to the sphere of society. While political theories on Western democracy can be ascribed very clearly to subjects such as political science, constitutional law, and political philosophy, social theory is not confined merely to sociology, but exists in a large number of disciplines, in philosophy and cultural studies, anthropology, linguistics, communication science, education, history, and the study of religion. In fact it is impossible to find a discipline in the humanities or social sciences that has *no* involvement in social theory. As the book proceeds, I shall be tackling separately three fields of social theory in the chapters on media, education, and religion, fields largely omitted from the following chapter. The concepts on which the spotlight now falls, such as "tolerance," "recognition," "racism," "integration," and "identity" come mainly from the discipline of sociology and the interdisciplinary field of cultural studies, which spends a good deal of time grappling with philosophical concepts. Sociology and cultural studies have also entered into numerous symbioses, as in the cultural sociology of Georg Simmel, Pierre Bourdieu, and Norbert Elias or in the cultural studies of Stuart Hall: all authors operating on the interface of base-superstructure phenomena within society, who deal, in other words, with the interactions between cultural symbolism and the everyday conduct of individuals, communities and groups.

[2.1]   This chapter is concerned with defining what the term "liberal society" might mean. I am in search of connections between the potential

for both individual freedom and a collective orientation, a potential built into the foundations of "liberal democracy" that might influence the coexistence of majority and minorities in society far beyond the idea of a constitutional consensus. The chapter is divided into sections that deal first with the attitudes, values, and behavior of majorities in European countries, then those of Muslim minorities, before concluding with an excursus on an alternative—structuralist-Marxist—interpretation of the relations between majority and minority that goes well beyond cultural sociology or cultural studies.

[2.2]

If we seek a definition of what we might refer to as desirable or deviant behavior by majorities towards religious minorities in liberal society, we find ourselves confronted with numerous problems. Recalling the "five faces of exploitation" of minorities and immigrants outlined by Iris Marion Young (see the introduction), in addition to political powerlessness and economic exploitation we must also mention cultural imperialism and racism or racist violence. While we have already discussed the first point and will look at the next two issues in later parts of the book, it is the issue of "racism" that we turn to now. The definition of racism, xenophobia, and similar concepts has often been subject to dispute and still is. This is because we must distinguish not only between more or less self-contained racist worldviews and discourses but also between images of the other, attitudes, and behavior. Further, an approach such as that of Young is automatically open to the criticism that it is blind to its own failings, because an approach that grapples with majorities' behavior solely from the perspective of negative attitudes such as racism may tend to become a kind of "self-fulfilling prophecy." As we find racist models almost inevitably in every society, there is a great temptation to regard societies *per se* as racist. In the analysis that follows, therefore, I consciously open up a theoretical field that extends from racism on one end of the spectrum to various forms of recognition, tolerance, and cultural membership on the other. We can understand the ways of thinking and behaving of both the mainstream and smaller subsystems of European societies only through such theoretical dialectics. The same applies to the minority. It is all too often evaluated on the basis of a minimalist conception of "integration." Just as observers often make the knee-jerk assumption that the majority is "racist," they tend to lament a lack of desire for integration on the part of religious minorities such as Muslims. "Parallel societies" and

"infiltration" are just two terms used in this context. All of them point to the fear of losing social control. The suspicion is that a group within a society wishes to make its own rules that are beyond the knowledge of the majority or that exclude the majority entirely because it is not part of the group. For the researcher, the striking thing here is that conceptually, two contrary types of societal border-drawing set the tone: racism and disintegration. Sections of majorities and minorities apparently wish to exclude the other party culturally and socially. Is there perhaps an interplay between the two tendencies? Is racism a fear-based response to disintegration or is disintegration a flight from discrimination? As we shall see, there is some empirical evidence of such processes. First, though, it is important to resolve whether this is really a case of a symmetry of perception and behavior, which is more than doubtful. Racism *can* be a legal attitude protected by the constitutional freedom of opinion, but as we have seen, it clashes at least indirectly with the civic consensus, as it represents a failure to tolerate other groups and ways of life. We can by no means view processes of social and cultural disintegration straightforwardly as running counter to the liberal model of society—quite the reverse. Liberal democracy and society were created to *facilitate* social disintegration. In the liberal worldview, society is held together by common values, traditions, and cultures only to a very limited degree; its need for integration is markedly lower than earlier community-based ways of living together such as villages or tribes. The exceptions are civic values and, as some authors such as Werner Schiffauer argue, a culture of mutual recognition that injects with social life, formulates and celebrates the liberal legal metanorm that we can be both different and equal (Schiffauer 2008, p. 13). But how far does the obligation to integrate in a *lifeworldly* sense extend? What we need to do is discuss the behavior of Muslims in Europe against the background of the various approaches to social and cultural integration and disintegration in a quite new and unprejudiced way.

[2.3]   In the concluding section of this chapter, I will be homing in on the question of which structural conditions, above all which socioeconomic driving forces, help us understand problems such as racism, recognition, and integration. It is true that theories of racism and integration have always taken account of aspects of economic marginalization and deprivation. Modern recognition theory, however, is directed towards ideas, concerning itself with "discourse," "habitus," and cultural "sym-

bolism" rather than the socioeconomic logic of social analysis, which seems to be out of fashion in the post-Marxist age. The gulf between theories of recognition and critical Marxian theories of "neoliberalism" is striking. But it is impossible to deal with issues of recognition if we leave economics out of our study of culture. It is not just that it is easier to provide evidence of people's economic interests than their desire for recognition: over the course of history, such desires have been far from clearly apparent, let alone expressed in a clear political program. Like racism and disintegration, recognition has economic parameters. The question that arises here is whether "Islamophobia" is an inevitable concomitant of a brewing structural crisis in Western economies within a global economic order or whether tolerance can be reinvented in European society during economic downturns.

THE BOURGEOIS MAJORITY: FROM RESPECTABLE ISLAMOPHOBIA TO SYSTEM-SOCIETY RUPTURE

[2.4]

Rainer Forst has argued that "tolerance" may be a legal-political prac- [2.5] tice, but is first and foremost a social attitude and culture (Forst 2006, p. 79 f., see also Forst 2003). From this perspective it is not just legal equality that matters. Tolerance and recognition of cultural and relig- ious pluralism are also needed, and they must be core values of society if the community and political order are to be stable. Just as liberal democracy cannot exist without internalized values privileging the con- stitution and democracy, this civic consensus is sustainable only if it is based on a hierarchy of social tolerance. Or is this notion wrong?

The classical liberalism of the nineteenth century and the first half of [2.6] the twentieth century paid little attention to questions of tolerance. As late as 1981, Lothar Gall and Rainer Koch could publish their four- volume *Der europäische Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert* ("European liberalism in the nineteenth century") while making almost no refer- ence to the place of religious or other minorities in society (Gall/Koch 1981). For the European pioneers of liberalism, the key issues were those of constitutional law, economic order, and nationalism. More or less as a counterweight to the assertion of individual liberties, in coun- tries such as Italy and Germany liberal thought developed in close asso- ciation with the formation of the nation and state. Following the disso-

lution of the various empires—such as the German empire, Austria-Hungary, and later, in states such as Yugoslavia—other parts of Europe cultivated the nationalism of the small state, which was only gradually augmented by a European component within the framework of the European Union and Council of Europe. This was particularly problematic because at least until the Second World War "nation" and "race" were often conflated, so that immigrant minorities could be "naturalized" only through marriage and assimilation. The status of a permanent minority such as the Jews was always precarious vis-à-vis the nation. Even established nation states such as the Netherlands, often claimed to possess an exceptional tradition of tolerance, seem far less unusual on closer inspection. Even there tolerance did not mean equality for religious minorities. It is true that religious pluralism prevailed in the United Netherlands during and after the Reformation era. But it took centuries of struggle for religious minorities such as Catholics to gain many effective rights of religious freedom, political participation, let alone broad official recognition (Lademacher et al. 2004). Even the much-praised Dutch tradition of tolerance, then, was "liberal" at most in the sense that the state tolerated minorities, but not in terms of equality and official recognition.

[2.7]   Liberal theory, of course, did not explain its disregard and even hostility for "multiculturalism" with reference to the need of the majority to impose its will on society. Instead liberal theorists underlined liberalism's own natural blindness to difference. Culture, religion, but also gender were long considered irrelevant categories; to incorporate them into theory would weaken the status and freedom of the individual (Heywood 2007, p. 322). Classical liberalism thus fed mainly off the contrast between state and individual; "society" was a theoretical residue, while a category such as "public" gradually received more attention (ch. 3). In deliberate contrast to group- and community-oriented ideologies such as conservatism, socialism, and recently (American) communitarianism, liberalism remained individual-centered. There are still people who vigorously espouse this view, such as Harvard economist Amartya Sen (Sen 2006). For these classical liberals, multiculturalism is no more than another form of collectivism, not very different from its supposed pendant of racism.

[2.8]   Tellingly, however, classical liberalism has not even begun to resolve the problem of racism in society. Quite the opposite. Expressions and

attitudes of intolerance increasingly provoked responses from the anti-fascist left, leftist social scientists, and religiously informed theorists of tolerance such as Catholic theologian Hans Küng with his "Weltethos" ("World ethos") foundation, to name but a few. But these were and are marginal intellectual currents compared with the broad constitutional consensus on the "fundamental liberal order," from which perspective *it is not ethnic or religious tolerance that is obligatory but rather, as paradoxical as it may seem, tolerance for racism*, as long as this neither claims legal status nor preaches violence. Racist insults aimed at individuals are prohibited because the right to express one's views is valued less than other personal rights. But neither insulting groups, such as "Muslims," let alone religions such as "Islam," is subject to punishment. Again and again in the last few decades, the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany has overturned sentences passed by lower courts on individuals who have repeated the quote from Carl von Ossietzky that "soldiers are murderers." In this sense it seems only consistent if statements such as "Muslims are terrorists" are also allowed due to freedom of opinion. Whether all Muslims are described as terrorists is of no interest to courts as long as Muslims are not denied their constitutional rights or persecuted in violent ways. In European countries, the extensive right to freedom of opinion is occasionally qualified. In Germany it is against the law to deny the Holocaust. A "blasphemy law" provides opportunities to prohibit anti-religious slander disruptive of public order (ch. 1.1). In practice, however, such laws are rarely applied these days in Europe. Prohibitions such as that on Holocaust denial are thus exceptions within what is otherwise a consistently liberal interpretation of the law. Both legal theory and legal practice are overwhelmingly informed by classical liberal thought. Following the mass killings in Norway in 2011, authors of right-wing Internet blogs in particular have made a fine distinction between Islamophobia and a "civic critique of Islam," which they justify not in terms of content but by underlining that the civic critique of religion goes hand-in-hand with acceptance of the constitution.[1] This ennobles the stoking of public sentiment through tirades that are not just sweeping but also highly emotional and polemical by presenting them as evidence of liberal values.

This setting of priorities, according to which, in case of doubt, tolerance for racists is more important than tolerance of minorities, has made it possible for racist discourses to maintain a perceptible presence

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in every Western democracy, decades after the Second World War. Up to 20 percent of the German public, for example, show a relatively stable tendency to hold racist views, such as the idea that it is quite right for "whites" to be the leaders of the world and so on. Not only this, but more than a third of Germans, and at certain times more than half, are "xenophobic" in that they believe that there are too many foreigners in Germany (Heitmeyer 2002–2010). Sentiments redolent of pogroms—of the kind seen at the time of the attacks on asylum centers in Germany in the 1990s—always interface with such attitudes, and the public response is ambivalent. The number of those who openly endorse violence is small, which suggests that support for the constitution is firmly entrenched in society, but the idea that there exists a civic racism that stirs up anti-Muslim sentiment is one that must be taken seriously (F. Esser et al. 2002). For liberal society, then, it remains unclear how we might get from the "negative tolerance" characterized by essentially formal support for constitutional freedoms to a more participatory democracy and, even more important, to the cultural and social recognition of minorities. It is unlikely that the primordial liberal credo of liberal rights is sufficient to function as a cultural break on attacks against minorities. As the book proceeds, we will see that while Muslims certainly want to enjoy equality of religious freedom, they must also be recognized as part of Europe. When then German president Christian Wulff stated in 2010 that "Islam is part of Germany," however, it kicked off a heated debate—but a social consensus is something else. This shows that while Muslims may *nolens volens* be granted constitutional rights, they are not equally respected as a social group.

[2.10]   Research on racism has identified a number of reasons for its emergence, among them relative social deprivation. In addition to poverty, this includes declining prosperity among higher income groups. Ideological influences also play a decisive role. In the case of racist ideologies it is important to keep in mind not just their content but also their social genesis and the process of socialization. Worldviews are imparted via primary reference groups such as the family and through peer groups, schools, and media. It seems plausible that in the case of "remote topics" such as Islam, an interplay between primary and secondary agencies of socialization is hugely important in the development of a racist ideology. (Vertical) core values are inculcated via families and friends and they develop in an increasingly conscious way into (horizon-

tal) worldviews or ideologies, whose development is stimulated in significant part by the media. It is also clear from opinion polls that racism is greatest when the media generators of the *Zeitgeist* focus their attention on certain groups within a society (ch. 3.1). Media cannot shape people's views completely; their impact is limited. Particularly when it comes to issues located within the familiar sphere of everyday life, media are relatively weak, because recipients have their own experiences and are not dependent on secondary information. But the importance of the media grows as events and individuals are perceived as distant. Here the media take on a so-called agenda-setting function (K. Hafez 2002a). The greater recipients' distance from an object, then, the greater the media's influence on their ideologies tends to be.

The question, however, is whether religious minorities are in fact a "distant reality." We might assume that living together in society automatically brings about a certain experiential and interactional intensity, such that minorities cannot be sweepingly described as an unknown quantity for majority society. That this is not in fact the case, however, is something that research on the social "contact hypothesis" of social psychology has long since established. On this view, not every form of encounter between individuals is "contact" well-suited to dismantling prejudices. For Thomas Pettigrew, we can refer to contact of this quality only if common goals are developed and enduring cooperation or even friendships begin to form—even if this is on the very everyday level of neighborly relations (Pettigrew 1998). Even in a nominally multicultural society, however, it is no rarity for many members of majorities to have no conversational or other meaningful kinds of contact with members of religious or ethnic minorities. So immigrants are often "present" only in a very limited way, namely as a fleeting presence in urban spaces. [2.11]

A core problem for liberal social theorists is how to avoid the liberal order they would like to preserve by protecting freedom of opinion being infiltrated by a racism that endangers the social order, and ultimately liberal democracy itself. Modern theorists of liberal multiculturalism have been tackling this question at least since the 1970s and time and again they return to the old, unresolved issue of "tolerance." Here, in contrast to ideologies such as conservatism, liberal thinkers are not interested in religion and culture as sources of social value production, as the "cement" of society. It is the "multi" part that interests the new [2.12]

liberals, in other words the question of how freedom for different groups can be guaranteed over the long term. Like its classical predecessor, multicultural liberalism advocates liberties within a constitutional order, but beyond this also the greatest possible degree of liberal *and* peaceful coexistence of religious-cultural majorities and minorities. It is not religion and culture as social values that count, but the "meta-value" of religious and cultural tolerance: the older notion of tolerance as a by-product of civic values (ch. 1.4) seems to have come to grief. For this school of thought, it is only through the development of new forms of tolerant values and social recognition that we can permanently ensure the survival of the *political* order of liberal democracy.

[2.13]   To open up the possibility of augmentation by a theory of tolerance, multicultural liberalism first had to clarify how it relates to the relationship between individual and society: against the background of racism, "individualism" is no longer enough, despite the fact that liberalism must always protect individual rights. Thomas Bedorf:

[2.14]   If we wish to understand sociality neither holistically, that is, solely as an outcome of social structures, nor individualistically, in other words solely as the aggregate of separate, individual 'atoms', the alternative that suggests itself is a paradoxical structuring of social being. . . . The singular being understood in a plural sense can be . . . dissolved neither by envisaging a plurality, as with the 'melting pot' or a cheerful multiculturalism, nor by positing the kind of singularity espoused by advocates of the 'leading culture', ethnicisms and nationalism. On this view, the truth of culture and the social dimension consists in the indissoluble tension between unity and multiplicity, identity and non-identity (Bedorf 2010, p. 204).

[2.15]   At the same time, Bedorf highlights the problem of "misjudged recognition." This comes about when people absolutize aspects of social life such as religion or culture, declaring them necessary human reference points. New liberal theory recognizes group foci of this kind as a *possible* form of sociality more readily than in the case of classical liberalism, which considered these processes virtually as private matters sealed off from everything else. At the same time, however, Bedorf refers to "provisional identities" (Bedorf 2010, p. 194). This makes sense when we look at how cultural studies within sociology have illuminated the fact that people's identities often change, that they are con-

structed, deconstructed, and reconstructed, that identities have many other points of reference, and that in any case the members of large social groups, even if they use the same terms to refer to themselves, often have little in common in reality. Liberal Muslims have expressed concerns about the potential for an artificial identity politics on the part of the state, for example in connection with the German Islam Conference (ch 1.2). Liberal multiculturalism, however, has remained "liberal" in the sense that it does not impose any kind of identity on either majorities or minorities or make identities the ontological basis of its theory building. Strictly speaking, then, for multiculturalism what matters is not *Muslims as a social group* that wishes to achieve recognition, but rather the *social recognition of the state of being a Muslim*.

The interplay between individuality and provisional group membership determined by individuals themselves is a useful supplement to our thinking: research in cultural studies has shown that people (almost) always create cultural meaning through a process of coming to terms with groups. Even a postmodern cultural approach such as that of Stuart Hall by no means forgoes these elements. Certainly, Hall views "culture" as a construct that is changeable and negotiable, and subject to numerous structuring influences from institutions such as mass media, but above all it consists of individual processes of interpretation which—and here Hall is very much the theorist of action—ultimately show any notion of a uniform social structure to be a fiction. But people have a need to endow the categories of their worldview with a certain degree of social consensus through interaction with others, in other words there are "preferred readings" within groups (Hall 1980). Humans generate linguistic and figurative symbols that suggest commonalities, even if a close interpretation of their meaning shows that these symbols are often very different and sometimes even contradictory. In this view, culture as a cementing element is largely a fiction—but a necessary and powerful fiction.

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So contrary to what we so often hear, postmodernists are by no means necessarily radical individualists. But they have consistently expressed their rejection of cultural readings that construct cultures as ontologically opposed, as with Samuel P. Huntington's popular concept of the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1993, 1996). In reality, the subsystems of *different* cultures are more similar than those of national cultures—a left-wing Muslim often has more in common with a left-

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wing non-Muslim than with a right-wing Muslim (K. Hafez 1997b). The postmodern concept of sociality recognizes people's tendency towards a collective interpretation of culture, but—very much in line with the work of authors like Bedorf and Hall and in opposition to Huntington—views these interpretations as heterogeneous and improvised. There is no ultimate reason to deny struggles for religious and culture recognition within society or to view them negatively. A laicist form of secularism that would like to drive such conflicts out of society and into the private sphere is often counterproductive. But there is a need for a fundamental understanding of the provisional character of every major group identity and a resulting consensus that embraces diversity and mutual recognition.

[2.18]   Alongside the forms of recognition of love and law, Axel Honneth identifies that of social respect. According to him, a lack of social recognition inevitably leads to a "struggle for recognition." If recognition does occur, however, a solidarist society develops (Honneth 1994, p. 207 ff.). We can trace intellectual perspectives of this kind back to the ideas of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Max Weber, as well as lesser-known authors such as Thorstein Veblen, and George Herbert Mead. Axel Honneth:

[2.19]   In contrast to legal recognition in its modern form . . . social respect relates to the particular attributes that characterize individuals in terms of personal differences: while modern law represents a medium of recognition that expresses general attributes of human subjects in a differentiated way, this second form of recognition thus requires a social medium that must be able to express the different attributes of human subjects generally, in other words in an intersubjectively binding fashion. . . . Under the conditions of modern societies, solidarity . . . is tied to the prerequisite of social conditions of symmetrical respect between individualized (and autonomous) subjects; in this sense, symmetrical respect means regarding one another reciprocally in light of values that present the abilities and attributes of the other as meaningful to shared practice. Relations of this kind are 'solidarist' because they not only generate passive tolerance for, but affective participation in, that which is particular about other individuals (Honneth 1994, p. 197, 209 f.).

[2.20]   Rainer Forst has shown that cultural recognition consists of at least three dialogical components: 1) *Refusal*, these days often concealed

behind a mere "negative tolerance" of what is actually being rejected, 2) *Acceptance*, in other words a form of political tolerance and respect involving the identification of a common denominator, and 3) *Rejection*, meaning active and sometimes even legal refusal and prohibition, essentially comparable to Thomas Meyer's basic civic values (Forst 2006, see also ch. 1.4). The concept of cosmopolitanism put forward by Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande also involves an interplay between different interactional forms, which most closely resemble Forst's "acceptance" and "refusal":

> Rather than threatening, disintegrative and fragmenting, the other is   [2.21]
> experienced and valued as enriching. Those who integrate the per-
> spective of the other into their own lives learn more about them-
> selves *and* the other. But it is crucial that while cosmopolitanism
> accepts otherness it does not absolutize it (as postmodern particular-
> ism does); it also seeks means of making otherness fully compatible
> with society. So cosmopolitanism also requires a certain corpus of
> universal norms that make it possible to regulate interaction with
> otherness in such a way that it does not endanger the integration of a
> polity. Cosmopolitanism combines the tolerance of otherness with
> indispensable universal norms; it combines diversity and unity. . . .
> The *hypothesis* we want to put forward here is that Europe can
> certainly be organized in a democratic fashion but that the model of
> majoritarian parliamentary democracy is insufficient to this end. The
> democratization of Europe must be achieved with the help of a new
> model of cosmopolitan democracy (Beck/Grande 2006, p. 340, 346).

The problem with such concepts is that while they develop visions of a   [2.22]
dialogic form of social recognition, generally conceived in light of issues central to multicultural societies, they do little to elaborate the interactional elements. So they often leave us with more questions than answers. But we must keep all of these questions in mind, because they provide useful theoretical criteria when we turn to the question of the social recognition of Muslims in Europe. We may distinguish between questions relating to the *forms of dialogue and recognition* (1) and those concerning the *conditions for successful dialogue* (2).

[2.23] **1. Forms of dialogue and recognition**

[2.24] • Is *negative tolerance* no longer significant at all? Concepts such as that of Beck and Grande view "tolerance" as unimportant. With reference to conscious acceptance and respect, they mark modern recognition off from classical tolerance, which, as we have seen, makes racism possible within a civic framework. But what we need to ask is whether it befits the liberal idea, which has always differed from other ideologies by avoiding ideological homogeneity, to try to exclude negative tolerance entirely as one *possible* attitude within a context of pluralistic diversity.

[2.25] • In the sphere of recognition, dialogue and respect, which must certainly be expanded, we would have to think about how to describe the relationship between *knowledge/Enlightenment, emotion and action*. As far as knowledge is concerned, people generally know less about "unfamiliar" religions than about their "own." When does this lack of knowledge become problematic, and to what extent is it sufficient to establish a culture of ignorance in which people do not know everything about the other, but are well aware of the limits of their own knowledge (Scheunpflug 2000)? With regard to emotions: is there a space of the symbolic in the modern politics of recognition and if so what should it look like? With regard to action: How are we to put dialogue and recognition into practice in the form of social action? Is it the task of each individual to take action or, as in the case of politics, is there representation in society through institutions, and so on, which should be the real agents of social recognition?

[2.26] **2. Conditions for successful dialogue**

[2.27] • What are the *discursive structures* that thwart recognition and dialogue and which are often passed from one generation to the next? Etienne Balibar has described how, following the Second World War, a new social racism was constructed in Europe. This was a "racism without races" based not on genetics but cultural affiliation and theories of difference, very much in line with the likes of Samuel P. Huntington (Balibar 1989, p. 373). Which key reconfigurations of racist discourse should we be focusing on? In the specific case of

Muslims, where do the boundaries lie between legitimate criticisms of Islam and Islamophobia?

- Can *socioeconomic tensions* impede or even prevent social recognition, and if so which forms of deprivation are involved? With respect to Jews, even before the Nazis seized power there was a "respectable anti-Semitism" in Germany and other European countries that reached deep into all strata of society (Lenk 1994). At the same time, however, there is evidence that not just poverty but any form of actual or feared deprivation may reinforce xenophobia, including among the middle and upper classes. [2.28]

- What *macrosociological structures of interaction* in a society promote or hinder recognitional dialogues? If it is true, as the "contact hypothesis" claims, that certain forms of an enduring dialogue intended to achieve cooperation are well-suited to dismantling prejudices between social groups, we must be alert to the parameters of contact. It makes a difference for example whether people live concentrated in urban spaces or scattered across large territorial states, but also whether they move in "mixed" or socially separate urban milieus. [2.29]

- What are the *social-cultural power-based conditions* of hegemony, and who are the elites opposed to recognition and social movements campaigning for it? Discourse and social action by the individual are often influenced by social opinion formers, who groom their public persona through cultural struggles over recognition, benefit from them, and thus have no interest in seeing problems resolved in a solidarist way. Alongside the political parties of the parliamentary sphere discussed earlier, these include neo-populist movements, but their antifascist opponents and networks also exercise an influence. [2.30]

The problem of the parameters of dialogue demonstrates with particular clarity that an action theoretical perspective on the conduct of social majorities is not enough. We cannot get at social attitudes, opinions, discourses, and actions—from tolerant and willing to engage in dialogue to racist—solely through an approach based on the premise that thinking, feeling, and action form in a specific situation and are "negotiated" anew within it. Instead, alongside a conceptual openness to actor perspectives, we must also be aware of social structures and the system theoretical interpretive framework of societal liberality or illiberality. So [2.31]

a recognition theory informed by the sociology of culture should not be reduced to a mere cultural theory of action. It must be paradigmatically open, elaborating interactions between autonomous actors and their social environments—elites, individuals, groups, organizations, and movements.

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The following chapter examines the image of Islam in European societies. If public discourse influences the actions of individuals, groups, and societies and may in extreme cases lead to racist rejectionism, then this discourse requires in-depth examination. We turn now, therefore, to the history and present-day reality of the image of Islam in societies' middle-class "mainstream." Our concern is with empirically measurable attitudes in majority societies. By getting to grips with empirical studies, we can investigate public opinion in Western democracies and the state of the social recognition of Muslims. The chapter discusses solidarist social networks and Islamophobic violence and attempts to get at the roots of xenophobic attitudes in "liberal society."

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It makes little sense to try to produce a comprehensive definition of the terms "image," "stereotype," "enemy," and "discourse," an unquestionably difficult task, especially since serious attempts to do so have already been made elsewhere (K. Hafez 2002a, vol. 1). Nonetheless, a few preliminary remarks are necessary before we examine the bourgeois image of Islam. In what follows, I use the terms "image of Islam" or "discourse on Islam" for overarching structural features of majority perceptions of Muslims and Islam within European public opinion. These structures may initially be viewed as "stereotypes" in a value-free sense: in social psychology, image structures are not generally considered pathological, but rather an inevitable means of reducing environmental complexity. I do not mean to suggest that individuals, as bearers of images, act in exclusively stereotypical ways—individual images may prove dynamic and changeable. In this chapter, however, our initial concern is with the extent to which people endorse certain forms of highly negative or—now and then—highly positive images of Islam. The degree of this endorsement defines, as it were, the remaining space that societies make available for individual images—no more and no less. By now there is a long tradition of such approaches to investigating concepts of the enemy, and they can be traced back to the Cold War,

when studies were made of American and Soviet images of the enemy (Frei 1985, MccGwire 1987, see also Frei 1984, 1989).

When academics today refer to "Islamophobia," the term is largely coextensive with the limited classical view of enemy concepts found in social psychology and political psychology. Following the example of studies on "group-related misanthropy" at the University of Bielefeld, I regard Islamophobia as any form of sweeping disparagement and condemnation of Muslims as a group, their culture, and/or religion (Heitmeyer 2005, 2006). In contrast, the "critique of Islam" would be limited to specific aspects and make fine distinctions (Schneiders 2010b). Islamophobia may entail fears about Islam, underscoring the "phobia" element. Every image of the enemy has an affective level on which rage, hatred, and fear find expression. In the research, however, the term nearly always refers to the cognitive patterns of the enemy image, which sweepingly ascribe to Muslims negative qualities and hostile intentions because of their group affiliation.

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The term "Islamophobia" has often been criticized (see Bielefeldt 2010, p. 190 ff., Cesari 2006, p. 6, 101, 143). Critics generally underline that not every form of criticism of Muslims and Islam can be regarded straightforwardly as an expression of Islamophobia, only the endorsement of negative views that fundamentally reject Islam or Muslims or describe them in disparaging terms. Not every critique of Islam or discourse on Islam is Islamophobic. The hard core of what social scientists concerned with attitudes have studied in depth for many years consists chiefly of generalized rejections of Islam and the tendency to establish distance from Islam. Certainly, discourses on Islam in the mass media are often one-sided; we shall see later how Islamophobia can be constructed in a politically correct way without classically racist statements along the lines of "All Muslims are . . ." (ch. 3.1). Interpretations based on textual criticism, however, are problematic and theory-dependent and therefore not the object of my analysis here. The theoretical constructs found in attitudes research, on the other hand, such as stereotypes, images of the enemy, and prejudices, tend to be simpler, but this makes its methods all the more representative and reliable—allowing us to present scientifically secure findings on certain basic, group-hostile constants in the image of Islam among Europeans.

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Image structures are not coextensive with people's "attitudes" or "opinions" and by no means do they automatically lead to actions. Atti-

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tudes and opinions are complex constructs in which, alongside images, key values also play a role. Because of this, some researchers work on the assumption that, despite a high degree of Islamophobia in a given country, the core liberal value of religious freedom may help ensure that debates on mosque-building and headscarves are less vehement than in other places. Highly developed liberal values, then, may have a dampening influence on the social virulence of Islamophobia; the lack or underdevelopment of such values, however, may have a radicalizing influence. In this context, we must be alert to an alarmism according to which prejudices *automatically* lead to social discrimination or even violence against minorities. This reductionist error is a common danger of research on stereotypes and images of the enemy. Such research does identify prejudices, but is rarely able to explain their social consequences. At the same time, however, the transitions between "images," "attitudes," and "actions" are crucial, because hegemonic images may well lead to intolerant attitudes, everyday discrimination, and racist violence within a particular social system of values. In this way, the images and attitudes characteristic of a societal majority may be partly responsible for the actions of extremist groups and individuals.

[2.38]   If we turn to the history of perceptions of Islam and the Orient in Europe, we find at least three major traditions. First, a Christian-dogmatic perspective that lacked theological categories applicable to post-Christian religions, a perspective that concerned itself primarily with Judaism and was characterized by value judgements about Islam of an overwhelmingly negative kind. After the Crusades, which began in the eleventh century, Islam was viewed as one of many Christian heresies, and the Prophet Muhammad was regarded as the Antichrist by many Christian scholars, though his teachings only became accessible after 1143 through the Latin translation by Robertus Retinensis (Southern 1978, Watt 1972, Daniels 1975). Because it spread through conquest, Islam was regarded as a violent religion, with no account being taken of the Islamic tradition of respecting monotheistic religions (*dhimmi* status) or its capacity for synthesis with other cultures, which it by no means sought to annihilate. Because the era of the Crusades not only led to wars but also facilitated an improved information flow between Orient and Occident, the science, art, and culture of the Islamic-Arab world exercised an enduring influence on Europe, including, among other things, the notion of the honorable enemy through reception of

the Crusaders' counterpart, Sultan Saladin. At least in Central and Western Europe, however, the religion of Islam was widely regarded as the negative side of Oriental culture, particularly because, as critics often argued, Islam was hostile to the rational traditions of its own culture. As French Orientalist Maxime Rodinson states, this is a largely inappropriate imputation to Islam of the Catholic church's repression of European science (Rodinson 1985, p. 34).

The second tradition of images of the Orient is to be found in the secular perspective of European modernity, which increasingly began to oust Christian structures of thought. From now on, under the influence of a basically secular-liberal mindset, a non-European religion such as Islam existed within a "no man's land." Islam was opposed by Christian traditions while at the same time being rejected as a seemingly restrictive cultural system by an antireligious secular liberalism that had to assert itself against Christianity. There was more to the secular image of the Orient, however, than anti-Islamic attitudes. In peripheral fields of European culture, which sometimes even managed to attract the attention of mainstream culture—as in the case of Goethe's *West-Eastern Divan*—there was a respect for the rational legacy of the Orient and, as Islamic and Oriental studies began to develop, even for Islam itself as a religious-cultural system of order. As the physical danger represented by the Ottoman empire fell away, the Central European world in particular was gripped by a craze for the Orient in the late Classical and Romantic periods. Here the notion of a pious, morally strict, and tradition-conscious Orient was welcomed in part as a counterbalance to the pressure to embrace a modern mindset exercised by the French Enlightenment. But neither gushing Orientalism nor the rational tradition of Oriental and Islamic studies could enduringly influence the image prevalent within the European mainstream. The core Western criticisms, centered on Islamic fanaticism and Oriental despotism, never disappeared from the encyclopedia, having long attained the status of ethnic and religious myths. The anti-Islamic apologetics of a Voltaire, who achieved more nuanced insights only in his late writings, reigned supreme over the cultural relativism of a Lessing, who saw no alternative to the coexistence of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, prompting historian of religion Karl-Josef Kuschel to conclude: "It is a cultural scandal. No religion in the world is as 'demonized' in contemporary Europe as Islam—a significant difference from all other major

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world religions such as Hinduism or Buddhism" (Kuschel 1998, p. 16). To this day, however, we can see how the "major" and "minor" traditions of European images of the Orient and Islam may collide, especially when debates reach their peak of intensity—as in the case of the caricature dispute of 2006. Here exponents of the minor traditions often attempt, and are briefly enlisted by the media, to correct a one-sidedly negative image of Islam.

[2.40]   A third, pragmatic tradition developed against the background of European (and later American) policies towards the Orient. Centuries of conflict in Moorish Spain, prevention of free access to the trade centers of Asia, and Ottoman military expansion into Southeastern and Central Europe contributed to the development of a negative image of the Orient and Islam—as exemplified in German "Turkish songs." As the German empire pursued its late colonial ambitions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this image served as a pretext for a paternalistic foreign policy. The Orient was considered weak and in need of control. Contemporaries hailed the famous "Baghdad railway," built with German assistance, not just as an economic boon, but also as a means of educating the natives. Statements such as the following by nineteenth-century Scottish Orientalist William Muir, were developed into a racist view of colonial subjects by colonial politicians such as the British governor of Egypt, Lord Cromer: "The sword of Muhammad and the Qur'an (Koran) are the most fatal enemies of civilization, truth, and liberty which the world has yet known."[2] Identical statements are still to be found today, on anti-Islamic Websites for example (ch. 3.2).

[2.41]   The image of the Orient and Islam in contemporary Europe, that is, since the Second World War, is to a large degree a microcosm of the perceptual traditions outlined above. While the two traditions of perception continue to exist, the major tradition, the perception of Islam by the bourgeois mainstream, has become progressively unhinged from the dichotomy of distancing and affection that was once part and parcel of the European cultural legacy, hitting one low after another (K. Hafez 2000a, b, 2002a). In place of the partly positive-exotic image of the Orient still evident in the postwar era (reports from the court of the Shah of Persia and so on in major European media) a new focus on conflict has taken hold, traceable through several stages: Arab nationalism, Middle East conflict, Palestinian terrorism, oil crisis, and finally re-Islamization, exemplified by a number of striking events such as the

Iranian revolution of 1978/1979, the Rushdie affair, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, subsequent attacks in London and Madrid, and the caricature dispute. These events were certainly based on real conflicts, but triggered a revival of old tendencies to *sweepingly* equate Islam with violence, repression, and fanaticism, as evident in the media image of Islam (ch.3.1).

In terms of *content*, the Iranian revolution of 1978/1979 was the key turning-point with respect to the image of Islam. Other caesuras followed, such as the end of the East-West conflict in 1989 (Ruf 2006), the Rushdie affair, and the attacks of 11 September 2001. These did not change the image of Islam in any substantive way, but helped emotionalize Western publics and expanded the domestic and foreign policy dimensions informed by the notion of "Islam as the enemy" that had been undergoing a revival since the Iranian revolution. As a result of the Rushdie affair of 1989, Islam then entered into Europeans' internal lifeworld and imagination. While Muslims became an increasingly visible minority in Europe, triggering resentment on the part of many through such things as mosque-building (Vertovec/Peach 1997, p. 24 f.), the threats made by Iranian leaders on the life of England-based writer Salman Rushdie seemed to symbolize a growing internal danger. Several authors have pointed out that in the course of the Rushdie affair, racist diatribes against Islam made a return to the public sphere of bourgeois Europe. A racist worldview was expressed under the "pretext of criticism of Islam" (Vertovec/Peach 1997, p. 4, see also K. Hafez 2002a, vol. 2, p. 261–265). The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 are often wrongly interpreted as the key turning-point in a worsening image of Islam. With regard to content, little has changed in the popular European image of Islam since 2001. All the typical features of the negative image of Islam—fanaticism, repression, misogyny—were not just latently present in a cultural sense, but had already been sufficiently activated by the Iranian revolution and the Rushdie affair.

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So "9/11" did little to change the substance of the prevailing discourse, but it was surely of crucial importance to the West's *social approach* to Islam. It not only served to legitimize foreign wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (K. Hafez 2010a, p. 170–189), it also triggered an electoral breakthrough by right-wing populist parties in Europe and sounded the alarm with respect to increasingly violent discrimination against Muslims living in Europe (see below). Those who had harbored

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hopes that the slow learning processes of the liberal-democratic European political system with respect to the equality of religious minorities would spill over into society were increasingly disappointed after 2001. The terrorist attacks sparked off anti-Islamic social networks of all kinds, now such a common presence on the Internet (ch. 3.2). "9/11" finally laid bare the breach between system and society when it comes to the topic of Islam. Islam was now a major rather than peripheral theme in the European public sphere. For now it is unclear whether, as with the Iranian revolution of 1978/1979, an event distant from the lives of Europeans can alter the image of the Orient—in this case, stop it from worsening. The Arab revolutions, uprisings, and processes of democratization that have occurred since 2010 have the potential to function as a kind of "paradoxical intervention": an event so unexpectedly positive and of such magnitude that it can alter images of the other and perceptions of distance (ch. 3.1). Franz W. Dröge rightly distinguishes between three historical periodicities governing images of nations, which may be applied to the image of Islam: a) enduring cultural stereotypes (such as religious ideas), b) epochal cultural stereotypes (such as ideas about the "Turks at the gates of Vienna"), and c) stereotypes determined by a given historical period (such as German ideas about "the French" during the Nazi period) (Dröge 1967, p. 151). The upheavals in the Arab world might well have a positive impact as contemporary historical events. At the same time, there is a high probability that the image of the Orient will improve over the short term, but not the enduring cultural negative image of Islam, prevalent in the West for more than a thousand years. In other words, the events in the Orient may be welcomed, but only so long as they can be viewed as a kind of "Western" process of democratization, without the involvement of Islamic forces.

[2.44]   Opinion polls and major social scientific studies of the 1990s and 2000s confirm that problems relating to the image of Islam had already appeared before 2001, but the terrorist attacks of 11 September caused a kind of social dam to break. Alongside social networks, this involved aspects of established party politics and put the Islamophobic ideology of neo-civic right-wing populism on the European agenda. The best-known study on Islamophobia in the 1990s was probably the 1997 report *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* by the British Runnymede Trust, produced in collaboration with the British interior ministry or

Home Office (Runnymede Trust 1997). This made a first attempt to define Islamophobia. The Trust identified as Islamophobic statements referring to Islam—or to Muslims as a social or religious group—as religiously or ideologically monolithic, alien to the West, violent, generally irrational, and misogynistic. All these elements were already clearly evident in the image of Islam found in European media during the Iranian revolution of 1978/1979 and in the media reports on the Rushdie affair (K. Hafez 2000b, 2002a, vol. 2, p. 207 ff.). During the Iranian revolution, major European media often equated Islam with politics, Islamic politics with fundamentalism, and Islamic fundamentalism with violent extremism. Many other psycho-logics inherent in the image of Islam were in evidence, generally based on selective perception and worst-case generalizations. Often, the image of Islam in Europe was characterized by a tendency to construct "Islam" as a mirror image of "the West" with different and antagonistic values and behavior patterns—religious, fanatical, repressive, and collectivist Islam versus the enlightened, rational, liberal, and peace-loving West. What this apparent construction of a mirror image entailed was in fact a form of "antipodal thinking," which evaluated fundamental anthropological categories differently in the case of Muslims than with respect to the Western world. For example, there was a widespread assumption that religion and politics are inseparable in the Islamic world. This, of course, is not the case: as a country like Turkey shows, secularization can and does occur in the Islamic world (K. Hafez 2010a, p. 76 ff.). So this mentality was characterized not only by an image of the difference and antagonism of another culture—a "new racism" according to Balibar—but also by a specific image of humanity recalling older forms of genetic racism, a point we shall be returning to later.

The studies of the 1990s, however, were incapable of clarifying how [2.45] representative and formative of Europeans' image of Islam Islamophobic image constructs were. Generalizing statements of this kind certainly cropped up again and again, but then as now the image of Islam also contained neutral elements that are less generalizing, negative, and boundary-marking. The research was largely limited to media content, as representative social scientific surveys were infeasible at the time due to the high costs. And in theoretical terms I have already highlighted the problematic fact that we cannot look at Islamophobic images in isolation from social values and attitudes, let alone as inevitably guiding

how people behave. But some of these issues were resolved in subsequent years. The attacks of 11 September 2001 not only gave a tremendous boost to Islamophobia but also to related research. It became apparent that even a comparatively progressive political system such as that of the United Kingdom did not stop citizens from cultivating Islamophobic attitudes (Vertovec 2002) and even in states like the Netherlands, formerly considered models of tolerance, a huge shift in attitudes occurred. There was serious public discussion of absurdities like a ban on Islam, the deportation of Muslims, and the abolition of the gender division in mosques, though such ideas were not implemented (Cesari 2006, p. 32). It was not long before major opinion surveys were launched to examine more precisely what people actually thought.

[2.46] In 2005, for example, Pew, the famous American public opinion research institute, published a study within the framework of the Pew Global Attitudes Project that showed a slight preponderance of positive attitudes towards Muslims in countries such as France and the United Kingdom, while in Germany and the Netherlands negative views prevailed (Pew Research Center 2005). In these countries a majority thought a ban on headscarves was a good idea or believed that Islam is fundamentally more violent than Christianity or Judaism. The differences in respondents' evaluations were extreme, with less than 5 percent viewing Christianity as violent but more than 80 percent taking this view of Islam. More than 70 percent of the population in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, France, and the United States expressed fear of Islam. In France, Germany, and the Netherlands, majorities were against Muslim immigration; Britons, Spaniards, and Poles had a rather more positive attitude. So it comes as no surprise that a study by the World Economic Forum on "Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue" (2008) found that Europeans often have no interest in an improved dialogue with Muslims. A study carried out in a number of European countries, and with the participation of the University of Münster's "Religion and Politics" research group headed by Detlef Pollack, found that while in most Western European countries the image of Islam is slightly more positive, around 60 to 80 percent of Germans associate Islam with violence and fanaticism and a majority rejects the idea that society could benefit from cultural and religious pluralism (Pollack 2010). This figure is almost twice as high as in France, Portugal, or the neighboring country of Denmark. In Ger-

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many only around 20 percent approve of the building of mosques, while the figure is 50 percent in Denmark.

Despite certain grey areas with respect to the issues considered and methods used, which differ to some extent, an unpalatable trend is unmistakable here. Of all the countries studied, when it comes to Islamophobia, Germany is the reigning "European champion." Central European states such as Germany and the Netherlands are now hotbeds of Islamophobia. Throughout Europe, however, prejudices against Muslims are not just present among lower social strata, but firmly entrenched in bourgeois society. We are not dealing here with elite Islamophobic ideas or peripheral social groups, but with hostility towards Islam reaching deep into the heart of European societies. [2.47]

This problem is also found in the United States, making it a "Western" rather than European phenomenon. A supplementary Pew survey from 2010 is interesting in this connection. As Barack Obama's standing declined during his presidency in the wake of numerous political conflicts and defeats, his popularity suffered. In addition, ever more people believed that he was a Muslim rather than a Christian. This notion was especially widespread among his political opponents, in other words supporters of the Republican Party, about a third of whom held this belief (Pew Research Center 2010). Political antagonism and the notion of Islam as the "enemy" thus seem to be closely bound up with one another. Many national studies essentially confirm the findings of these major international comparative surveys. Up to half of the American population believes that Islam is a religion of violence and hate and that Muslims are violent; a third believes that Muslims *per se* are anti-American; and a growing number of citizens are prepared to curtail the civil rights of American Muslims (Haddad/Ricks 2009, p. 23, Nisbet et al. 2009, p. 164, 167, 172). It would no longer be correct, therefore, to state that Americans are religiously tolerant in any general sense, at least when issues of security come into play (see below). Increasing numbers of people are willing to respond to fears about security through discrimination, and to suspend the rules of liberal democracy. [2.48]

Numerous surveys carried out in Germany in the 1990s indicated that a majority were already afraid of and felt an aversion to Islam (Allensbacher Jahrbuch 1997, p. 62).[3] A 2006 survey commissioned by *stern* magazine confirms that around a third of Germans fear Islam, while a majority regard Islam not as an enrichment but as a threat.[4] The [2.49]

Shell Youth Study of 2006 reveals a diffuse xenophobia and a relatively large number of first-time voters opting for far-right parties among German youth.[5] The 2007 study by the German interior ministry mentioned earlier shows that the incidence of Islamophobia among non-Muslims is higher than that of Christophobia among Muslims (ch. 1.4). In Germany, in the long-term study "German realities" (*Deutsche Zustände*), Bielefeld sociologists around Wilhelm Heitmeyer have made similar findings. This study shows that a sometimes substantial majority of Germans do not want Muslim neighbors and believe that Islam is not suited to the West (Heitmeyer 2005, see also Leibold 2010, Zick et al. 2011). No less than 20 percent take the view that it would be better if there were no Muslims in Germany and if there was a ban on Muslim immigration; 84 percent think the Muslim religion and culture is not suited to Western culture; around 60 percent believe that Muslims strongly support terrorism (Heitmeyer 2006). Further, Jodie T. Allen and Richard Wike work on the assumption that fear of parallel societies and terror is greater in Germany than in all other Western countries, basing themselves on data from Pew (Allen/Wike 2009, p. 138 ff.).

[2.50]   National studies in other European countries have largely corroborated these trends (European Monitoring Centre 2006a, p. 44 ff.). In Denmark, for example, opinion polls show that many Danes believe that Muslims will eventually form a majority of the Danish population. In Spain, 80 percent believe that Muslims are essentially authoritarian, while 57 percent of Spaniards regard Muslims as prone to violence. In Italy, a majority believe that Muslims support international terrorism. No less than a quarter of Austrians dislike the idea of having Muslims as neighbors. In Finland, 50 percent of those surveyed take a negative view of Islam, and in the United Kingdom 40 percent of young people exhibit Islamophobic attitudes.

[2.51]   Overall, we find plenty of evidence of growing Islamophobia among large sections of the European public, often among majorities. As this chapter proceeds, we will be looking at the causes and effects of this image of Islam, but at this point it seems helpful to assess the current structure and extent of Islamophobia in Europe. In 2006, the Swiss Federal Commission against Racism attempted to identify the basic characteristics of negative ideas about Islam. It came to the following conclusions. Even before the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Euro-

pean public opinion showed a clear tendency to exclude Muslims both religiously and culturally and ascribe to them an incompatibility with Christianity and the West (Eidgenössische Kommission 2006, p. 14 ff.). Up to the present, many people not only make sweepingly negative judgements of Islam but also place far too much emphasis on religion, despite the fact that the majority of Muslims do not strictly practice theirs.[6] Muslims are associated with "images of traditional practices" even if they have no connection with them. Muslims are becoming the "new scapegoats" and are frequently subject to collective condemnation as a result of distant events (in Afghanistan for example).

In light of the empirical findings on Western public opinion, which have appeared in ever-greater quantities over the last few years, such evaluations are quite correct. If we take the simplest definition of "Islamophobia," namely the expression of a sweepingly negative view of the religion and culture of Islam and of Muslims as a religious and social group, then there is plenty of evidence that most Westerners are "Islamophobic." Do most Westerners exhibit a hegemonic, anti-Islamic racism? Modern sociologists often refer to the "construction of the other" when investigating images of "foreigners" and other groups. One of the construction paradigm's key components is the assumption that social psychological categories such as "the familiar," "the other," or "foreign," which are elements of the definition of "people," "nation," "citizen," and "foreigner" in public discourse and law, should be seen as results of social definition processes. From an anthropological perspective "foreignness" is not a constant quality, but a social act of separating in-groups and out-groups, based on the need to identify and a belief in difference, an act of separating so fundamental that it influences the coexistence of states and societies politically and socially (through the concept of the nation, for instance). Here, religion and culture become virtually "natural" hallmarks of difference that make it difficult or impossible for groups to live together.   [2.52]

If images of Islam enter into the construction of the foreign, that is, if ideas about the Islamic world become criteria of difference shaping the definition of social groups, then this means that the characteristics of these images can move beyond the level of the transcultural imaginary, becoming factors in everyday social life (microlevel), institutional behavior (mesolevel), and domestic politics (macrolevel). What are the implications of these images of Islam for the construction of the other?   [2.53]

Public images of Islam exhibit the unmistakable attributes of extreme collective perception. Processes such as the reduction of complexity in favor of a *pars pro toto* view of Islam in which a multiplicity of religious, political, and social realities are reduced to a single phenomenon, namely radical-fundamentalist and fanatical Islam, like the other principles of perception and construction evidently inherent in images of Islam, are typical of the world views and concepts of the enemy found among extremist political groups (Funke 1986, p. 132–136). What we find here is an unexpected structural affinity between common democratic and extremist images of the other. The public view of Islam is highly selective, stereotypical, sloganeering, and disparaging, and shows the same kind of uniformity typical of ideological schemata. There is a strong tendency here towards a "radical style of thought," as Aleida and Jan Assmann describe the inclination for dualistic models of values, inescapable logical alternatives, and absolute truths, which they regard as essential features of the profane society of Western modernity amidst the clash of cultures (Assmann/Assmann 1990, p. 25 f.).

[2.54]   In addition, the embedding of Islam in a worldview privileging cultural difference seems to be linked to the development of modern racism. As discussed earlier, this "racism without races" (Balibar) tends to highlight affiliation to a particular culture as the supreme criterion of difference rather than physical characteristics (see also A. Bühl 2010, p. 293 f.). Many Europeans think in terms of a fundamental cultural or even anthropological difference between Muslims and non-Muslims of the kind common among supporters of the "new right" (Höhne 1995, p. 74–79). Dichotomous images such as the "modern West" versus "backward Islam" or "peaceful West" versus "violent Islam" almost inevitably lead to processes of social border-marking distinguished by a high degree of latent violence, as "us and them" are constructed as opposites.

[2.55]   Since the turn of the new millennium, there has been a lot of evidence to suggest that Islam can inspire a regression from cultural to genetic racism. Geneticists such as Charles Watson have begun to discuss questions long believed resolved such as those relating to the innate intelligence of "blacks" and "whites." What is more, popular critics of Islam such as Oriana Fallaci in Italy or Thilo Sarrazin in Germany have repeatedly used biologistic metaphors and referred to genes in their writing, which has not stopped their books from becoming bestsellers. Thilo Sarrazin: "It is a fact that the incidence of congenital

disabilities is much higher among Turkish and Kurdish migrants" (Sarrazin 2010, p. 316).[7] Or: "All Jews share a specific gene; Basques have certain genes that distinguish them from others."[8] These ideas are often linked with the revival of social Darwinism—and all this is happening as Europe is gripped by financial and economic crisis. In this view, natural characteristics lead to social segregation and selection. What counts is the survival of the fittest rather than social recognition. The affinity between biology and social Darwinism is merely superficial, however, as the latter is a vulgar form of Darwinism. Evolutionary theory has never denied the influence of environmental factors on human learning processes.

In light of the huge popularity of authors such as Fallaci and Sarrazin in Europe, Albrecht von Lucke rightly refers to a new "elite racism," to a shifting of the middle towards ideas of inequality and to both a "relativization of the principle of equality and justice" and a new "bourgeois coalition" (von Lucke 2009, p. 58). It is in fact fair to say that this highly selective view of Islam and Muslims (and often Arabs, Turks, and Iranians as well), which argues in terms of cultural or even genetic inequality, is a new form of racist yet socially acceptable Islamophobia, one that is widespread in bourgeois Europe and frequently incurs no social taboo. This differentialist conception is expressed in a fundamental distinction between the messages of Islam and those of Christianity or the West, and even more in the image of Muslims, Christians, or Europeans in religious, human, and social terms. This conception tends to present a sweeping view of Islam as an inferior, negatively charged, problematic religion and culture and can certainly be described *in nuce* as racist, as it seems incapable of making any distinction between different schools of thought, actors, and so on, and makes no attempt to back up its critique with hard evidence. The exaggeration of supposed cultural differences has already been referred to in the research as "concealed prejudice" (Zick et al. 2011, p. 35). There are formal differences between stereotypical images of Islam, as these are not always *explicitly* disparaging and do not always present Islam as the enemy but may merely essentialize and culturalize. That Islam is regarded as "different" does not necessarily mean it is seen as "worse" than one's own religion or culture. But differentialism, culturalism, and racism often go together. It is surely not the same if an individual experiences Islam "merely" as other—more religiously devout for instance—or as incompatible

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with her own culture. But at least when we look at this latter variant, we have to ask whether "incompatibility" means that one "cannot stand" Muslims, in other words one holds them in very low regard. When all is said and done, citizens of a liberal society do not have to adopt a "foreign" lifestyle. But they must be able to put up with this lifestyle within their social environment, and occasionally engage with it. In everyday life, differentialism and culturalism *may* function as a kind of crypto-Islamophobia, as they foster an extreme perception of Muslims as the stereotypical other with whom a relationship is undesirable. Most public opinion surveys or social scientific studies point beyond this, showing that in present-day Europe majorities often embrace clearly disparaging images of Islam—in other words explicit Islamophobia.

[2.57]   Variants of Islamophobia come into play not just in anti-Islamic statements, but also in those supposedly intended to recognize Islam. Such discourse calls for acceptance and tolerance of Islam because, for example, these things are legally enshrined in a liberal, democratic order. But mention of this imperative of tolerance is not followed by any reference to anything the addressees might have in common with Muslims and Islam—by recalling, for example, Islam's history of tolerance, particularly with respect to Judaism. Instead the emphasis is on the persecution of Christians in the Islamic world and its supposed justification in the Koran. Few would suspect that Cairo alone is home to hundreds of churches. Christianity, meanwhile, is portrayed as essentially reformed, peaceful, and tolerant.[9] A philosophy of tolerance of this kind does not provide a way forward. Beneath the patina of civic tolerance lurks latent essentialism and Islamophobia. From the standpoint of the theory of multicultural liberalism, these are cases of "pseudo-recognition."

[2.58]   The concept of "respectable Islamophobia" evokes a comparison with "respectable anti-Semitism" (see below). A number of authors have now pointed to the affinity between these phenomena (see for example Heitmeyer 2005, p. 20, Benz 2009, K. Hafez 1999a, Schiffer 2009). The comparison that suggests itself here is not so much with the image of the Jews held by the Nazis, but with the anti-Semitism of the nineteenth century, which was more subtle in nature. Micha Brumlik: "No, the Turks of today are not the Jews of yesterday, but their situation may in fact resemble that of an earlier generation of Jews."[10]

In both images of the other, theological clichés (Jews as Jesus-killers, Muslims as a threat to Christianity) are combined with the fear of the infiltration or conquest of Europe or its states through a religion-based conspiracy. There are surely many differences in the images of Jews and Muslims, probably anchored chiefly in the very different global position of Jews and Muslims—Jews form the majority only in Israel, while Muslims do so in many different countries. But the historical-diachronic overlap of the images prevalent within nineteenth-century anti-Semitism and present-day Islamophobia are sometimes so striking that in 1999 Ignatz Bubis, long-time chair of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, concluded that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are essentially similar and that the negative image of Islam is now underpinned by the same false information that once led to contemptuous attitudes towards Judaism (Bubis 1999, K. Hafez/Steinbach 1999). In 2004, a study by the University of Zurich on behalf of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), B'nai B'rith Zürich, and the Swiss Federal Commission against Racism found that regardless of the historical affinity, the image of Jews and Muslims in *present-day* Switzerland is notably different: Jews are perceived in an overwhelmingly positive way, Muslims negatively; Jews are generally viewed as victims of anti-Semitism, Muslims as perpetrators of terrorism, with the sole exception of the Middle East conflict, where perpetrators and victims are acknowledged on both sides (Meier et al. 2004). So parallels between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia do not exist in all historical periods; contemporary images of religious groups vary. Structural affinities exist mainly in a diachronic sense, between the current image of Islam and the historical image of Jews. Nowadays, Islamophobia is at home in the mainstream of bourgeois society, while anti-Semitism has been largely, although not completely, banished to its extreme fringes.

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All of this throws up the question of whether there is a close connection between the image of Islam as the enemy in the mainstream European public sphere and the aggressive hostility to foreigners in extremist circles. It is particularly important here to distinguish between the construction of the Islamic other, characterized by the "perceptual extremism" of sweeping denigration and culturalism—what we might call mainstream Islamophobia—and the anti-Islamic racism found within far right circles in Europe. What we find here is that the concept of racism is only of limited value in studying the relations between major-

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ity opinion, extremism, and discrimination (Ulrich Bielefeld 1991, p. 18). Islamophobia is not identical with the racism of the far right, even if it is often "quite apparent" that those espousing them "see things in a quite similar way" (Uli Bielefeld 1993, p. 37). What mainstream Islamophobia and far-right Islamophobia have in common is that due to a warped view of reality, both tend to construct an essential difference between the Islamic and Western worlds and, as a concomitant, to sweepingly condemn Islam. European majorities and their far right minorities define "the other" in similar ways, but differ greatly in their approach to the other. We may assume that the majority differs from the minority in that it is not prone to violence. In other words, the majority may cultivate an Islamophobic racism, but the vast majority of the majority uphold the civic value consensus, which includes an absence of violence (ch. 1.4). We may even assume that the majority's Islamophobia is unintentional. It does not necessarily involve pursuit of a political goal in the narrower sense and does not have to be political-ideological in character. It may simply be a prejudice structure inherent in the European imaginary, one endowed with enduring contemporary relevance by many media after the Iranian revolution, an Islamophobia now being handed down through the interplay of media, opinion leaders, and the institutions of primary, secondary, and tertiary socialization. The majority are Islamophobic and racist, but they do not adhere to a *uniform* racist worldview that privileges violence. The majority probably do not even think their Islamophobia is racist.

[2.61]   Nonetheless, Andreas Zick is right when he states that "concepts of xenophobia, prejudices and racism [are partly] generated through public debates" (Zick 1994, p. 119). The Islamophobic massacre and bomb attack in Norway in 2011 prompted a new kind of debate, which asked: Was mass killer Anders Breivik a "lone wolf" or does majority society bear some of the responsibility in light of its socially acceptable Islamophobia (see below)? It is not just a widely shared worldview that is it at issue here, but the fact that European culture still lacks a binding taboo on Islamophobia. As Edward W. Said already noted: "For no other ethnic or religious group is it true that virtually anything can be written or said about it, without challenge or demurral" (Said 1995, p. 287). And this is just where a new politics and culture of recognition in liberal society would have to come in, a culture of the kind we have already considered on a theoretical level. While the Islamophobia of the bour-

geois majority may have originally developed as a social prejudice of an unintentional, quite unconscious kind, since 2001 at the latest is has become very apparent that neo-populists, right-wing extremists, and many other social actors have successfully pursued a kind of secondary ideologization. Right-wing neo-populists in particular have increasingly endowed bourgeois Islamophobia with a political direction that it lacked in the 1990s (see below).

If Europe has a sometimes hegemonic proclivity for a culturally racist view of Islam and intolerance towards Muslims as a social group, then we must acknowledge that there is a chasm between the political system of liberal democracy and Europe's social and cultural mindset. But what of the long-term survival of a political system that not only guarantees rights of private religious freedom but also demands equal treatment of religions by the state and which *is* making a reality of this, albeit slowly and inconsistently? A majority of European publics essentially want the exact opposite: unequal treatment, discrimination, exclusion of Islam from the state and public sphere, even bans on immigration and physical displacement. For now liberal democracy persists, since even a majority of those who feel antagonistic towards Islam support the constitution and basic rules of the system. In the United States, however, opinion surveys have clearly shown that the tightrope walk characteristic of such a "tolerant society" will be hard to sustain over the long term and may rapidly come to a sorry end. Antagonism towards a religious and social minority is generating calls for restrictions on basic rights. The tendency towards improved rights of representation within the state or political sphere is coming up against powerful opposition from political parties and the legislative branch. It is doubtful that the judicial and executive branches of European states will remain steadfast in such a situation.

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There are two conceivable future scenarios: a collapse of political systems with unforeseeable consequences or a form of cultural and social development that prompts at least sections of bourgeois Europe to move away from negative tolerance and embrace positive recognition of the Muslim minority, generating a new consensus on the multicultural, liberal society. Conservative approaches centered on a "leading culture" (*Leitkultur*) and "integration" are an attempt to reach a social compromise. But they ultimately go too far in pandering to majority resentments, and are usually limited to granting basic rights within the

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private sphere. The exponents of such approaches are also keen to go further in imposing the will of the majority on the state and public spheres. From a theoretical perspective, conservative ideologies are a precise reflection and expression of Europe's current schizophrenia—caught between the liberalism of much of its political system and the intolerance of much of society.

[2.64]   Before we begin a closer analysis of neo-populist parties that would like to see a dictatorship of the majority, are opposed to the liberal order, and wish to upset the fragile balance between system and society, it is interesting to note that since 2001 at the latest a number of Western politicians have recognized the danger of a rupture between the political and social order with respect to Islam. In 2004, then secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, warned against Islamophobia, calling it one of the worst forms of religious intolerance. Muslims in the West, he claimed, are far too often subject to suspicion, intimidation, and discrimination.[11] The German Islam Conference was opened in 2006 with a statement underlining the need to combat "racism, anti-Semitism and extremism" (Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 7). Though there was still an attempt to avoid the term "Islamophobia" here, in a later speech then interior minister Wolfgang Schäuble criticized distorted views of Islam and referred to an "emotional rift between people" that worried him greatly (Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 23)—conservative code for a critique of the general public's racism. Differing sensibilities among Germans were also evident during the debate on Thilo Sarrazin's xenophobic polemic *Deutschland schafft sich ab* ("Germany is abolishing itself"; 2010). While most citizens of Germany agreed with his ideas, Chancellor Angela Merkel and other leading politicians were highly critical and drove him from office.

[2.65]   The system-society rupture with respect to Islam has now even come to the attention of those conservative commentators who tend to be more representative of society's Islamophobia than of multicultural recognition. Alexander Gauland:

[2.66]   [What we see] is the aloofness of a political and media elite who are unwilling to accept a reality, even to discuss it, because it clashes with the official concept of a multicultural society. . . . But no society has ever survived over the long term if it has tried to banish reality, while preferring to lock up those who call it what it is. The GDR was

not the first but is certainly the most recent example of the self-inflicted nemesis that will result. [12]

Gauland agrees that there is a chasm between the political system and much of society, but believes the system must fall into line with society, abandoning all attempts to pursue a multicultural policy of recognition. What the conservative Gauland fails to see is that we can, and in light of the liberal social imaginary *must*, turn this evaluation on its head. When it comes to Islam, many members of European societies have clearly not internalized the values of positive tolerance necessary to maintaining the system, and wish to isolate Muslims as a supposedly dangerous and disagreeable group. He is rightly worried about the stability of the system, but his solution is to privilege the "will of the people"; he fails to grasp that equality for Muslims in the justice system, state, and public sphere cannot be achieved in this way. In his analysis, Muslims are unassimilated intruders in a community of citizens whose willingness to tolerate a disagreeable minority, in a "civic" sense, is beginning to run out. Notably, Gauland assumes that multiculturalism is the guiding principle of the conservative government of Angela Merkel. This is surprising given how she and the CDU have railed against multiculturalism. Again, though, this reinforces the point that in their role as party of government, the CDU has *de facto* made considerable progress towards the recognition of Muslims (ch. 1.2).

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So what is interesting about Gauland's analysis is his correct supposition of a looming rupture between system and society on the question of Islam. But he is essentially Islamophobic and quite wrong to rage against the conservative elite. The dispute over Sarrazin showed that the conservative assimilatory consensus with regard to Islam has begun to break down. It is not just Merkel's Christian Democrat government that took a critical view of Sarrazin and that to some extent rejects his view of Islam as the enemy, but also conservative intellectuals such as Frank Schirrmacher, editor of the influential *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* newspaper. We might refer to the development of a "modern conservatism," though this does not constitute a strategic grouping. Schirrmacher for example fails to grasp the risk of a system-society rupture, which is clearly apparent in the way Islam is perceived. For him there is no problem of racism in Germany; since 1945, the country has developed a "great sensitivity to racism and totalitarianism of all

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kinds,"[13] a thesis contradicted by statistics on German Islamophobia. At best, his analysis is more or less correct when applied to anti-Semitism (see below). In Schirrmacher's interpretation, the myth of a society purged of and liberated from racism has clearly caused him to suppress awareness of new dangers. He ignores the fact that while German society has indeed made a sustained effort to combat anti-Semitism over the past few decades, it has failed to apply the same approach to other ethnic and religious minorities.

[2.69]   Overall, then, the conservative camp now features a number of quite different views on Islam:

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- a generally enlightened view that entails a willingness to improve Muslims' equality as citizens, but which either transfigures (Schirrmacher) or discusses with timidity (Schäuble) the problems arising from the looming rupture between system and society, a tendency reinforced, of course, by the fact that their own clientele is largely Islamophobic;

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- an essentially Islamophobic perspective whose exponents accuse their own elites of being too accommodating and clearly want to roll back the nascent conservative policy of dialogue and recognition (Gauland).

[2.72]   This distinction is interesting with respect to the neo-populist or right-wing populist parties that have recently emerged in Europe. These might be considered the new proponents of a conservative roll-back of the policy of recognition, who threaten to unbalance the system of "liberal democracy." They want to give society the upper hand over the political system. The hegemonic views of the majority society must reconquer the state and public sphere. Schools and other institutions must be freed of symbols of the presence of Muslims; mosques, if they are to be built at all, must be relegated to the periphery and remain inconspicuous through the banning of minarets, while the Christian character of institutions and the state must be privileged as the country's core tradition. Exponents of such views, professing their commitment to liberal-democratic constitutions, dispute that their ideas run counter both to the efforts made over the last few decades to achieve legal equality and to individual rights of religious freedom. But the tension between these imperatives is unmistakable. Right-wing popu-

lists are radical democrats who wish to make the majority completely dominant—in this sense they do indeed deserve to be called "populist"—and who have reservations about the "liberal" element of "liberal democracy." But since liberality is part and parcel of Europe's political systems, tensions between these systems and European right-wing populists are inevitable.

Ultimately, then, the question we must face is whether this movement, which allegedly supports the constitution, would not in fact overthrow present elites and alter the system if it gained power. So far, most right-wing populists operate below the level of open confrontation with the system. Their main function consists in stirring up *social* tensions between majorities and the Muslims of Europe. But we should assume that these parties have the potential electoral support of up to a quarter or more of European publics in many European countries. This segment of society openly espouses xenophobic views such as "foreigners just want to live off benefits." Such attitudes have intensified over the course of the 2000s and have moved from the margins to the "center" of European societies (O. Decker/Brähler 2008, O. Decker et al. 2008, 2010). Though we should be careful of making comparisons with National Socialism, we cannot rule out the possibility, should right-wing populist parties take power in European nation states, rather than merely being junior coalition partners as in Finland, Denmark, and Austria, that the majority's pent-up rage with regard to Islam may put the political system in danger.

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American theorist of liberalism Alan Wolfe has described the cold, harsh ideology of neo-populist parties as "reactionary":

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> One finds in them no generosity of spirit toward people whose conditions of life have been difficult in the extreme: no heart-warming accounts of their courage in leaving one land and try and achieve success in another; no sense that all cultures have something to value: no appreciation of the underlying universality of all people whatever their national differences: no recognition of the fact that peace among cultures is a worthier objective than war between them: and no acknowledgement that the society being protected, far from being flawless, could use an injection of new ideas and entrepreneurial energy (Wolfe 2009, p. 204).

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[2.76] Propaganda directed against foreigners and immigrants has always been a significant aspect of right-wing populist movements and parties in Europe. Since the attacks of 2001, however, xenophobia has become specifically directed against Islam and Muslims (Cesari 2006, p. 31, Hartleb 2011, p. 29 f., Ehrke 2002, p. 17). In these circles. Islamophobic polemics are nothing new. As early as 1990, Beat Christoph Bäschlin, a contributor to far-right magazine *Junge Freiheit* ("Young Freedom") wrote a pamphlet titled "Islam Will Devour Us" in which he described France as the bridgehead of an Islamic invasion of Europe (Bäschlin 1990). In the 1990s, far-right extremists across Europe frequently accused Muslims of "exploiting" and "oppressing" their hosts and of wanting to destroy Europe with its Christian heritage (Pinn 2000, p. 94). In the 2000s and 2010s, however, Islamophobia grew exponentially among Europe's ever more numerous right-wing populist parties:

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- *Austria*: the Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* or FPÖ) and Alliance for the Future of Austria (*Bündnis Zukunft Österreich* or BZÖ). Having long been led by Jörg Haider, these parties are among the oldest far-right parties of Europe. The leader of the FPÖ, Heinz Christian Strache, once described Islam as the "fascism of the twenty-first century" and rejected the idea of building mosques and minarets, which, he stated, are out of keeping with the landscape of Europe.[14] These parties advocate a ban on minarets and headscarves[15] and refer to a "creeping Islamization" of Europe (Bauer 2011, p. 58).

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- *France*: National Front (*Front National* or FN). Together with Haider's FPÖ, this party, built up over the years by Jean-Marie Le Pen, is in a sense the forefather of modern far-right parties in Europe. Le Pen was so successful that he made it into the second round of the 2002 presidential election. His successor and daughter Marine Le Pen has stepped up her party's Islamophobic rhetoric, referring to Muslims as occupiers of French territory and accuses all Muslims of being Islamists.[16]

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- *Denmark*: the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti* or DF). The party's main theme is the need to put a stop to immigration and warnings about "criminal foreigners and Islamists" (Beer 2009, p. 95).

- *Finland*: True Finns, Ordinary Finns or The Finns Party (*Perus-   [2.80]
  suomalaiset* or PS/PERUS). This party counts among its ranks
  known haters of Islam such as Jussi Halla-aho, who has called the
  Prophet Muhammad a paedophile and mused about the genetic
  causes of theft.[17]
- *The Netherlands*: Freedom Party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid* or PVV).   [2.81]
  In 2010, far-right populist Geert Wilders and his party took 21.6
  percent of the vote in local elections, making the PVV the second
  biggest party in the country. While he only managed around 15
  percent at the parliamentary elections of the same year, this still
  made his party the country's third biggest. Wilders is one of the
  most vehement and clearly Islamophobic critics of Islam, who
  calls the Koran fascist, refers to Muslim hooligans, and states that
  Muslims should clean the pavements with their toothbrushes
  (Langenbacher/Schellenberg 2010)—horrifyingly reminiscent of
  the treatment of the Jews, who were forced to do just such things
  under Nazi rule in Germany. Wilders won elections by advocating
  a ban on the building of mosques and on allowing Muslims into
  the country. His unnuanced message is that Islam is a threat to
  the Western lifestyle. Despite his popularity and successes, his
  open Islamophobia has made it difficult for him to work with the
  established parties, which reject his sloganeering.
- *Sweden*: Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna* or SD).   [2.82]
  Though Sweden has long been regarded as a bastion of Northern
  European liberalism, the far-right populist Sweden Democrats
  made it into parliament for the first time in 2010. Their greatest
  PR coup was to disseminate a photograph of burqa-clad women
  waiting in line for welfare benefits.[18]
- *Italy*: the Northern League (*Lega Nord* or LN). This is one of the   [2.83]
  oldest right-wing parties with populist tendencies. It not only agi-
  tates against immigration from Islamic countries but supports re-
  gional initiatives against mosque-building and Islamic schools
  (Bauer 2011, p. 75).
- *Switzerland*: Swiss People's Party (*Schweizerische Volkspartei* or   [2.84]
  SVP). Rose to international prominence in 2009 when it instigated
  a referendum that resulted in a ban on the construction of mina-
  rets (ch. 1.1). The party rejects everything that it views as special
  religious rights, including special burial rules for Muslims, the

introduction of which can only be seen as an act of equalization. With the success of the Swiss People's Party in 2009 and Wilders' election victories in the Netherlands, in the late 2000s Europe was gripped by an "increasingly Islamophobic mood"[19] and Islamophobia in Europe was widely politicized. The example of the Swiss People's Party, however, demonstrates that far-right populists sometimes package their antagonism towards Islam with considerable skill. At least in its official manifesto the party deliberates without the usual clichés. Its arguments are not Islamophobic in a narrow sense, instead focusing, in a highly selective way, on phenomena that infringe human rights and should therefore find favor even among those who are not Islamophobic. No references here to Muslims or Islam as monolithic entities. Yet Muslims only ever appear in the manifesto in association with negative practices. This is a kind of "enlightened Islamophobia" based on selective perception and agenda-setting, which we will be returning to in connection with the media view of Islam (ch. 3.1) and which, along with classical Islamophobia (essentialist racism), contributes to the stigmatization of Muslims as a social group. An excerpt from the 2011 manifesto:

[2.85]   No doubt just a small minority sympathize with Islamist ideas. But Muslim immigrants often come from countries that lack a democratic legal system. They bring with them ideas about law and order that are not compatible with our democratic rules. Under no circumstances must our liberal-democratic legal order defer to sharia; our courts must never accept an Islamic 'cultural background' as grounds for leniency. The tolerance or even promotion of practices such as forced marriage, 'honour killings', vendettas, female genital mutilation and polygamy is completely unacceptable in this country. The cowardly, browbeaten attitude of certain politicians, journalists and church representatives is alarming. Left-wingers, feminists and even gender equality offices are mostly silent as well (SVP 2011).

[2.86]   • *Norway*: Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet* or FrP). This is one of the strongest far-right parties in Europe. Following the combined bomb attacks and massacre in Oslo and Utøya in 2011, the party rose to international prominence because the perpetrator men-

tioned it and had long been a member, though of course it distanced itself from his crimes. The party's image of Islam is at times openly Islamophobic: one of its leaders stated that all terrorists are Muslim. Further, the party helps create a climate of fear by evoking terrifying scenarios. The party chair has expressed fears that Islamic law (sharia) might be introduced in Norway at any time.[20]

- *Germany*: here far-right parties have only been successful at the   [2.87]
local level, an example being the Constitutional Offensive Party
(*Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive* or *Schill-Partei*), represented
in the Hamburg state government between 2001 and 2004. Attempts have been made to found an anti-Islamic party but have
come to nothing. Germany is home to certain "classical" rightwing extremist parties such as the National Democratic Party of
Germany (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* or NPD),
which have often made it into state legislatures. But their support
is generally limited to less than 5 percent of voters, and their
traditional critique of the political system places them outside the
category of modern right-wing populism, which tends to criticize
elites rather than systems. It is doubtful, however, that Germany's
history makes it immune to a major far-right movement of the
kind that now exists almost everywhere in Europe. When the
Sarrazin debate flared up in 2010, many voters of all parties expressed support for his ideas, and 18 percent of Germans expressed their willingness to vote for a party informed by his
views—in other words, a highly Islamocritical or Islamophobic
stance.[21] Similar figures apply in other European countries as
well, prompting *Spiegel* magazine to aver: "The support for Sarrazin makes you wonder whether there might not be a residuum of
xenophobia."[22]

- *Eastern Europe*: there are numerous far-right parties in Eastern   [2.88]
European countries that pull no punches in expressing their hostility to Roma, homosexuals, or Jews. The "Movement for a Better
Hungary" (*Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom* or *Jobbik*) for example openly refers to the country's infiltration by foreign influences. It often articulates a hostility to democracy as well, placing
it among the classical far-right parties (Mayer/Odehnal 2010).
Among Eastern European far-right radicals, Muslims and Islam

are often less present as scapegoats than in other milieus, as relatively few Muslims live in Eastern Europe. The National Party in the Czech Republic, however, has repeatedly expressed antagonism towards Islam and tried to build momentum for a ban on minarets in much the same way as the Swiss People's Party, though it failed to achieve its aim (Mayer/Odehnal 2010, p. 156). Bulgarian far-right extremists in contact with Western parties have also campaigned against Turkey's entry to the European Union, a message that has fallen on fertile soil in view of the widespread hatred of Turks in the country (Mayer/Odehnal 2010, p. 266 f.).

[2.89]   The growing chasm between the Islamophobic attitude of much of the European population and the gradually increasing integration and participation of Muslims in European political and legal systems has opened up a space for powerful protest parties, which are increasingly making Muslims and Islam their central ideological whipping boy. They link Europe's financial and structural crisis, which is now affecting sections of the bourgeoisie (see below), with the question of Muslim immigration and suggest seemingly political solutions in the shape of their xenophobic and ultranationalist ideologies. These parties are in no way the inventors of Islamophobia, but they provide an indication of its high degree of social respectability at the heart of European societies and help further cement and spread it. They stoke social tensions and actively oppose any positive social recognition of Islam, something still lacking in much of society. As far as the political system is concerned, both modern liberal segments of the established political world and far-right populists seek to change the system, liberals in pursuit of effective equality and recognition, and far-right populists in order to bring about radical democracy and racist or crypto-racist hegemony.

[2.90]   The dualism of liberal and right-wing actors within the party system, however, is just one example of the activities that have grown up around the issue of Islamophobia in Europe. Far-right populists and opponents of Islam are now active not just within parties but also in self-proclaimed "anti-Islamic movements," mainly organized through the Internet (ch. 3.2), and in much the same way there are anti-Islamophobia networks in almost every country in Europe. It is, however, difficult to define the concept of network more precisely since we are not dealing

with fixed alliances of organizations but with social movements that aim to curb Islamophobia. Even the concept of "social movement" that has become established in political science would be out of place here. In contrast to the environmental movement, it is unclear how many people sympathize with anti-Islamophobia networks and to what extent they might be mobilized; not only that, but the so-called social movement organizations that tend to hold social movements together, such as Greenpeace, are far smaller in this case. Anti-Islamophobia networks receive impetus from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that contain at most a few representatives of large social organizations here and there. Only in the case of exceptional events do (largely spontaneous) alliances spring up around these core structures, which can then incorporate the capacities of the traditionally well-organized antifascist groups, along with trade unions, churches, and other associations. In contrast to major topics such as "the environment" or "human rights" or even the general topic of "xenophobia," at present European civil societies have *no* clearly defined policy on tackling Islamophobia. Those groupings that specialize in combating Islamophobia frequently complain that major European civil society organizations do too little to address the topic of "Islamophobia" (Cesari 2006, p. 206). Nonetheless, alongside widespread Islamophobia, the "little traditions" informed by an enlightened view of Islam have not gone away. These have always existed in Europe and are firmly anchored in contemporary civil societies. Goethe's *West-Eastern Divan* has morphed into the "Islamophilic" networks of today.

The oil crisis of 1973 led to massive political tensions between Europe and the Arab world, but also to an awareness among some Europeans of the need to enhance cultural cooperation with the Arab-Islamic world. Since then there have been many forms of cooperation, in which questions of the perception of Islam and the Islamic world play an important role (see for instance Hopwood 1985, Kaiser/Steinbach 1981). Perhaps the largest NGO that specializes in combating Islamophobia and also one of the oldest is the *Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism* (FAIR) in the United Kingdom,[23] which engages in a wide variety of activities. The organization works with human rights groups such as Amnesty International, the United Kingdom parliament, local government, ministries, and the police. It carries out campaigns, operates a discrimination hotline, and engages in political lobbying and me-

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dia watch activities. The French *Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en France* takes a similar approach.[24] It was some time before a similar local group was founded in Germany, in Leipzig: the Network Against Islamophobia and Racism (*Netzwerk gegen Islamophobie und Rassismus* or NIR).[25] The Christian-Islamic Society (*Christlich-Islamische Gesellschaft* or CIG), on the other hand, has been active in Germany for a long time.[26] Islamic organizations also participate in the struggle against Islamophobia, such as the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland*),[27] which maintains a good relationship with other NGOs, including the Central Council of Jews in Germany (*Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland*) (K. Hafez/ Steinbach 1999). The potential for networking is perhaps most evident today in the case of the Intercultural Council (*Interkultureller Rat*),[28] which includes representatives of welfare associations, Turkish and Muslim organizations, the Central Council of Jews in Germany, human rights organizations, trade unions, Sinti and Roma groups, the Protestant academies, and the regional branches of churches. Those involved do not, however, represent their organizations in any full sense. They are there as individuals, though presumably with the approval and support of their employers. A glance at the United States shows that there are similar, often little-known but gradually growing networks there as well, as became apparent in the context of protests against the Patriot Act of 2001. As this act placed restrictions on people's rights, especially those of Muslims, organizations such as the American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Library Association joined the protests (Haddad/Ricks 2009, p. 25).

[2.92]   If we look for the social "recognition" of Islam in present-day Europe, then it is in anti-Islamophobic networks that we are most likely to find it. Islam and Muslims are by no means idealized or dealt with uncritically within these networks. Rainer Forst's notion of the three necessary steps involved in modern recognition—"refusal," "acceptance," and "rejection"—is being put into practice in numerous contexts and especially in the many informative events and debates on the topic of Islam and its perception that social organizations of all kinds have been organizing for decades. In this connection, it was interesting to observe the dispute over cultural relativism and tolerance that took off within the basically "Islamophilic" camp in 1995 in light of the controversy in Germany over German Orientalist Annemarie Schimmel. The

question at issue here was whether she had played down calls for Salman Rushdie to be killed (Hoffmann 2004). So as a form of recognition and acceptance, dialogue leaves ample room for the rejection of views and practices that violate human rights.

Despite their organizational limitations, anti-Islamophobia networks' capacity to achieve spontaneous mobilization was evident in 2008 when the "Cologne resists" (*Köln stellt sich quer*) alliance mobilized against the Islamophobic movement "Pro-Cologne" (*Pro Köln*).[29] It is above all protests and demonstrations that have brought out the astonishing potential for anti-Islamophobic mobilization in Germany, beyond mere educational work. At a demonstration in Cologne, more than 15,000 citizens protested against the activities of the far-right "Pro Cologne" movement. The *tageszeitung*, a left-wing, "alternative" newspaper, described the protest as follows:

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> Last weekend in Cologne tens of thousands of locals made things right again by confronting a handful of right-wing extremists. When push comes to shove, Cologne's civil society sticks together—and on a scale that is probably without equal in all of Germany. Though they may well continue to hold quite different views about the planned construction of a large mosque, there is one thing they all agree on: they do not want people of an openly far-right persuasion in their city. Christian Democrats stood shoulder-to-shoulder with trade unionists, Left Party members and school pupils, Christian churches with Muslim associations, critics of Islam with mosque supporters, carnival-goers with leftwing autonomists. Taxi drivers refused to let members of the 'brown' fraternity into their cabs, hoteliers asked them to leave the premises, and publicans pulled no punches by putting up notices declaring 'No *Kölsch* beer for Nazis'. And strikingly, the police used all their room for manoeuvre under the constitution to avoid being manipulated by 'Pro Köln' & Co.[30]

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The newspaper also noted, however, that this "weekend anti-racism" should not obscure the reality of resentment towards those of a different religion, which often dominates everyday coexistence with Muslims and made the rise of Pro-Cologne possible in the first place. The weakness of networks against Islamophobia, which have not been able to prevent the entrenchment of a high level of anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe and which come to the fore, at most, in connection with exceptional events, is an indication of internally split European civil societies.

[2.95]

As impressive as isolated activities may be, in connection, for example, with the murder of the Egyptian Marwa El-Sherbini (in Germany) or the Utøya massacre (Norway), there is often little sign of resistance to Islamophobia in everyday social life. In contrast to the dramatic spread of Islamophobic networks (a right-wing Website such as Germany's *Politically Incorrect* alone registers an estimated 60,000 hits a day (ch. 3.2)), opposing forces remain weak. Anti-Islamophobic civil society may be able to mobilize on this scale in exceptional cases, but in terms of the sustainability and permanence of its social impact, it is vastly inferior to the fusion of everyday racism and far-right agitation found on the Internet and among right-wing parties.

[2.96]   If we turn to the causes of societal Islamophobia, we find ourselves confronted with a number of theories on the development of racism. Before discussing their relevance to the topic of Islamophobia, however, we must tackle the question of whether Europeans' image of Islam is so loaded with prejudice simply because Islam *deserves* such a negative assessment. The problem of so-called "adequacy to reality" has frequently been discussed in the research on images of nations (Ostermann 1977, p. 100). The idea here is that images of the enemy are not straightforwardly wrong; they may, though do not necessarily, portray real enmity. Many sweeping statements, of course, entail partial truths—the famous "kernel of truth." Some Muslims, for example, *are* fanatical, terroristic, or fascist. But it is simple to refute the idea that Islamophobia is merely a depiction of reality. All the relevant social scientific studies show that only small numbers of Muslims are prepared to embrace extremism, in line with averages for European populations (ch. 1.4). And I will show later that often Muslims are not only committed to upholding the law, constitution, and democracy, as we have seen, but, despite existing problems, are better integrated legally, socially, and culturally than their reputation would suggest (ch. 2.2). Those who explain Islamophobia as a response to Muslims' failure to adapt can adduce empirical evidence of slightly lower levels of integration. But these figures are generally typical of "labor migrants" and "refugees" and by no means socially alarming. Furthermore the reasons for this are complex, and majority society often bears some of the responsibility. To put Islamophobia down to Muslims' failings, then, is to be ideologically biased and to combine conservatism (an insistence on

social and cultural assimilation) with notions of cultural, anthropological, or genetic-racist difference.

Here the real causes of racism come into view. For heuristic reasons [2.97] we may distinguish between two major fields, namely *cultural* and *social* theories, though it soon becomes clear that it is near-impossible to separate them since each field makes such extensive reference to the other. Cultural factors are emphasized by those schools of racism research that highlight the role of values, ideologies, and discourses within a society, including the media. Those with right-wing political leanings are as a rule more xenophobic than supporters of liberal or left-wing parties. There are of course variations in every political current, such as an enlightened and open-minded conservatism whose motto might be "Each to his or her own fatherland." But those members of society with conservative leanings often tend to idealize the values of their own community, and it is precisely here that the exponents of the new "innocent nationalism" seek to make a crucial distinction. They emphasize the differences between nations, religions, cultures, and so on, but no longer in such a way as to denigrate "out-groups"—they leave that to the far right. The litmus test for modern conservatives arises when they have to tolerate and recognize these—supposedly equal—lifestyles in their own country. They are now faced with a dilemma: they wish to preserve their own lifestyle but they are also influenced by an image of cosmopolitanism. Their solution is typically to call for the assimilation and adaptation of the other. By this point if not before we can discern a covert "ranking" of cultural respect. Those on the "left" are not immune to these reflexes. They are often progressive only when it comes to distributive justice, but not with regard to issues of nation or religion. Even liberals have a long tradition of Orientalism and racism, because nationalism was often the glue that held their otherwise liberal ambitions together. This is also the reason why even now only some of those who call themselves "liberal" are truly antiracist: as a political label, "liberalism" often includes "neoliberalism" or even "right liberalism," political currents that have little or no time for the tolerance and recognition of religious minorities. At present, only liberal and left-wing multicultural ideologies have a positive commitment to religious and cultural diversity.

With the exception of far-right populists and extremists, however, all [2.98] established ideologies in Europe are programmatically opposed to any

form of "racism." Cultural recognition in the center-left spectrum and antiracism in enlightened conservatism are reactions to the social ostracization of racism and anti-Semitism after the Second World War in Europe. There are, however, ways for the supporters of *all* political currents to avoid the social taboo on racism: 1) a nuanced picture of Islam that forgoes direct condemnation is not considered racist by most people; 2) specific ethnic-religious enemy concepts can be regarded as exceptions to the general prohibition on racism. Samuel P. Huntington's paradigm of the "clash of civilizations" fit and still fits neatly into this interface: Huntington views Islam and the West as mutually incompatible and alien—no more and no less. Huntington was no old-style racist, but rather a culturalist who typecast Islam, leaving no room for nuance. Those who support such ideas "officially" reject the kind of racism that entails the denigration of the other. But as we have discussed, behind this idea of difference there often lurks a crypto-racist inclination to do the other down. To quote Oliver Decker, Marliese Weißmann, Johannes Kiess and Elmar Brähler:

[2.99]   A biologically informed racism no longer . . . seems capable of commanding majority support. Instead it seems [acceptable to express] a racism that centres on cultural differences without arousing suspicion of hostility, which means this racism can be articulated without reservation. Such modern racism conceals equally undemocratic antagonism. as seen for example in the ethnicization of social conflicts—and such antagonism is apparently more socially acceptable if it takes the form of Islamophobia. This acceptance of Islamophobic statements opens up the opportunity for far-right parties or right-wing populists . . . to create space and acceptance for other ideological elements of their extremism in the public realm, such as the classical racism that asserts the inheritance of inferior characteristics among certain groups (O. Decker et al. 2010, p. 135).

[2.100]   After the Second World War. Islam in Europe entered a fraught ideological space that led to the reworking of the image of Islam but not necessarily to the dismantling of the European cultural tradition of Islamophobia. On one side stood conservative, right-wing but subliminally also left-wing and liberal antagonism towards the "other" and especially towards "Islam" as a supposedly anti-Western and antiprogressive religion and culture. On the other stood widespread demands for a

consensus on antiracism. To satisfy these divergent aspirations, Islamophobia was welded into a "new racism." In the shape of differentialism, essentialism, and crypto-racism, this Islamophobia no longer violates taboos and can now command majority support. This allows sweeping judgements of Islam that tend to express subtle condemnation: "It's not our way." That this "trick" has worked in every social milieu is evident in surveys of public opinion that show, for example, that large numbers in all European countries agree that Islam and the West are incompatible (see above).

As early as the 1990s, cultural studies scholars David Morley and Kevin Robins discerned a trend towards a new dissociation from the "other"; in addition to many national and local causes, this is due to political changes after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the process of European unification, and "globalization":   [2.101]

> The incorporation of 'others' into the German *Volksgemeinschaft* has long been troublesome, as it has challenged the underpinnings of the German notion of identity: *Überfremdung* (overforeignisation) has been perceived as a threat to national integrity and culture. Now it is the 1.5 million Turks living in Germany who have become the salient and disturbing 'Other'. 'We the people' are now defined, in Germany, against the 'Islamic Other'. The question is whether Germany can come to terms with this 'Islam within', or whether the new nation will be imagined on the basis of an exclusive and excluding racism. . . . [There is a] powerful appeal of Heimat throughout the changing Europe. . . . The crucial issue that now confronts European culture, we would argue, is whether it can be open to the condition and experience of homelessness (Morley/Robins 1995, S. 102 f.).   [2.102]

Modern Islamophobia and its variants are the product of traditional images of Islam as well as contemporary social values and developments. Ideologies and core societal ideas are not discrete entities separate from the rest of the world. They relate to conditions at the heart of society, which is where they are usually formulated. This is why approaches in mass and social psychology have always been part of the arsenal of research on racism. The figure of the "authoritarian personality" identified by Theodor W. Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno et al. 1950), and the theory of dogmatism expounded by Milton Rokeach (Rokeach 1960) are well known. From this perspective, people who   [2.103]

think in rigid terms reject otherness, take their lead from the society's hegemonic value center, and condemn those who seem not to belong. Studies based on these ideas have not yet been made of Islamophobia. It remains unclear—despite the superficially apparent uniformity and highly stereotypical character of many Europeans' image of Islam, in light of what, borrowing from Assmann, we have called a "radical style of thought"—whether authoritarian and dogmatic personalities are truly dominant. Andreas Zick, Beate Küpper, and Andreas Hövermann have concluded that while about half the population of most European countries agrees with statements like "There are too many Muslims" or "Islam is a religion of intolerance," in other words they have a negative view or Islamophobic view of Muslims, the relation to authoritarian and dogmatic values varies from country to country, showing high levels in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy (Zick et al. 2011, p. 70, 89).

[2.104]   What emerges here is a hugely interesting and largely untapped field of research that requires examination of the relationship between "images of the other," "values," and "attitudes." To put it bluntly: Is the image of Islam in Europe so negative because—regardless of all the liberties that have been proclaimed and the fundamentally liberal-democratic political systems—seventy years after the Second World War Europeans still lack a fundamentally liberal conception of culture and society? Is this a heretical question? For decades it was assumed that Europe was gradually setting aside the racist values of the past, developing a less "authoritarian" or dogmatic personality in the sense of Adorno or Rokeach. We cannot, of course, lump together the 500 million Europeans who live in the European Union alone. And we should always keep in mind that "culture" includes "cultural *change*," so we should not assume that social attitudes are static—a fact that we will be returning to later in connection with Europe's socioeconomic crisis. Nonetheless, we may describe, with the tools of modern social science, the social attitudes, (core) values, and ideologies capable of attracting majority support during a given period of time. Contemporary sociology emphasizes action- and system-oriented or utility- and effect-oriented aspects of "public opinion." People are not simply manipulated by ideologies; to some degree they actively seek out those ideologies, opinions, and media that match their thinking. For Michel Foucault, "power" does not just emanate from the state apparatus or a small number of

"powerful" people. Instead such powerholders secure their power through a system of social integration, with values such as those of the authoritarian family forming the nucleus of power (Foucault 2005). In the age of the Internet, this decentralism of power is more apparent than ever, beyond the role of social institutions. Cultural power has never been *wholly* the reserve of elites—of politicians, media, and other opinion leaders. Social dynamics of attitude and discourse formation exist in every society, and these are not conveyed completely by terms such as "public opinion" or "silent majority." In an age when culture is understood in constructivist terms, as we saw in the case of Stuart Hall, notions of "mentalities" and "cultures" are also of little use.

We can illuminate how long- or short-term social values and attitudes may influence the image of Islam in the European context by making a comparison with the United States. Prejudices towards Islam are roughly as widespread in the United States as in Europe. The image of Islam there is no more nuanced, and Islamophobic perceptions and value judgements are common. Nonetheless, there is more acceptance with respect to religion, religious freedom, and even radical religious views of the kind that are quite normal among many Christians in the United States. In the United States, then, the Islamophobia disseminated by media and other opinion leaders exists in a context that differs from that of Europe. There is a long tradition in the United States of immigration as a flight from religious persecution in Europe, and America tends to see itself as the home of religious freedom. This may explain why, despite the very negative image of Islam, it took a long time for debates on the Muslim headscarf or mosque-building to get off the ground in the United States (though there is evidence that this is changing; Esposito 2011, p. XXIV f.). At the same time, as discussed earlier, because of "9/11," US society has developed its own phobias with regard to national security, which may be more extreme than in Europe (ch. 1.2). Jocelyne Cesari: [2.105]

> The social legitimacy of organized religion in American society does   [2.106]
> not, however, translate into an unequivocal acceptance of Islam. In
> fact, Muslims in America are caught in a difficult paradox: the simul-
> taneous demonization and acceptance of Islam. Especially after 9/11,
> American acceptance of Islam is at odds with the persistence of anti-
> Muslim prejudice and discrimination (Cesari 2010b, p. 170 f.).

[2.107]   One would have thought that the complex interplay of cognitive con-
structions of the other and affective and conative values in Europe over
the last few decades would have made values of freedom more promi-
nent than authoritarian or dogmatic tendencies. At the very least it has
commonly been assumed that the formerly fascist states of Germany or
Italy had largely overcome their cultural obedience to authority since
the Second World War. Again and again, however, what the evidence
shows is that while this may be true of acceptance of the political system
of democracy, it does not apply to statistics on tolerance *per se*. The
notion of primordially liberal countries such as the Scandinavian states
or the Netherlands, which have always been regarded as role models in
the European context, has taken a beating in the last few years. Conser-
vative and reactionary elements have returned to the political and pub-
lic spheres, and not just in the shape of organized far-right populism.
Calls for religious "integration" and its elimination from the public
sphere are louder in most European countries than in the United
States.

[2.108]   Were theorists such as German constitutional lawyer Carl Schmitt
(Schmitt 2007) right after all to believe that each nation needs to be-
lieve in an external enemy? Are we compelled to argue, with Jean-
Christophe Rufin (Rufin 1994), that having an *external* enemy is the
price democratic societies pay for their *domestic* freedom, that it en-
sures community cohesion, and that at present the Muslim is the enemy
both externally and domestically? Is there ultimately no way of avoiding
racism, no enduring, stable cultural shift towards a liberal society, and is
the aversion to Muslims in the US merely glossed over by the historical-
ly great value placed on religious freedom in what started out as a
settler colony? Even in the United States, society is quite capable of
expressing its Islamophobia in acts of discrimination informed by other
values—such as national security. In Europe, the negative image of
Islam was adapted under pressure from a policy of antiracism, as we
have seen. It mutated from classical into cultural racism and from direct
to indirect, differentialist racism, but this changed nothing about its
wrongness. Only among a small section of the population do we find a
real shift in social values towards recognition and a genuine, critical,
dialogical tolerance of Islam.

[2.109]   Alongside elite ideologies and social values, socioeconomic factors
also play a role in the emergence and development of racism. The anti-

Semitism of the Bismarck era famously functioned as the ideology of disadvantaged members of industrial society, in line with the principle: "The social question is the Jewish question" (Herzig 2006, p. 189 f.). I shall be going into more detail about the relationship between racism and the economy in a later excursus (ch. 2.3), but at this point I want to underline that social values and attitudes are partly dependent on economic conditions. Values centered on coexistence and conciliation between social groups will find favor at the "heart" of society as along as social deterioration is a rare phenomenon explicable in individual terms (O. Decker et al. 2010, p. 44). Modern researchers no longer assume that poverty and unemployment are the *primary* reasons for racism; what matters is *relative* deprivation. The important thing is not which rung of the social ladder an individual is on, but whether she or he is at risk of sliding downwards. So fears of declining prosperity matter, not just the rage of long marginalized strata.

Are social problems in Europe concomitant with respectable Islamo-   [2.110]
phobia and increasing far-right agitation? As we will see, though Europe's constant economic crises and the often shrinking middle class do indeed contribute to growing xenophobia, it would be rash to explain Islamophobia *solely* or *primarily* in light of these developments. It is by no means certain that these crises are the crucial factor, even if they reinforce such views. To understand Islamophobia as a result of socioeconomic crises is to adopt a foreshortened perspective. Long-term, conventional concepts of the enemy that are constantly being updated, and social values that have merely been superficially reformed (at best) play an equally large role. Is the normal condition of a well-to-do European bourgeoisie peaceful coexistence with Muslims? Hardly. During periods of growth and upward social mobility in Europe in the first few decades after the Second World War the image of Islam was not much better than it is today. Certain negative variants of Islamophobia were avoided, while far-right populism and the kind of sensationalist portrayal of Islam by the media that we have seen in recent times were yet to come (ch. 3.1). But this highly negative media image of Islam, along with the odd survey of public opinion in the 1970s, show that while far-right Islamophobic populism may be a symptom of crisis, this is not true of Islamophobia itself. This is inherent in the majority society's cultural legacy and has been revived in recent times, at least since the Iranian revolution of 1978/1979. Present-day Islamophobia is not *determined*

by crisis, but at most *intensified* by crisis. It is not a short-term disruption of Europe's normally multicultural condition—it is the normal state of affairs.

[2.111]   We might ask ourselves why, as Muslim immigration to Europe has increased, another factor has not had a positive impact on the image of Islam, namely interpersonal contact. Scholars regard xenophobia and racism, as well as the modernized racism of Islamophobia, partly as a result of lack of contact between individuals and groups. The majority scarcely know the minority, relying on media images and other hackneyed notions. Prejudices arise through selective perception, which is much easier to maintain from a distance than in the case of direct social coexistence, which enables people to get to know one another from various angles. Through varied forms of interpersonal contact, the internal differences within what tends to appear as a homogenous group—Muslims, in this case—become far more apparent. Gordon W. Allport is the source of the classical "contact hypothesis." In the 1950s, he concluded that contact between majority and minority groups can dismantle prejudices (Allport 1954). Today we find such suppositions confirmed by the fact that xenophobia is often strongest in places where the *fewest* incomers live. The "absent other" functions more effectively as an enemy than the "present other," though the latter can certainly be perceived in stereotypical ways, as further development of the contact hypothesis has shown. Pettigrew has highlighted that the contact must have a certain quality if it is to break down prejudices. People have to develop common goals, cooperative ventures, or friendships (Pettigrew 1998). There is a further complicating factor, however. Even intensive contact of this kind, though it may dissipate prejudice towards a *particular* individual, may not necessarily improve the image of the *group* to which this individual belongs or to which she may be categorized as belonging to. So even under conditions of contact it is possible to maintain prejudices against almost all members of a group. The principle at work here is captured in phrases such as "All Muslims are *x*, but not my neighbor Muhammad." It may be the case that interpersonal action is not necessarily impaired by a negative view of Islam, in other words that members of the majority group do not transfer this negative image to their personal, everyday lives (Halm et al. 2007). But it would be wrong to assume that because Islamophobia may sometimes be qualified in the interpersonal sphere it is socially harmless. The cultural exception

hypothesis is a venerable one, but it in no way negates the negative consequences of racism. Even the individual who holds his neighbor Muhammad in high regard may very well be capable of allowing his Islamophobia to mushroom into xenophobic action of all kinds, from discrimination to violence, in other contexts (see below). To sum up: contact may be helpful, but it must be of a certain quality, and even then there is no guarantee that it will eliminate racism from society.

If we apply these ideas consistently to the prevailing image of Islam, what emerges is that large numbers of Europeans have very little contact with Muslims. Two thirds of Dutch citizens, for example, report that they rarely or never come into contact with immigrants, at least not in any intense and interactive way (Open Society Institute 2007, p. 24). Why should the figures for other countries be much better? Jørgen Bæk Simonsen criticizes the West's notion of integration because, he states, it has required Muslims to adapt yet many of Europe's citizens are unwilling to engage in a dialogue with Muslims (Simonsen 2002, p. 125). The modern nation state characterized by immigration is only apparently a site of encounters among people of different ethnic, cultural, or religious origins or identity. If we define "contact" as at least involving a minimal degree of conversational exchange, then it is often said that despite the small territory of Israel/Palestine a great number of Israelis have never spoken to a Palestinian. Often, people are not even aware that they are talking to a Muslim since most Muslims do not wear any kind of traditional dress. Major events such as the attacks of 11 September 2001 probably reached almost everyone in Europe. "9/11" was a kind of distant contact with the Islamic world with enduring psychological effects, as evident in the constant ritualized repetition of footage of the destruction in the first few weeks following the attacks and on subsequent anniversaries. Historically, catastrophic major attacks have had a greater impact on people's image of Islam than interpersonal "contact." Evidently, for many European citizens things are not much different than when the Turks stood at the gates of Vienna—though there are significantly more Muslims living in Europe now than there were then.   [2.112]

As far as the quality of exchange is concerned, there are positive reports of contact between Muslims and non-Muslims in the workplace. On the basis of an empirical study, Rainer Dollase and Kai-Christian Koch conclude that: "People with Muslim colleagues feel less distance   [2.113]

from them" (Dollase/Koch 2006, Dollase 2006). Working together is a form of enduring and, depending on the activity, intensive contact. It is doubtful that this always involves friendship and cooperative relations of the kind Pettigrew has in mind, as contact is often predetermined by the structure of work process and rarely occurs on a voluntary basis. Nonetheless, intensive work relations are likely to increase the prospects of deeper interpersonal relations. Much of the contact between majority and Muslim minority in Europe, however, is not like this. It is often superficial, being limited, for example, to brief dialogues with the proprietors of businesses and shops. European schools are an interesting place to study both contact and the lack of it. But no general statements are possible here. The assumption must be that contact with Muslims is on the increase within the state school system. But such contact is dependent on region, social stratum, and social milieu, and even in cases where mixed classes exist, contact through friendship may well have its own special features. Children may come into contact while their parents do not, which is not unusual for friendships among the young generally. As yet no really serious study of these processes has appeared.

[2.114]   Even the most intensive *interpersonal* contact may not necessarily have a positive impact on the *group image* held by those involved. And why should it? If we assert that large social groups ultimately consist of individuals, subcultures, and so on, in other words that they are heterogeneous, then it makes no sense to come to conclusions about Islam as a whole or all Muslims just because we know a particular Muslim. Thinking in terms of exceptions must have been very common during the "Third Reich." Non-Jewish Germans knew Jewish Germans and were sometimes friends with them—yet they could also be anti-Semites under certain circumstances. It is not just "methodologically" justified to eschew generalizations based on one's personal impressions, but it also makes sociological sense, because while contact with one's neighbor and work colleague may be intensive, it meets different needs and plays a different role than racism, which is a group ideology of domination intended to evoke the cohesion of the majority. Action theorists might contradict this argument because they do not assume that people have social objectives or functions as such; instead they privilege social motives that arise and are negotiated through contact itself—the tradition of symbolic interactionism being a case in point. Yet most action

theorists would surely concede that people construct identities, world-views, and images of the other to routine ends, that they by no means reinvent their social reality from one day to the next, even if they some-times make new discoveries as they interact with other individuals. It is only when personal contacts are numerous, intensive, and sustainable that general patterns of perception might come into conflict with per-sonal "empirical" experience and a change in group images may occur. But since we have yet to see any really "intelligent" studies on contact with Muslims and on continuity and change in images of Islam, for now all of this is theoretical speculation lacking an empirical foundation.

The research situation is rather better with respect to the final [2.115] source of xenophobia: education. Education is generally regarded as moderating xenophobia and racism. People with a higher degree of formal education are more likely to reject racism than those with a lower level. The same applies with respect to Islamophobia. The highly educated are less prone to it than the less educated (Zick at al. 2011, p. 95 ff.). What is striking, however, is the quantitative level. While very few people with a high level of education in contemporary Europe express *generally* racist views—particularly genetic racism—the num-ber of those who agree with anti-Semitic views is significantly higher. An even greater number of highly educated individuals support Islamo-phobic ideas. It would seem, then, that education generally works to moderate racism, but functions as a buffer against Islamophobia only to a limited degree. It is not just that ideological transformation, unclear social values, economic deprivation, and lack of interpersonal contact foster Islamophobia. Education and knowledge also seem unable to banish it. A 2010 analysis by the department of political science at the University of Bern showed that the Swiss People's Party's anti-minaret initiative was less popular among those with a higher level of formal education.[31] But this is not necessarily evidence of less Islamophobia, because whether one supports the Swiss People's Party is a loaded issue, both politically and ideologically. As the symbol of a modernized racism, many educated individuals find the party generally intolerable. But this has little to do with Islam, let alone with any increased level of support for Muslims. The reason why the sociodemographic factor of "education" has so little influence is linked with the way in which this education is typically acquired in Europe. As a rule it does not provide people with specific knowledge of Islam, and is mostly ethnocentric if

not Eurocentric—an aspect we will be examining in depth later on (ch. 4).

[2.116]   Data on the *causes* of Islamophobia is in far shorter supply than that on Islamophobic attitudes *as such*, which have been examined in numerous surveys of public opinion. But there is a lot of evidence to suggest that Islamophobia and hostility towards Muslims in Europe has found a perfect social breeding ground in a way that applies to no other minority. Islamophobia develops at the point where all the causal factors discussed above intersect. Simplifying somewhat, we might put it like this. Islam is a supposedly old and new ideological enemy with a long tradition, one that is easy to revive. This revival is hampered to a degree by the tolerance and antiracism valorized after the Second World War. But the fact that these values have never found universal consent makes it all the easier to erode social taboos, at the heart of society, by shifting the image of Islam in the direction of a "new racism"—Islam as a problem of culture rather than race and so on. This is less simple with respect to other groups. "Blacks," Africans, and African-Americans, for example, are not identified with a uniform (for example, religious) ideology. Since many of the immigrants in Europe at present are Muslims, they provide obvious social scapegoats, who are supposedly stealing jobs, exploiting the welfare state, or lowering standards in schools, ruining the career prospects of the up-and-coming bourgeoisie. To cultivate personal contact with Muslims is undesirable and unnecessary. You know other foreigners, most of whom you meet on holiday, so you can develop an image of yourself as cosmopolitan and Islamophobic *at the same time*. Education is no hindrance: in contrast to anti-Semitism or anti-Americanism, you know essentially nothing about Islam, the Islamic world, and Muslims. This may not be much different in the case of Jews, but the history of the Holocaust is well known and still exercises an influence. And people acquire at least basic knowledge about the United States in school, from the media, sometimes through visits and family ties, films, and many other channels based on the English language; these suggest cultural proximity to Europe and help prevent overly sweeping judgements.

[2.117]   While the overall reality of racism and images of Islam is a depressing one given their widespread support in society, there is no reason for resignation. If we take education alone, it is important to underline that regardless of all its shortcomings, it is not inevitably bound to fail. As

Western canons are usually unreliable or insufficiently reliable sources of information when it comes to Islam, however, this conclusion seems premature. How can we judge the deficiencies of an education that does not yet exist? We need to be careful not to view Islamophobia, like Rufin, as a primordial state of affairs, a constant of the European mind-set that merely goes through contemporary permutations from time to time, a constant that is reinforced or mitigated by economic or other factors. Despite the long tradition of a one-sidedly negative image of Islam in much of European society, the shift towards "global education" has as yet occurred only to a limited extent. But if it did happen in a comprehensive sense, the impact could be considerable. Educational traditions would change, which would influence media and ideologies, in other words, the cultural relations of power. The broad-based social recognition of Islam and Muslims as part of Europe, supported not just by the political system but also by most citizens, might well be the outcome.

At present, however, the empirical data provides little evidence of [2.118] such recognition. On the contrary, fear of and aversion to Islam are on the increase and in evidence at the heart of the (educated) middle classes. Rather than a recognized part of social systems, then, Islam tends to be a generator of social conflicts, and these lead, among other things, to discrimination and violence. Muslims' attempts to achieve recognition (ch. 2) come up against the majority society's hegemonic claims, which rest on an ideational, material, and communicative foundation. Of course, we might think it a matter of perspective to what extent social conflicts are par for the course in "liberal society"; we might view them as unavoidable and perhaps even important to the development of society. Sociologists such as Reinhard Bendix and Ralf Dahrendorf rightly criticized Talcott Parsons' system theory, still dominant in the 1950s, for its harmonious assumptions; here conflicts appear at most as disturbances within otherwise equilibrated social segments (Bendix 1963, Dahrendorf 1959). While conflicts are disturbances within the Durkheimian notion of system integration, in Weberian theory, social conflict is an expression of dynamism and freedom in human societies. This positive view of social conflict seems to ennoble Muslim minorities' struggles for recognition vis-à-vis the majority. But we must be careful here. What we are dealing with is an asymmetrical web of conflict. This is not a matter of social strata or classes seeking to outdo

one another with respect to their habitus, but of a majority acting against a minority that makes up a small proportion of the overall population.[32] As a consequence, we can now discern various instantiations of both latent and manifest violence that may seriously threaten the peace of society. Even conflict theorists would concede that social conflict can renew the system only if it keeps to certain rules. The principles of equality and religious freedom in the private, public, and state spheres laid down by liberal democracy, the constitution, and the law must be socially internalized and practiced in society—otherwise, conflicts certainly have the potential to wreck the system.

[2.119]   With the help of empirical findings and specific examples, we turn now to the question of the "productivity" of the social conflict centered on Muslims in Europe. A number of studies by the European Monitoring Centre have identified an increase in discrimination towards Muslims in the workplace, schools, and housing market (European Monitoring Centre 2006a, 2006b).[33] Discrimination of this kind already existed before 11 September 2001, as shown by a study covering the years 1999/2000 by Paul Weller, Alice Feldman, and Kingsley Purdam (Weller et al. 2004). With respect to the European Union, the Open Society Institute has found that about 50 percent of minorities in the Netherlands feel discriminated against, while 74 percent of Moroccans in the same country believe that discrimination exists (Open Society Institute 2007, p. 30). The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), established by the Council of Europe, has published two general recommendations: Recommendation 5 from 2000 on combating intolerance and discrimination against Muslims[34] and Recommendation 8 from 2004 on avoiding racial discrimination while fighting terrorism.[35]

[2.120]   The European Monitoring Centre distinguishes between legitimate criticism of Islam and discrimination. On this view, criticisms may be justified but it is "crucial that actors respect the principle of equality despite any critical views they may hold about the beliefs of other social groups" (European Monitoring Centre 2006a, p. 17). Muslim headscarves and the building of mosques are two well-known fields of conflict. It is often these symbols that ignite social conflicts and Europeans' Islamophobia. Critics view the headscarf as violating human rights and misogynistic as well as incompatible with Western culture. Wearers and supporters, meanwhile, complain that wearing an Islamic headscarf

leads to discrimination in society. Who is right? If we take Rainer Forst's three-stage recognition process as our basis, we might develop a variety of views on the headscarf: first, "refusal" as merely superficial toleration on the basis of inner rejection of the headscarf as an orthodox symbol not in keeping with the times; second, acceptance, since wearing a headscarf may entail very different attitudes, including emancipatory ones, but in any case legitimate ones; third, "rejection" and active prohibition of the headscarf as an expression of authoritarianism that violates human rights.

"Rejection," which would inevitably culminate in a ban, is a fringe position held by very few people, even those on the far right—if we disregard the ban on headscarves in official bodies, which is a special case (1.1). But if we base ourselves on survey findings showing that a majority of Europeans consider Islam to be misogynistic, then most people are likely to express "refusal" and very few "acceptance." It is not difficult to imagine that such latent rejection of the headscarf *may* lead to discrimination, in cases where people not only reject the headscarf in their own minds or verbally, but view it as a reason to deny equal employment, housing, and other rights. Then inner "refusal" *might* become active "rejection." However, attitudes that must be interpreted as mere toleration ("refusal") are undoubtedly more common than active discrimination or "rejection." We must distinguish between views of Islam as an *attitude* of supposed tolerance that does not, in reality, constitute recognition, and discriminatory *acts*. Especially in the field of discrimination, actions arise only in contexts of direct interpersonal contact, which, as we have seen, does not happen often and allows for exceptional conduct. Even if it is very common, Islamophobia will never be reflected in everyday discrimination in any complete way. Often, in fact, it is likely that respondents in the European studies cited above have expressed *assumptions* about others' discriminatory intentions based on the negative image of Islam that surrounds them in the media. This may be something they sense rather than having experienced it themselves. Sometimes they make the mistake of confusing people's concepts and attitudes with their actual behavior. Despite this qualification, however, discrimination undoubtedly occurs. In fact it happens a lot, and it is *based* on the commonly held stance of tolerance that is in reality negative tolerance and inner refusal. What cannot be prohibited politically and legally is stigmatized and socially ostracized by many.

[2.121]

[2.122]   Beyond surveys, public discourse can also cast light on attitudes towards the headscarf. While there have been relatively few debates on the headscarf in the United Kingdom, there has been no end to such debates in France over the last few decades (Amir-Moazami 2007).[36] Much the same applies in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, reinforced by the fact that prominent feminists have expressed fundamental opposition (Schiffauer 2006, p. 105, see also Berghahn/Rostock 2009). In Belgium, debates on headscarves were still fairly relaxed in the 1990s. In the 2000s, probably partly in response to the situation in the Netherlands, the old pragmatism suddenly began to lose ground (Bousetta/Jacobs 2006, p. 30). The equation of the headscarf with the oppression of women so common in the European public sphere overlooks the shortcomings of the West with regard to the equality of women, who are only gradually beginning to catch up with men in terms of pay and employment and their chances of occupying the highest offices of state, as women in many Islamic countries have done for decades. We need think only of female heads of state such as Khaleda Zia, Benazir Bhutto, or Tansu Çiller. This equation often creates an artificial opposition between the Western and Islamic worlds (Rommelspacher 2001, El-Zayat 2001).

[2.123]   It also fails to take account of the highly complex motives, long attested by empirical research, which play a role in the wearing of headscarves and by no means express any fundamental inferiority of women. Significant here are religious self-presentation and transitions from rural to urban life and from domesticity to the public sphere: often, in contrast to most Westerners' perception, the headscarf functions as a kind of symbol of the transition from tradition to modernity (Lutz 2001, Nökel 2002). In semiotic terms the headscarf may express both external and internal control of the female body; women evade the dictates of fashion without having to be "badly dressed" by affiliating themselves to a tradition. Fashionable and ultra-fashionable headscarves, meanwhile, signal a different conception of aesthetics (Giannone 2005). Niqab and burqa, in other words the veiling of most or all of the face, is a special case in the sense that it has been banned from public institutions even in many Islamic countries. Such a prohibition exists in France, but in Egypt too there is opposition to complete covering of the face at universities. It has been argued that here personal freedom with respect to the headscarf is taken too far, as it is no longer

possible to identify and communicate with another person in the public sphere, threatening public order. [37] The main reason why women wear the headscarf in Germany, as a study by the conservative Konrad Adenauer Foundation (*Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*) has shown, is by no means family pressure, but rather religiosity, which often goes hand-in-hand with a modern, emancipated conception of women's role, at least among educated women (von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (2006). Many such women feel a sense of religious and moral superiority, but this generally has nothing to do with any fundamentalist aspirations. None of these nuances, however, change anything about the fact that at present, as evident in the public sphere and in published sources, the widely held if not majority view in Europe reduces the headscarf to repressive, misogynistic motives incompatible with the West (Pinn/Wehner 1995, Youssef 2004, Röder 2007). The headscarf is tolerated but regarded as a foreign body; it is not accepted and recognized as a legitimate element of life in society.

Disputes over mosques in Europe (Sommerfeld 2008) also lay bare the social virulence of respectable Islamophobia. It is clearly apparent here that social conflicts associated with Islamophobia are not just elite discourses but territorial conflicts interwoven with political power structures. Conflicts over mosques mobilize the heart of bourgeois society and Islamophobia marks the boundary of the local community. Clearly, while many Europeans preach "integration" and would like to prevent the development of Muslim "parallel societies" they are resistant to neighborly coexistence with Muslims and the recognition of Islam. There are authors, however, who assert that even this kind of conflict may foster integration or recognition, on the principle that "[it] is the social conflict that generates structures of communality in society in the first place" (Hohmann 2007, p. 19). This seems dubious, however. Such conflicts are asymmetric, with Muslims having to defend what ought to be self-evident rights. They have to do this only because they are in the minority; in other words, it is a matter of societal power relations. Though we cannot say precisely what proportion of the bourgeoisie feel hostility towards Muslims in such conflicts, it is certainly the case that such conflicts have increased exponentially over the last two decades in many European countries. Mosque opponents are not identical with the bourgeoisie (ch. 1.3) but they are largely drawn from its ranks and make up the most articulate portion of what is otherwise an

[2.124]

often "silent majority." These conflicts are a matter of securing territories, group power, and processes of re-identification at the expense of a religious minority. During the dispute over a mosque in Berlin-Heinersdorf, t-shirts appeared bearing the slogan "You are Heinersdorf," signalling the return of a long missed sense of "we" and confirming many theories of racism.[38] Conflict theorists should not idealize conflicts, as conflicts may be framed differently and therefore have different effects. Mosque-building conflicts may strengthen the majority's sense of community, but it is doubtful that they help minorities achieve recognition. Richard N. Rosecrance distinguishes between different types of conflict: those on the basis of positive-interdependent, negative-interdependent, and non-interdependent relations, in other words conflicts in which the opposing parties maintain a basically positive or negative relationship or no relationship at all (Rosecrance 1973). He sees positive-interdependent relations as having the best prospects of resolving conflicts, while all other conflicts seem to be "zero-sum games," in which every gain for one side means a loss for the other. Mosque-building conflicts are zero-sum games of this kind, because the citizens involved are firmly convinced that they have nothing to gain from the building of mosques but much to lose. There is no understanding of the fact that rights of religious freedom are a highly valuable good that ultimately benefits everyone. The benefits in terms of fortifying civil society are not understood. In all likelihood, such conflicts will foster the looming rupture between system and society identified earlier, contributing to the disintegration of the political system and undermining the gradual progress towards recognition evident within it.

[2.125]   Conflict theorists, however, might argue that dialogue is often an unintended by-product of social conflicts. People who previously had no contact and no wish for any enter into a dialogue in the course of conflicts over mosques. These constellations recall historical realities. It was during the Crusades that the first translations of the Koran made it to Europe. But these cultural interconnections were ultimately incapable of preventing the European mainstream from developing a negative image of Islam. Information exchange and communication do not automatically lead to greater mutual understanding between the parties to interaction. We need to be aware of the power relations that form the background to every dialogue, and in the case of conflicts over mosques we may characterize these as follows: top dogs against newcomers, pow-

er versus powerlessness. These are poor conditions for meaningful dialogue, which is undermined by the power relations involved (Watzlawick et al. 1967). Acceptance and recognition must be viewed as the *precondition* for dialogue with respect to conflicts over mosques; they must be prior to the dispute itself and are certainly not the necessary consequence of such dialogue. Political systems have made a certain amount of progress in including Muslims symbolically and emotionally (ch. 1.2), but few such rituals are to be found in the public sphere or society. If they do exist, it is through inter-religious exchange, though the upper echelons of the German churches have rejected the performance of shared rituals (ch. 5).

The topic of Islamophobic violence has as yet received little attention in Europe. Islamophobia does not necessarily entail the existence of discrimination, let alone violence, since people with Islamophobic leanings do not necessarily have to act in discriminatory or violent ways, but Islamophobia *may* prompt such actions (Peucker 2010a, p. 165). In contrast to everyday discrimination or protests against mosques, Islamophobic violence is a marginal form of extremism, though one that has grown in scale and significance since 2001. This problem has been investigated in a number of studies carried out by the European Monitoring Centre (European Monitoring Centre 2002a, 2006a; see also Cesari 2006). These in-depth reports registered acts of violence against Muslims and Islamic institutions in countries such as Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, including: bomb and arson attacks on mosques, Islamic associations, and establishments such as cemeteries; vandalism; the daubing of buildings, etc. with blood and swastikas; and the firing of shots at mosques. A growing number of people have been attacked or murdered in recent years. What follows is a brief sample of the European panopticon of Islamophobic violence in the 2000s (European Monitoring Centre 2002a, p. 80 ff., Cesari 2006, p. 70 ff.): [2.126]

- In Denmark, far-right propaganda material was found in the entrance of a Muslim association; the entrance was also daubed with phrases such as "fucking Islam." [2.127]
- In Germany, mosques have been daubed with swastikas; mosques, a Muslim butcher's, and so on have suffered arson attacks. [2.128]

[2.129] • In Greece, a mosque was set on fire, while graves and historical buildings from the Ottoman era were destroyed.

[2.130] • In Spain, far-right extremists carried out attacks on mosques.

[2.131] • In France, there have been arson attacks on mosques, and the graves of Muslim soldiers from the Second World War were desecrated; extremists attempted to burn down a Muslim prayer room, a Muslim undertaker's was attacked, shots were fired at mosques, mosques were daubed with racist slogans, a woman in a headscarf was attacked, and an attempt was made on the life of an imam.

[2.132] • In Ireland, a woman wearing a headscarf was attacked, while other women were called "fucking Arabs" and terrorists.

[2.133] • In Italy, buildings belonging to the Muslim community were daubed with slogans such as "death to Islam" and the entrance of a cultural center was damaged by an explosion.

[2.134] • The Netherlands has seen arson attacks and dozens of criminal acts. Harvard professor Jocelyne Cesari refers to a "worrisome increase in anti-Muslim violence" (Cesari 2006, p. 138).

[2.135] • In the United Kingdom, mosques have been threatened by gangs of youths, their entrances smeared with blood and their windows broken. A Muslim taxi driver was paralyzed as a result of an attack; a nineteen-year-old was beaten with a baseball bat. A Muslim family were called "terrorists"; a fourteen-year-old had his head pushed into a toilet, "Islam" scrawled across his forehead, and a sausage forced into his mouth to force him to eat pork and break Ramadan. An Islamic school was temporarily closed due to terrorist threats.

[2.136] • There have been numerous attacks on mosques in the United States, though they have received little attention (Nimer 2002, p. 176). A taxi driver was attacked in New York.

[2.137] • In Australia, youths chased after immigrants shouting slogans such as "Fuck off Lebanese!"[39]

[2.138] The entire Western world has seen events such as these. Terrorist attacks are followed by waves of attacks on Muslims, which indicates that the Muslim minority as a whole is held responsible for such crimes. The worst incident so far was the Islamophobic murder of Egyptian Marwa El-Sherbini in Dresden in 2009 and the massacre and bomb attack in Norway in July 2011, which took the lives of seventy-seven people.

Though in Norway the victims were not Muslims, this atrocity was clearly inspired by Islamophobia. The perpetrator had earlier proclaimed his hatred for Islam on the Internet and was long a member of the far-right populist Progress Party.[40] The perpetrators of such crimes tend to be far-right extremists in a broad sense. They are not always organized or politicized but are willing to give violent expression to their Islamophobic views, which they share with many other citizens. In this sense there is an at least indirect connection between the Islamophobia of the majority and the propensity for violence of the often young perpetrators, who generally believe that they are acting on behalf of society and expressing the will of the majority. Further, in a survey of around 20,000 Muslims covering almost all of Western Europe, around 11 percent stated that they had suffered racist threats, harassment, or attacks, of whom 72 percent stated that the perpetrators were by no means always youths but sometimes adults as well (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009, p. 3). Especially when it comes to verbal violence, the number of unreported cases is likely to be far higher than this, making it all the more vital to investigate in greater depth the transitions between bourgeois Islamophobia and extremist violence.

It is doubtful that European publics are sufficiently aware of these connections. The European Monitoring Centre criticizes the state for the lack of official statistics and data on Islamophobic violence, though it also states that the authorities exhibit a growing awareness in this regard (European Monitoring Centre 2006a, p. 18, 23). One example is Germany's Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation (*Bundeskriminalamt* or BKA), which has been registering, for example, politically motivated attacks on mosques since 2001.[41] Between 2001 and 2008, 153 criminal offenses were registered in the statistics under the rubric of "arson," "damage to property," "propaganda crime," and "hate crime." The level of violence remained about the same during this period. So it would be wrong to assume that such acts are spontaneous outbreaks of violence in the wake of attacks such as those in New York, Madrid, and London. Islamophobic violence has become a significant, enduring feature of European societies, and unreported cases of violence are likely to be far higher than the official statistics suggest. While the authorities exhibit a growing awareness of Islamophobic violence, European publics have as yet scarcely addressed the issue. In Germany, for example,

[2.139]

it was only after the murder of Marwa El-Sherbini in 2009 and follow-
ing a series of attacks on Berlin mosques in late 2010 that short-lived
debates began. The Central Council of Jews in Germany was one of the
contributors here, stating that "Islamophobia is no illusion."[42] As a rule,
however, Islamophobic violence is merely registered in brief reports in
the newspapers.[43]

[2.140]   Overall, Islam is an ideal-typical "enemy" in European societies. For
numerous cultural, social-interactional, socioeconomic, and educational
reasons, this image of Islam is deeply rooted not just in the minds of far-
right extremists but also in those of the bourgeoisie—in the shape of
differentialism, essentialism, crypto-racism, and full-fledged traditional
and new racism. Attitudes towards Islam vary. Smaller networks in Eu-
ropean societies exhibit a fairly high degree of acceptance and general
support for multiculturalism, while larger groups if not majorities feel
antagonistic towards Islam and at most tolerate it, but deny it funda-
mental acceptance as an equal religion and culture. So this social con-
flict is occurring under asymmetric power conditions, with the majority
striving for inclusion in society's hegemonic power center while a mi-
nority is excluded—at least as long as it remains "visible" as a minority
and is unwilling to be completely assimilated. In this way, European
societies reproduce images of the enemy—and even worse, the risk of
discrimination and xenophobic violence increases. When things go that
far, we are already seeing a rupture between political systems and soci-
eties. Liberal democracy, with its highly unstable balance between the
constitutional rights of freedom and equality on the one hand and the
hegemonic principle of majoritarian democracy on the other, is increas-
ingly called into question. To recall the slogan from the French Revolu-
tion, this is liberty and equality devoid of the element of "fraternity."

[2.141] **THE MUSLIM MINORITY: NECESSARY INTEGRATION AND
RECOGNITION-WORTHY SEGREGATION**

[2.142] We have reached a critical point in our reflections on liberal society. In
chapter 1 we established that liberal democracy might incorporate a
certain logic of legal neutrality and equality that influences the political
system but can demand no more from the individual citizen than recog-
nition of the legal and political framework. Everything else comes

under the rubric of freedom. The recognition of multicultural diversity in the wider political culture is more or less a by-product of this conception of politics. In the course of chapter 2, however, we learned that the problems of xenophobia and racism in liberal democracies are far from being solved, and are in fact being constantly reignited by the issue of Islam and Islamophobia. Informed by the ideal of liberal democracy, we may wish for multicultural recognition all we want, but a significant number of Europeans refuse to comply. Across class and milieu they react with a reflexive privileging of their own community that excludes immigrant ethnic and religious minorities and declares Muslims and Islam incompatible with European values.

So the question arises: what is going wrong? Why, to use Will Kymlicka's terminology, is citizenship granted whereas "cultural membership" of the political culture as well as wider society is denied? And how might we reconcile liberalism and cultural membership without lapsing into old or new fundamentalisms? [2.143]

To this end, some modern thinkers have formulated the seemingly paradoxical concept of "multicultural nationalism." This entails the recognitional credo of greater acceptance, but coupled with the demand that this value be declared central to entire nations, a value that must be upheld. Multiculturalism and recognition are no longer left to the free play of social forces but are instead declared "ground rules" (Aleinikoff 1998, see also Hussain/Miller 2006, Kernerman 2005). The idea is for the classical "nation state" to become a "state nation" that sees itself as a new ideational community (Stepan et al. 2011). Multicultural nationalism involves a difficult tightrope walk. What is expected here is not cultural membership in the conventional sense of affiliation to a particular ethnic group or religion. Instead this concept of culture is dynamic, mutual, and permeable. The understanding of what is regarded as national culture is explicitly liberal. Nonetheless, this school, which is particularly widespread in the United States and is consonant with the American principle of *e pluribus unum*, is a new form of nationalism. People profess "hyphenated" identities such as African-American, Italian-American, and so on. This is not the cosmopolitan community of the anti-communitizers, but merely a transformation of nationalism from a stationary to a multicultural ideal of community. The worrying possibility here is that if this movement was to prevail across the world, these "new nations" might create new tensions between the hyphenated [2.144]

members of individual nations. Furthermore, the pressure to advance
from cultural "refusal" and negative tolerance to cultural acceptance is
already a restriction of freedom and the liberal principle.

[2.145]   Such apparent means of resolving the dilemmas thrown up by liberal
democracy with respect to freedom and community cannot simply be
embraced in any unqualified way. From a liberal perspective, multicul-
tural societal recognition is certainly a vital means of securing the legal
and political order and thus personal freedom as well. The transforma-
tion of the refusal of the other that entails at best mere "toleration" of
religious minorities into a positive tolerance that involves acceptance
and recognition would be a welcome development. We might certainly
celebrate this transition in part as a community-based value, but not as
a traditional value of the "nation," as this would in turn mean excluding
others. To confront people, in the extreme case, with the dilemma of
having to choose between being a racist member of his own nation and
a liberal member of another nation, as does multicultural nationalism, is
a parlous strategy and no route to progress. At best, such an approach
might constitute a necessary step on the way to a cosmopolitan liberal-
ism. Ultimately, the aim of liberal society must be to persuade members
of society, if not all of them then at least most of them, uncoerced and
of their own free will, to rally round the value of recognition. The goal is
not cultural harmony and new identities but recognition of the *possibil-
ity of difference among people and groups* within the framework of a
shared polity. Differing forms of community within a society, as well as
differing relations to the realm of the national—multiple national iden-
tities, dual citizenship—must be recognized as worth protecting in or-
der to counteract racism. Such a politics is "post-collective" as it pro-
tects the existing foundations of community such as religion, ethnic
group, and so on, but at the same time goes beyond them when accept-
ing internal diversities, making it "neo-collective" in a cosmopolitan
sense as well. The only ones culturally excluded from this "recognition-
based community" are racists and fundamentalists.

[2.146]   As yet, such ideas have scarcely made it into social theory. And while
liberal theory demands too little of majorities (recognition), it often
demands too much of minorities. The key concept around which most
current debates in Europe revolve is that of the "integration" of minor-
ities. Unfortunately, what horrifies integration theorists—the socially
unnetworked, unadapted, and unrecognized individual—is to some ex-

tent the very individual envisaged in the liberal concept of society, who is *in most respects* free, independent, and unadapted. Because of this, a liberal critique of the concept of integration is indispensible. As we shall see, a minimal consensus fusing the two schools of thought has gradually taken shape in social theory in recent times. The assumption there is that feats of integration should occur less through adaptation to certain values and the "leading cultures" of the majority and more through linguistic competence—as a prerequisite for free forms of dialogue in society and social recognition.[44] Thus, recognition of minorities by majorities and *necessary* integration by minorities could ideally be two sides of the same coin. The idea here is that multicultural communities could prevent the rupture between political systems and societies in Europe.

Most social theories today are less compromising. Integrationists [2.147] make demands of the individual extending beyond necessary acceptance of the constitutional state and the political values of democracy. Hartmut Esser's concept of integration for example consists of four levels: "social integration" as a form of identification with the key values of a society; "culturation," which centers on linguistic competence; "placing," which essentially means acquiring a place within society; and "interaction," in other words entering into social relations (H. Esser 2001). In Esser's concept, all these processes are mutually dependent, which is the crucial sense in which his concept differs from classical liberal ones such as that of Thomas Meyer (ch. 1.4), who explicitly postulates that these dimensions can be separated out as the essential core of liberal thought. For Meyer, requirements that go beyond what Esser defines as "social integration," that demand more than the acceptance of core constitutionally based values, must be described as conservative, radical, or fundamentalist, and in any case not as "liberal."

Despite scholars' attempts to clarify it, "integration" is still a vague [2.148] term, though the same might be said of other terms like "tolerance" and "recognition" as well. The following distinctions are crucial. First, "integration" emphasizes the formation of commonalities, whereas "recognition" underscores the possibility—and *not* the primordial existence—of differences between people and social groups. Second, "integration" tends to be understood as "assimilation," that is, the formation of commonalities should occur on the basis of hegemonic ways of thinking and behaving within a society; the minority should cast aside its unique

characteristics, at least in the public sphere. Attempts to distinguish between an integration that changes actions and an assimilation that changes personalities (Stichweh 2010, p. 202) remain hazy. The notion of mutual accommodation by majority and minority in the course of integration is common among scholars (see for example Modood 2009, p. 104). But how likely is such accommodation given the kind of power relations that exist between societal majorities and minorities? If integration theory is to avoid lapsing into a form of self-deception, it must recognize that those who refer to "integration" not only imagine that it is the formation of political, cultural, economic, and interactional ties that makes societies crisis-proof and stable, but also assume that these ties are defined hegemonically—in other words, they are associated with a substantial loss of freedom, mainly on the part of the minority.

[2.149]   Despite this, we should not simply denounce integration theory as "conservative," as the motives underpinning the various theoretical concepts differ profoundly. While conservative politics still derives its focus on integration, assimilation, and adaptation—as a debt to be paid by immigrants—from ultimately romantic notions of the homeland, tradition, and the eternally valid character of certain cultures and nations, many contemporary integration theorists have a far more complex worldview. The interface between integration theory and concepts of liberal society consists in the fact that both are formulated with similar goals in mind, namely a society that is based on public order but is as free as possible. But theorists of integration want to get there by a different route. In other words, the two camps are pursuing the same objectives but by different means. Of course, the very notion of ethnic and religious minorities as *un*integrated economically, as standing on the margins of the affluent society, lends far-reaching demands for social integration apparent plausibility. It is very doubtful that the civic consensus of liberal democracy will be enough to guarantee the stability of European political systems over the long term.

[2.150]   Liberal democracy alone has not managed to eliminate the two alarming visions of integration theory: racism on the part of the majority and segregation or separatism on the part of the minority. While we have said enough about racism already, the notion of the "segregation" of minorities requires explanation. The term "parallel society" has often been used to convey this idea over the last few decades. According to Susanne Worbs, the criteria for the emergence of these parallel soci-

eties are: a breakdown of communication with the majority society; linguistic, religious, and culture segregation; socioeconomic withdrawal through the development of alternative economies and labor markets; social distancing through the construction of parallel institutions (in the fields of education and leisure for example); intensification of social control over members of the collectivity up to and including physical and psychological coercion; a tendency to *de facto* prevent members of the group from making use of the democratic legal system and the development of a self-administered legal sphere (such as Islamic law); and residential separation and social-lifeworldly segregation (Worbs 2007, p. 11). Esser takes the view that "multiple integration," in other words integration into the ethnic or religious community *and* into the new social context of the receiving country, is possible in principle but nonetheless the exception:

> Because multiple integration is only likely under very specific (fa-   [2.151]
> vourable) circumstances, and because the marginalization of mi-
> grants cannot be a political goal, the only available means of socially
> integrating migrants is segmentation or assimilation. . . . It is theoret-
> ically possible in principle to conceive of ethnically plural *multiethnic*
> societies as a combination of the successful system integration of a
> society even if the various groups have not been 'assimilated'. Empir-
> ically, however. what we almost exclusively find is a system of ethnic
> stratification (Esser 2001, p. 73 ff.).

Do we inevitably have to turn to the instruments of integration and   [2.152]
assimilation in order to avoid a racist and segmented society? Despite
the fact that classical liberalism has shown no way out of this, it is
doubtful that "integration," if this goes beyond the civic framework, is
an effective means of remedying these problems:

- Particularly in the case of religious minorities, but also other kinds   [2.153]
  of minority with enduringly "visible" characteristics, which do not
  allow themselves to become assimilated through marriage over
  the centuries until they are barely recognizable, it is highly unlike-
  ly that integration and the fostering of social commonalities and
  networks will eliminate *racism*. An at least superficially discern-
  able difference will always remain between Muslims and Chris-
  tians for example. All social ties, meanwhile, are mere snapshots,

evident in history in a contrasting variety of ways. Social interactions with Jews were intensive, but as a rule were quickly abandoned under Nazi rule. Jews benefited little from their elevated economic position, and this applies even more to their successful acculturation. On the contrary, the more integrated they were, the more they were accused of causing the culture to "degenerate," "robbing" the people's wealth, and "worming their way" into the fabric of society as the "fifth column" of a worldwide conspiracy. Jews were long criticized for living segregated lives. As early as the nineteenth century, when they were gradually achieving legal emancipation, engaging in the liberal constitutional movement, and contributing to society, there was a tendency to assail them for wishing to infiltrate, control, and dominate society (Bronner 2000, p. 61 f.). The present-day Jewish community in Germany is thus highly critical of policies of integration (Eisenberg 2010/ 2011). We have also seen the collapse of seemingly integrated communities in the dissolution of integrative bonds in the former Yugoslavia. We must conclude that denying minority cultures as a means of reducing racism is a grave error. Historically, concepts of liberalism, recognition, and conflict have the better arguments here: only if the minority culture is not forced to assimilate, but instead battles to achieve equal recognition by society (culture, nation, and so on), only when we learn about it in universities and schools as a matter of course, when it is popularized in the media, is paid attention in the main political ideologies, and becomes part of the tradition of a given country is there any chance of eliminating racism.

[2.154]   • Some fear *segregation* through the presence of minorities, but fail to grasp that this is based on the generalization of extreme cases. Esser's notion that there is almost no evidence of "multiple integration" is highly dubious. In fact the opposite is the case. The full-fledged parallel society as defined by Worbs is an exception. For most people, who have more contact with majority society in some fields and less in others, grey areas are the rule. A full-fledged "parallel society" would be a kind of mafia-like state within a state. This can be seen in embryonic form in Europe, but we cannot generalize on this basis. Furthermore, even members of the majority are by no means always integrated in Esser's sense.

Not everyone has friends, is well networked, has found an eco-
nomic place in society, and even linguistic integration is some-
times no more than partial given the variety of sociolects and
widespread quasi-illiteracy in Europe. The dilemma thrown up by
assimilation and segregation is captured by the phrase: "Weber
for the majority, Durkheim for the minority" and is thus an artifi-
cial construct. In reality, a combination of social adaptation and
particularity provides a far more accurate description of the reality
of most people's lives—whether they belong to a minority or ma-
jority.

For similar reasons, Iris Marion Young criticizes the ideal of a com-   [2.155]
pletely integrated society, but also underlines other arguments against
"integration" as a guiding principle of society. According to Young, inte-
gration reinforces the hegemony of the majority, and denies the pos-
sibility of free association among individuals. The failure to integrate is
punished and is a heavy burden on society, and the majority, precisely
because they are in the majority, are quite unwilling to be integrated.
This is evident, for example, in the issue of residential segregation and,
we might add, is confirmed by studies cited earlier on many Europeans'
aversion to contact with Muslims:

> I question [the ideal of integration] as an appropriate guide for action   [2.156]
> to eliminate the harms of residential racial segregation. This idea
> tends wrongly to focus on patterns of group clustering while ignoring
> more central issues of privilege and disadvantage (Young 2000, p.
> 216 f.).

Young argues that ethnic and religious segregation are not wrong in   [2.157]
themselves, particularly as they may be a strategy for dealing with dis-
crimination by obtaining a new sense of affirmation within one's group.
She laments the fact that, in Europe especially, too much emphasis is
placed on the ideal of complete integration. She criticizes the tendency
to apply this ideology with particular force to immigrants from Asia and
Africa (Young 2000, p. 219). As Young sees it, integration is not just an
overblown approach to achieving societal peace that is inefficient over
the long term, but also an expression of a claim to cultural power by the
majority society.

[2.158]   Young qualifies this, however, by stating that there is a need for a minimum of participation in democracy and involvement in a solidarist socioeconomic community. Taking everything into account, she puts forward a concept of "differentiated solidarity"; here, cultural, communicative, and social independence, and even social introversion, become possible and meaningful on the basis of a fundamental commitment to the political system and social system (Young 2000, p. 221 ff.). We might conceivably view Young's "differentiated solidarity" as a counterpart to Will Kymlicka's "multicultural citizenship" (ch. 1.1).

[2.159]   Interestingly, within the context of the German Islam Conference, integration theorist Hartmut Esser has advanced towards a similar concept. This sets out minimal features of integration but is far more liberal than earlier concepts of integration and leaves significantly more room for segregation under the banner of diversity. Esser suggests declaring political integration our foundation, along with social integration in the sense of participation in education and the labor market, and also cultural integration, though this is restricted to the acquisition of the language spoken in the country of immigration. "But such 'acculturation' is . . . not an unreasonable imposition on migrants or ethnic groups, since it lies in their own 'objective' interest, and within this broad framework there is space for every conceivable form of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity" (Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 102). The formula of system acceptance + educational and labor market integration + linguistic competence does seem to constitute a viable compromise between primordial liberal principles of total freedom within the prevailing order and concepts of total integration. The liberal core is retained and is merely supplemented by elements facilitative of economic survival through the creation of crucial ties with majority society. The demand for linguistic integration rather than comprehensive cultural integration—which is voluntary rather than required—not only follows necessarily from the first two requirements, but is also necessary to all subsequent "struggles for recognition" and for the minority's dialogue with the majority. So in liberal society we achieve the maximum of independence with respect to lifestyle neither through total integration nor total segregation. What is needed is a "clever politics of difference" (Schiffauer 2008), rather than sweeping "polemics against assimilation" (Stichweh 2010, p. 203). This politics would require a certain minimal foundation of political and social values, but would be careful

not to produce an artificial dilemma. There is no need for people to choose between *either* integration *or* segregation. Such a politics would instead allow for multiple identities and constitutes a viable multicultural concept of liberalism (Heywood 2007, p. 321).

Within this conception, stability and cohesion are generated not by networks and commonalities, but through a recognition of difference that is in tune with minimal political, social, and cultural standards of society. It is not just individuals that have a right to difference, something radical liberal critics of multiculturalism such as Amartya Sen (ch. 2.1) need to comprehend. Social groups such as religious minorities also have this right to difference. From a historical perspective, a form of societal resistance produced by both individuals and groups that insists on cultural recognition by the majority has fairly good prospects of stabilizing society. The social conflict between majority and minority is in fact necessary, though the example of conflicts over mosques has shown that not every conflict is automatically beneficial. The conflicts over headscarves and mosques staged by the European bourgeoisie over the last few decades have often—not always—been "immature" conflicts because they are based on an unenlightened view of Islam (ch. 2.1). Regardless of the unequal power relations in Europe, however, cultural "struggles for recognition" must be fought in order to change social attitudes, institutions, knowledge, and values in a way that facilitates genuine *stability through the active integration of differential options*. Neither total integration nor total segregation are required in order to prevent the rupture between liberal democracy and European societies, but rather a dialogue on the basis of a liberal-democratic order and maximum independence with respect to lifestyles. Cohesion and a sense of community cannot be decreed in a liberal society, but there is no reason to fear that such cultural conflicts will inevitably undermine them or render them impossible (Ekardt 2009).

Though we may be beginning to discern a meaningful middle way here in theoretical terms, these concepts are rather simplistic. The models generated by theoretical sociology must surely come to grief when confronted with the multiplicity of biographical variants necessary to producing a realistic depiction of society. Ultimately, constructs such as "majority" and "minority" are far too crude and because of this they will always be contested. They do, however, represent residual categories for thinking, action, and social orientation that have proved

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extremely persistent. There is one factor we have not dealt with at all or which we have subsumed under the umbrella term of "culture": the question of religion, religious freedom, religious individualism, and religious integration. Not up for discussion is "integration" as a categorical demand for "conversion." The times when minorities were forced by majorities to adopt a specific religion are gone. But the issue of the social conditions, consequences, and limits of religious expression in *public* space remains unresolved. When discussing the concept of secularization, we established that the core of secularism cannot be the privatization of religion; the notions of privatization and laicization are in fact subordinate to the key motif of equality of religion before state and law (ch. 1.1). But while the central sites of liberal democracy may be the various branches of the state, the main site of society is the public sphere. So what appears peripheral from a political perspective—the relationship between religion and the public sphere—may be a priority from a societal perspective.

[2.162] Neo-religiosity has taken different forms in the Islamic and Western worlds over the last few decades, but after centuries of declining significance, observers such as José Casanova believe they can discern an upsurge in religiosity in both worlds (ch. 1.1). The relationship between neo-religiosity and the liberal idea of society is complex. The Islamic world has seen the invigoration of fundamentalist movements, but also of many forms of liberal or conservative reformist Islam (K. Hafez 2010a). Social conservatism and the search for a group identity go hand-in-hand with (Western-influenced) cultural modernity, media, fashion, and the Internet. This also applies to American Protestantism, which, as Casanova himself states, is essentially an (often conservative) movement for the renewal of religious values and community ideals within the basic framework of the liberal order. Because of the quite different political and social parameters, much of neo-Islam and a generally smaller portion of neo-Christianity in the Western industrialized countries lean towards political fundamentalism by rejecting the principle of a secular legal order—if their adherents are not in fact prone to acts of violence. In the Islamic world this has led to demands for the introduction of Islamic law (sharia). In the United States, the creationist movement has managed to get the biblical creation story enshrined in law as an alternative to Darwinism in many states. But if we disregard these developments, it is plain that at present both Islam and Christianity

constantly generate attitudes that involve acceptance of the political framework of liberal democracy, but which are guided by fundamentalist values and deny other religions "ecumenical" recognition—worldviews that are also common within religions' central institutions (ch. 5). So religious intolerance may well hamper mutual recognition of majority and religious minorities in Europe.

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As in the case of the majority society, to come to grips with the issue of European Muslims' attitudes to integration and recognition we must make a distinction between public sphere and public opinion, between the "silent majorities" (of the minority) and "elites." The concept of elites is generally difficult and easy to criticize, but one useful distinction is that between power, functional, and value elites. Since we have already examined power elites (ch. 1), we shall limit ourselves here to functional and value elites and examine their discourses in more detail. Intellectuals, scholars, and representatives of society, it goes without saying, often have no legitimacy in the sense of democratic elections. Since it is only relatively recently that large numbers of immigrants have come to Europe from the Islamic world, their elites may be categorized as latecomers (Vogt 2002, p. 99), having emerged since the 1980s and in many cases only in the 1990s in most countries. The process of their establishment is well under way, and despite the fact that there is still often a lack of Muslim voices in public debates (Zemni/Parker 2002, p. 241), the development of Muslim elites is dynamic, as evident in the rise of Muslim immigrants through the ranks of political parties and parliaments (ch. 1.3). Increasing numbers of Muslims are also present within universities, liberal professions, and the media (Sunier/van Kuijeren 2002, p. 155).

A cursory look at the views of just a few European Muslim elites shows that attitudes to issues such as liberalism, recognition, and integration are far from uniform and correspond to ideological currents largely identical with the theoretical positions described earlier with respect to these issues. Many Muslims are concerned with achieving improved recognition of Islam by the majority society. Mona Sahlin for example calls for respect and recognition of difference. She presents a vision of a Europe of diversity and concludes that we must "embrace" other ways of being in order to eradicate racism completely.[45] Especially against the background of the Holocaust, Sabiha El-Zayat refers to

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the "necessity for mutual exchange"; mere toleration or "putting up with" is not enough, and dialogical elements are a "key developmental factor" (El-Zayat 2001, p. 29 f.).

[2.166]   Muslims in Europe are not all advocates of a recognition-oriented multiculturalism, however. As in the case of Amartya Sen, some members of Muslim elites lean towards classical-liberal and often left-wing–integrationist views. Sami Zubaida for example claims that the concept of multiculturalism entails *a priori* assumptions about the existence of unity among "Muslims" or a unity of "Islam" that prove highly problematic when we look more closely.[46] In her book *After Multiculturalism*, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown laments the fragmentation of society into static groups divided along ethno-religious lines.[47] Jamal Malik and Levent Tezcan have expressed similar views (ch. 1.1 and 1.2). The arguments being put forward here are essentially classical liberal ones; these intellectuals are individualist in orientation and assail what they regard as the artificial construction of Muslims as a group or community—a process they reject as a form of "ethnicization."

[2.167]   These commentators show that Muslims hold a variety of views. These views, however, are rarely clearly defined, such that the boundaries between them are often porous. What is apparent is that representatives of classical and multicultural liberalism often talk past each other. While the multiculturalists chiefly emphasize the necessity for a public sphere, social conflict, and cultural recognition, their critics are not opposed to this tendency as such but to the collectivist tendency they believe they can discern behind it. So I underline once again that from the perspective of the liberal school, "recognition" may bear both individual and group-based attributes and that neither collectivist incorporation nor physical and psychological coercion can be seen as legitimate means of creating a Muslim consensus. Individual choice, and the basic and human rights of the individual remain a prerequisite for any politics of recognition. In this sense, it is not enough to claim the support of Muslims for a particular policy simply because they are Muslims. Because of the lack of institutionalization through church membership and tax liability, it is often not even possible to determine the identity of Muslims, which from a liberal perspective would have to be established by a profession of faith. People born as Muslims may be atheists or "cultural Muslims" who were socialized in a Muslim context but who are not committed to the religion (Sakaranaho 2006, p. 208). At the

same time, however, it must be admitted that religions are not purely individual products. As a rule, they involve not just common texts and symbols but also strong elements of community with regard to ritual and theology. It would be reductive to regard individualization or privatization as the basic reality of religion. Freedom, after all, includes freedom of association, and for many Muslims their individual or collective commitment to religion is a component of their lived self-conception; sometimes, it is also a logical alternative to societal discrimination and Islamophobia (see below).

Jytte Klausen considers Europe's Muslims to be overwhelmingly liberal in orientation and thus differs from intellectuals like Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel, who are doubtful of the sincerity of Islam's rapprochement with liberalism (Klausen 2005, p. 204 ff.). Such differences of opinion are no doubt partly due to the lack of clarity, mentioned above, characteristic of multicultural liberalism among Muslims as a middle way between classical privatized liberalism and communitarianism or fundamentalism. Intellectual heterogeneity lies in the nature of liberal thought, which foregrounds ideological openness, textual criticism, and a plurality of styles of thinking and living. But this heterogeneity is partly determined by the fact that European parties' liberal and left-liberal programs with respect to multiculturalism and Islam are often quite immature (ch. 1.3). The progressive scene among Muslim elites in Europe is still considered "disparate" (Rohe 2008, Kandel 2007, p. 29).

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The lack of programmatic clarity is evident in the case of German Green Party Bundestag deputy Omid Nouripour (Nouripour 2007). He expresses understanding for the striving for community characteristic of many immigrants in Germany, and sees ethnic or religious processes of communitization as just as legitimate as other forms of legal association. But at the same time he calls for a view of humanity that takes account of all social relations, relations to the group as well as to the society in which the human being is integrated. This he calls "radical republicanism within a multicultural reality" (Nouripour 2007, p. 87). This is confusing, as it was radical republican views that allowed the Swiss to prohibit the building of minarets. The term "multicultural liberalism" captures Nouripour's standpoint better than "multicultural republicanism," because liberalism, unlike republicanism, makes positive reference to values and law that cannot be called into question by a radical-

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ized popular will or civic virtue movements. "Liberalism" may be an awkward term for Nouripour because the Greens are in political competition with Germany's liberal party, the FDP. So it may be that intellectual views are being concealed for political reasons.

[2.170]   It is in significant part because of this lack of clarity that critics dismiss liberal multiculturalism among European Muslims as partly too collectivist and partly too individualist. In addition to the classical liberal or left-liberal critique, there are influential elites and organizations that may be placed within the communitarian camp and whose views are often held to be representative of Europe's Muslims within the European public sphere (Klausen 2005, p. 205). Apart from extremist positions, most representatives of these currents are committed to the laws and political system of Europe, but sometimes seek routes to legal segregation from the majority society and clearly articulate the primacy of the in-group in social and cultural terms. The communitarianism of European Muslims, which I have referred to elsewhere as "conservative reformist" (K. Hafez 2010a, p.32 ff.), foregrounds the search for a new community consensus among Muslims. Pioneering thinkers such as Tariq Ramadan, however, refuse to come down clearly in favor of integration, recognition within multicultural society, or segregation, since for them what matters above all is the process occurring within the Muslim community:

[2.171]   So we could continue to refer to *assimilation, integration* and *isolation* but these terms remain empty as long as we are unclear about who the relevant 'subject' is both in a literal and philosophical sense. . . . The path of the golden mean is a demanding one. It requires us to begin by defining Muslim identity with respect to its principles and its foundations. . . . Ultimately, this approach demands that we undergo an intellectual revolution: for us, the question can no longer be what our place is ('dissolved within' or 'isolated outside of') but instead how to determine the nature of our active contribution. *Contribution* means presence, exchange, partaking and giving; this is a great deal more than merely being *integrated* (Ramadan 2001, S. 232 f.).

[2.172]   Despite the valorization of the in-group and of the Muslim collectivity and identity, social isolation is by no means inevitable among Muslim communitarians—but it is central both to groups and viewpoints that

we might call "fundamentalist." Cultural and social anthropologist Werner Schiffauer has made an intensive study of the group Millî Görüş, which is active in Germany, and other Turkish Islamists. According to Schiffauer, though Islamism cannot be explained solely as a result of discrimination, in Islamist circles the rejection of a Western lifestyle was often greater among immigrants to Europe than among those in Turkey (Schiffauer 2004). The community ended up splitting, with political extremists breaking away to form a group around the preacher Cemaleddin Kaplan. Yet Millî Görüş was in fact long characterized by anti-democratic attitudes and fundamental criticisms of liberal democracy. Though it is impossible to determine exactly what form of state Millî Görüş would like to see and how it views Islamic law (sharia) and secularism, it is clear that there has been a split over the last few decades between extremist ideology and the rather more civil everyday reality of the group (Schiffauer 2004). The second generation of members, who were born in Germany, has gone through a further development, which includes a bigger role for women—women who are now engaged in a dual struggle against discrimination, that of the German majority society and that of men in their own community (Schiffauer 2004).

Schiffauer criticizes theories of fundamentalism as crude constructions of the "other" and as a threat to the political system, Western modernity, the Enlightenment, and civil society (Schiffauer 2000, p. 315). As he sees it, the Islamists' worldview is "as justified or unjustified as other worldviews" (Schiffauer 2000, S. 319). In contrast to Schiffauer's anthropological perspective, however, from the standpoint of liberal theory we cannot view these "fundamentalist" movements in a completely relativistic way. Islamists may have beliefs that clash with human rights, the constitutional state, and the secularism of the political system. Their relationship to the social compromise alluded to by Iris Marion Young and others—the right to segregation on the condition of system acceptance, economic solidarity, and linguistic acculturation—is unclear. It is true that these groupings' relation to modernity is ambivalent and not comprehensively rejectionist and that their pronounced value conservatism clashes with the European "Zeitgeist," but with the exception of a small number of issues, this conservatism must be tolerable both legally and within society; in this respect, Islamists' views are often not that different from the reactionary models of

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thought and action found among the conservative or right-wing camp in Europe (K. Hafez 2010a, p. 40 ff., 56 ff.). It is not clear that Islamists are lacking in economic solidarity in the sense of paying taxes: social engagement within the in-group of Muslims is often substantial and they participate in working life in the normal way. Yet their self-image is generally built on religious and cultural superiority, and in this respect they show structural similarities with Islamophobia. Like many members of majority society who do not recognize Islam and at most tolerate it, there are reasons to doubt that Islamic fundamentalists really accept Europe's liberal model of society, that they accept it as equal in Rainer Forst's sense. Their sometimes rigid views of Western society and culture, which may extend as far as anti-Semitism, bring up major questions.[48] The problem here is not the lack of societal "integration," but the lack, some of the time, of "reverse recognition" of the majority by a (fundamentalist) minority within the minority. From the perspective of liberal political and social systems, Islamic fundamentalists must to some extent be evaluated in a different way than from the discourse theoretical and action theoretical standpoint of Schiffauer's social anthropology or ethnomethodology, which intentionally refrains from making structural statements about causal relations in society and focuses on the "discursive struggles" and rational motivations of certain actors.

[2.174]   We might be tempted to regard social recognition as a product of modern society, which immigrants, some of whom come from pre-modern societies, are incapable of exercising. But this would be wrong for a number of reasons. The *pre-modern* as well the *modern* qualities of Islamic elite views are underestimated. Today, in states from Morocco to Indonesia, a theology and ideology of Islam are being formed that may be described as multisectoral. Traditional and highly modern social and economic forms coexist here, and even traditional Islamic society exhibits a certain degree of pluralism (Salewski 2006, p. 210). As with Christianity, there were tolerant and less tolerant periods, currents, and regions in Islamic history. Islam's history of tolerance is venerable; it facilitated the peaceful and productive coexistence of different religions (in medieval Spain for example), pogroms against Jews were far rarer than in Europe, and even in the Second World War many European Jews fled to Turkey or Morocco. Angelika Hartmann:

Tolerance as a process of understanding the suffering of others, as emotional openness and as recognition of a divergence from the prevailing doctrinal view or standard norm has *de facto* always been present in Islamic history. Regardless of the lack of significant, programmatic texts on this topic with a direct impact on society, the concept of tolerance has entered into many fields of the impartation of knowledge, literature and mystical writing and, not least, into everyday practice (Hartmann 2006, p. 133).

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The reference here to the social context, however, shows that the issue of tolerance in Islam cannot be answered simply by quotes from the Koran such as "no compulsion in the religion" (2:256). Practiced religion and the tradition of this practice were not always identical with the sacred texts, and the texts have been interpreted in different ways. Though it often proved possible in the past for Muslims, Christians, and Jews to live together in the Islamic world, there is clear evidence that Islam was far less tolerant towards other religions (Friedmann 2003). Why, then, in their critique of modernity and its "capitalist idols," should fundamentalists recall only the history of tolerance towards Christians and Jews? The many people in the West who no longer refer to themselves as Christian are "heathens" from an extremist perspective. From a theological perspective, there is no reason why such people should be tolerated indefinitely. What is more, present-day Islamic fundamentalists should not be viewed as "traditionalists." They are neo-traditionalists who essentially wish to tighten up many social norms under the *pretext* of moral restoration. For the fundamentalists, the religious orthodoxy of Islam, which has had a long tradition of making arrangements with the state, society, and practices of popular Islam despite its dogmatism, is far too pragmatic, so they are radicalizing this tradition.

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Fundamentalist organizations, however, are just one of numerous elites. How do the Muslims of Europe think and act as a whole? In what follows I attempt to reconstruct the picture suggested by contemporary public opinion research and social research. In analogy to the examination of the European image of Islam (ch. 2.1), I scrutinize European Muslims' view of and attitudes to the West and the everyday strategies and actions derived from them in the context of recognition, integration, or segregation. Overstating things slightly, we might ask: Is the counterpart of European "respectable Islamophobia" and the common

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forms of anti-Muslim discrimination the introverted, intolerant Muslim hiving himself off into a parallel society? Or are the great majority of the "silent majorities" of Muslims in Europe just as liberally minded as Jytte Klausen claims of most members of Muslim elites?

[2.178]   We have already discussed attitudes towards the political system and established that, at least in Germany, Muslims are very supportive of it (ch. 1.4). As far as more comprehensive *legal integration* is concerned, one study has recorded an increased propensity for violence among Muslim youths in Germany. The percentage actively engaging in violence, however, is "only" about 10 to 15 percent higher than in the case of Christian adolescents, and the rate is higher among ethnic German Christian immigrants to Germany and other immigrants, narrowing the gap with Muslims (Brettfeld/Wetzels 2003, p. 347, 350, 356 f.). There was no clear evidence of a connection between violence and a commitment to religious values. The authors identify experiences of violence within individuals' socialization in countries such as Afghanistan, the Arab states, and Turkey, as well as effective norms related to "honor" and masculinity, as the main reasons for this difference. It is not difficult to explain this. While their countries of origin are often authoritarian, their social reach makes them "weak states." Social systems are held together by the traditional norms of tribal and family honor. We should keep in mind that within a given population attitudes towards violence generally take just one generation to change completely. We need only think of the fact that corporal punishment was common in German schools in the postwar period but was then vehemently rejected.

[2.179]   A study commissioned by the German families ministry found evidence of around 3,500 potential forced marriages, though only 40 percent of these actually occurred (T. Mirbach et al. 2011). It is unclear how many of the remaining cases were reported more than once. The study presumes that a large proportion of these cases involved Muslims. In a public statement, however, the expert advisory board associated with the study expressed doubts that the figures, which they felt tell us nothing in any event, were collated appropriately: "The sexual abuse of children and adolescents in church contexts, for example, should not be put down to the perpetrators' Christian faith but to the opportunity structures available to paedophiles . . ."[49] So while forced marriage constitutes a significant criminal problem, it affects only a very small

number of Muslims in Germany and there is no direct link to the religion of Islam.

We turn now to the Muslim minority's social and cultural attitudes. Again, our focus will be on Germany, though with some caution we may assume that the relevant findings apply to other European countries as well. We can now draw on a number of comprehensive studies that identify migrants' social milieus (Sinus-Institut 2008, see also Weiß/ Trebbe 2001). In sociology, the concept of "milieu" is an attempt to go beyond rigid social typologies of strata or classes and understand people mainly in terms of their habitus and lifestyle, things that can vary greatly even within the same income bracket. A representative study by the Heidelberg Sinus Institute from 2008 commissioned by German ministries and associations works with a model of eight immigrant milieus: 1) religion-based, 2) traditional guest worker, 3) status-oriented upwardly mobile, 4) uprooted, 5) intellectual-cosmopolitan, 6) multicultural performer (with a strong bicultural focus), 7) adaptive bourgeois (middle stratum with an emphasis on security and social harmony), and 8) hedonistic-subcultural (unadapted youth lifestyle). According to the study, both the religious and uprooted milieus make up less than 10 percent of immigrants, with all other milieus accounting for about 10 to 15 percent. Despite all the possible criticisms of the unclear distinction between the different categories,[30] this study is interesting because it shows that segregated milieus are in no way in the majority. The dominant groups are those featuring a high degree of integrative and multicultural capital. The influence of religious traditions is somewhat higher among Muslims than other immigrants, but more than half exhibit great willingness to integrate coupled with independent bicultural or multicultural lifestyles. The milieus often perceived by European publics, namely those characterized by social disintegration or religious fundamentalists, do exist, but they are marginal groups among immigrants and among Muslims.

A major 2009 study by Sonja Haug, Stephanie Müssig, and Anja Stichs, "Muslim Life in Germany" ("Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland"), commissioned by the German Islam Conference, confirms this trend (Haug et al. 2009). The study finds the Muslim population in Germany to be highly heterogeneous in terms of sociogeography, migrational biography and household structure, which makes sense even if we consider only Muslims' varied backgrounds (Turkey, Iran, South-

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eastern Europe, and so on) and the associated different motives for immigration (economic, political, etc.). Religion is generally important to Muslim immigrants, though this varies depending on origins. Immigrants from Iran, Central Asia, and Southeastern Europe include a greater proportion who describe themselves as non-religious (Haug et al. 2009, p. 325). Though more than 90 percent describe themselves as religious, more than half do not pray on a daily basis and are therefore not religiously orthodox. Religiosity is highly prevalent among Muslims, and so is religious heteropraxy, though the vast majority of Muslims comply with rules on the consumption of certain foods. Only around half of Muslim fast, however (Haug et al. 2009, p. 326 f.).

[2.182]   That religiosity itself cannot be considered evidence of organized fundamentalism is evident in the fact that only a third of Muslims indicate that they attend religious events, and just 13 percent are actively involved in the religious community (Haug et al. 2009, p. 327 f.). While a segregated lifestyle within one's own group is conceivable both with and without a high degree of religiosity, it is interesting that Muslims who regularly attend religious events are also more involved than some other groups in German associations, though the greatest proportion of members of German associations is found among those who rarely attend mosque. Every second Muslim is a member of a German association. This means that the propensity for social integration correlates to a high degree with religious heteropraxy, but also, though not as strongly, with pronounced religiosity. Muslims often have contact with non-Muslim Germans, and Muslims from all parts of the world show great willingness to engage in such contact (Haug et al. 2009, p. 337). The study states:

[2.183]   Overall, the intensity of contact between immigrants from Muslim countries and people of German origin is very high in all spheres of daily life . . . [Evidently] there is no general barrier between Muslims and the indigenous population (Haug et al. 2009, p. 338 f.).

[2.184]   Of course, a positive picture of social contact from the perspective of a minority making up about 5 percent of the population does not mean that most members of the German majority want or cultivate such contact (ch. 2.1). Seventy percent of Muslims, however, feel a strong connection with Germany, 36 percent even feel more connected with Germany than with their country of origin, with 27 percent of respon-

dents expressing a greater sense of connection with the latter (Haug et al. 2009, p. 337 f.). Studies such as that by Katrin Brettfeld and Peter Wetzels, which have found that Muslims identify more with their countries of origin, also conclude that this a) does not necessarily mean they are unwilling to integrate, and b) is most prevalent among school pupils but declines with age (Brettfeld/Wetzels 2007, p. 363). According to these authors, in no way should these cultural ties be confused with a general tendency towards segregation, which is estimated to apply to less than 20 percent of Muslims. Only a small number of Muslim pupils forgo unisex physical education, swimming lessons, sex education classes, or school trips; girls are most likely to be excused from such activities, the figure being around 7 to 10 percent. Nonetheless, the study finds that opting for children to be excused from educational activities is not a "mass phenomenon" (Haug et al. 2009, p. 330 f.). In much the same way as Muslims in the United States, and probably those in other parts of Europe as well, Muslims in Germany are very willing to marry non-Muslims, though traditional Islamic law imposes restrictions in this regard (Pew Research Center 2007, p. 34).

To sum up what we have learned so far about social integration, it [2.185] appears that with respect to *social networking*, Muslims are far better integrated than is necessary to meet the minimal requirements suggested by Iris Marion Young or Hartmut Esser. Most Muslims cultivate social contacts both within and beyond their in-group and are already broadly integrated into society's institutional landscape, while it appears that they also have distinct religious and cultural preferences and show at least some interest in communitization within the Muslim in-group. Clearly, then, as far as most Muslims are concerned, there is no necessity to choose between assimilation and segregation. The "parallel societies" so often invoked in European media, those of Lebanese-Kurdish clans in Berlin for example, are marginal groups within the Muslim minority. It is not clear from these studies whether Muslims are developing activities intended to achieve enhanced recognition within society, that is, whether they are cultivating a multi- or transcultural lifestyle or whether the tendency is for them to create separate lifeworlds, perhaps even to essentially privatize Islam. Sociological research is very much beholden to concepts of "integration." Little research has been done on issues of recognition, cultural dialogue, and social conflict. Yet such issues are of huge importance. If, from a theoretical perspective,

we have described a fixation on "integration" as flawed in historical terms because ethnic and religious conflicts may worsen at any time quite regardless of levels of integration and such integration provides no solution to racism (see above), it would be interesting to find out what strategies Muslims in Germany are pursuing to achieve recognition. It is by no means certain that the majority of Muslims are aware of and approve of the pursuit of positive tolerance and the recognition of Islam and Muslims as part of Europe—based on insights gleaned historically from the Holocaust and on the views propagated by many Muslim elites in present-day Europe.

[2.186]   As yet we still know too little about how Muslims in Europe organize their social relations, how social interaction functions, and what the Islamic-Western dialogue, much praised but rarely examined in any depth, consists of in everyday life. There are grounds or potential grounds for conflict here. Despite the positive picture of contact painted by Haug, Müssig, and Stichs, we know from other studies of Germany that Muslims complain of discrimination (impoliteness, cruel remarks, and so on) twice as often as other immigrants (Brettfeld/Wetzels 2007, see for example p. 236 ff.). This is common in other European countries as well, as we saw in connection with state antidiscrimination policies (ch. 1.2). It is interesting that those who are very *poorly* integrated and those who are particularly *well* integrated in social and linguistic terms show the lowest rates of experiences of discrimination (Brettfeld/Wetzels 2007, p. 239). In the case of the badly integrated, this is probably due to the fact that less contact means less discrimination. In the case of the well integrated, their affiliation to a religious minority is likely to be almost unnoticeable because they have adapted so successfully to the majority society. What, though, of the great group in the middle, who have not adapted so strongly with respect to language, habitus, and so on, but who, as we have seen in the statistics, also have a high degree of social contact with non-Muslims? It is they who must have most experience of discrimination, which means that social tensions and discrimination arise at the very point where immigrants' efforts to integrate ought to be complemented by recognition on the part of the majority. Clearly, discrimination is to be found in cases where sometimes highly integrated Muslims come up against an intolerant environment. This backs up the theoretical hypothesis that even integration is not necessarily a cure-all for racism and discrimination. It

is not a cure-all if it is incomplete, if it resists total assimilation and privileges spaces of liberality—quite apart from the fact that historically, even the highly integrated could not be sure of avoiding discrimination entirely, as we have discussed with reference to the European Jewry. Those who wish neither to adapt 100 percent nor seal themselves off from society have to put up with social tensions. As a study in the United States shows, fear of discrimination is widespread even among educated and rich Muslims (Pew Research Center 2007, p. 35 ff.). We have to qualify this conclusion because it is not always clear that Muslims' "experiences of discrimination" are truly based on "discrimination." They may partly reflect an oversensitivity that Muslims have often been criticized for. With respect to issues of conflict, integration, and recognition, social interactions have as yet been little researched. We would require far more detailed studies in order to understand the relations between minority and majority in "liberal society."

Women who wear the Islamic headscarf have a relatively low level of   [2.187]
contact. Only 28 percent of Muslim women wear a headscarf, with the vast majority of them stating that they do so for religious reasons and not because of family pressure. With respect to most integration factors, however, on average these women are in a worse position. Their level of education is lower, they are less often in employment, rarely have German citizenship, and have fewer friendships with non-Muslim Germans (Haug et al. 2009, p. 331 f.). While orthodox religious behavior is unproblematic within the framework of the religious freedom guaranteed in liberal society, the headscarf, in contrast to such elements as mosque attendance, seems to function as a social marker of disintegration. Social networking seems to occur on the basis of separation, mainly within these women's own group. It is unclear however, whether this is a matter of self-segregation or externally imposed segregation—we have evidence from some studies that headscarves lead to discrimination in the labor market (ch. 2.1 and 2.3). And we have already established from other studies that Muslim women who wear headscarves are not devoid of all individuality (ch. 2.1). Such findings, then, are not necessarily alarming.

Rather more troubling than European Muslims' degree of social   [2.188]
contact is their *socioeconomic integration*. It is here that the greatest problems are to be found: on average, Muslims in Germany have a significantly lower level of education (Haug et al. 2009, p. 332 f.). When

we break down the data, however, what emerges is that it is not the most religious of Muslims who have the worst educational results, but Turks; Muslims from the Middle East do better (Haug et al. 2009, p. 215). While Arab immigrants to France often find themselves members of a precariat, Arabs (and Iranians) in Germany are mostly educated and highly integrated, to a similar degree as immigrants from Southern Europe (Berlin Institut 2009, p. 49). So it is not the factor of religiosity that is crucial to socioeconomic integration and "differentiated solidarity" in Iris Marion Young's sense, but rather the nature of migration: Are we talking about labor migrants, as most Turkish immigrants are, or political refugees, for example from Iran? Despite the generally lower level of education among Muslims in Germany, the vast majority are in employment, though with a low income, and "only" 20 percent—twice the German average—are unemployed (Haug et al. 2009, p. 334 ff.). Further, as other studies note, there is a countervailing tendency towards the development of a Muslim middle class—Turkish, for example, in the case of Germany (Hildebrandt/Bendel 2006, p. 15). Haug, Müssig, and Stichs conclude that the key problems lie in the field of linguistic competence and relate to structural integration (labor market, education) rather than social networking (social contact, associations) (Haug et al. 2009, p. 344).

[2.189]   These findings are supported by studies of media use that show that segregated behavior (use of exclusively foreign-language media) is the exception, while bicultural usage is the rule (ch. 3.2). But since media use affects cultural rather than social integration, the foundation of which is language learning according to Esser, we need to take a closer look at this dimension. A number of studies provide more detailed information on *cultural-religious integration*. The Bertelsmann Foundation's "Religion Monitor" for example registers growing religiosity among German Muslims. More than 90 percent of Muslims describe themselves as religious, and 41 percent as highly religious. The study found that about 70 percent of the majority population are religious and 18 percent highly religious (Religionsmonitor 2008, p. 6). There is evidence of a slight diaspora effect: a comparative survey in Turkey found that 85 percent regard themselves as religious. So the idea that religiosity among Muslims in Germany is a reaction to immigration and discrimination applies at most only to a very small number of immigrants. What is not clear is whether a larger group become highly religious

because of immigration. Religion seems to be an autonomous cultural space in which traditional socialization and fear of contact with the new environment are fused together. We have evidence that religious identification increases slightly among the second and third generation of immigrants (Tietze 2003, p. 122, see also Gerlach 2006, Mandaville 2009).

Despite this, the vast majority of Muslims do not practice their religion as a response to Islamophobia. Instead they *preserve* their religion, which may well play a positive social role, as Kea Eilers, Clara Seitz, and Konrad Hirschler have pointed out (Eilers et al. 2008, p. 89). It may not aid cultural integration, but almost certainly does help people deal culturally with their changing everyday reality ("homesickness" being the key term here). As we will see in the chapter on the media, "cultural exile" is also a form of segregation, though it has no negative consequences for the minimal political and social requirements discussed earlier. Nilüfer Göle refers to various groups of Muslim immigrants, who "distinguish themselves, elaborate collectively a religious self, and carve new public spaces of their own in conformity with the requirements of their faith and an Islamic life-style" (Göle 2006, p. 3). Particularly in the case of progressive and multicultural immigrant milieus, a kind of withdrawal into "salons" or, as Göle puts it, into semi-privatized spaces, provides an opportunity to try out new discourses, dialogues, and fashions. Here her analysis sounds like a transferral of the Sinus milieus to the realities of Muslims in Europe. The Sinus concept takes full account of the fact that there are a small number of Muslims who seal themselves off from society for religious reasons. Traditionalism as well as uprooting may foster the sealing off of a particular milieu within the Muslim minority. As we have seen, this seems to bolster not so much religiosity as a particular type of religiosity (orthodoxy). By withdrawing into their own minority collectivity, some people try to avoid the painful experience of discrimination (Khosrokhavar 2003). It is not clear from the evidence that a religious orientation is responsible for existing linguistic shortcomings. Furthermore, a study by the University of Bremen has shown that even the social milieus associated with Islamist organizations with a strong tendency towards segregation may feature a pronounced orientation towards universal educational ideals and a willingness to work hard for success in school. In other words, cultural

and social segregation do not inevitably go hand in hand (Meng 2004, p. 158 ff., see also Religionsmonitor 2008, p. 8).

[2.191]   The bottom line is that it is not the religion of Islam or the comparatively high level of religiosity among Muslims that cause the real problems of social integration, namely economic deprivation, linguistic and educational deficiencies, and high rates of criminality. In fact these problems are a result of a lack of social capital (socialization, money, education, etc.) among immigrants and an unwillingness to invest and accommodate on the part of majority society. Majority society is often disturbed by Muslims' religion—even if it is in no way responsible for deficiencies in the minimal features of integration; even the relative dearth of social contact in the lives of women who wear headscarves must be interpreted, at least in part, as a response to discrimination in the surrounding society. We will return later to this crucial socioeconomic mechanism (ch. 2.3).

[2.192]   For now, though, what matters is to be aware of the asymmetry of social relations between majority and Muslim minority in the field of recognition and integration. Culturally established Islamophobia within the majority society, which is at most strengthened but not caused by economic crises, is not matched by a Muslim minority whose members are generally unwilling to integrate. When Muslims fail to muster the required level of social solidarity, this is chiefly because of socioeconomic shortcomings, not religious-cultural reservations. But the relationship between majority and minority seems to be characterized by an error of perception that is likely to make societal dialogue significantly more difficult: socioeconomic issues are interpreted in cultural terms by the members of majority society.

[2.193]   But the integration of Muslims, social as well as political, is already far advanced, and there can be no question of any general tendency towards segregation. In any case, the example of Germany shows that the major, representative empirical studies on Muslims in Germany— Brettfeld and Wetzels, Haug et al., the Religionsmonitor, but also the study by Weiß and Trebbe that I refer to later—essentially agree on this point. To quote prominent migration scholar Klaus Bade:

[2.194]   Sober analysis reveals that the situation is far better than it is claimed to be in public debates. In many fields amenable to empirical study it is in fact satisfactory, if not very good.[51]

Dirk Halm and Martina Sauer studied Germany's Turkish population in 2006. They conclude that it would be quite wrong to refer to a sealed-off community, a "parallel society," as it is only the factor of religion that is unusually pronounced (Halm/Sauer 2006). Most other social parameters are well within the normal range, corresponding roughly to the situation of the non-Muslim majority society. Many Muslims have social contact with non-Muslims. What form this contact takes, whether it is typified by harmony, conflict, or discrimination, is subject to just as much variation as in the case of individuals and groups within the majority society. Only small numbers of people have radical political views; in this respect as well Muslims behave in average, normal ways (ch. I.4). Labor migrants and their families are particularly likely to be affected by legal, linguistic, educational, and socioeconomic integrational shortcomings, but serious cultural incompatibilities such as refusal to attend school, forced marriage, or "honor killings" and similar repressive practices are much rarer than was long assumed.[52] A great deal of adaptation is expected of Muslims, on the other hand, particularly when it comes to religious integration. They have to justify wearing the headscarf, the state is keen to create church-like structures (ch. 1.1 and 1.2) and they are exposed to a great deal of hostility towards mosque-building projects (Hildebrandt/Bendel 2006, p. 19–26).

There are real integrational shortcomings, but it is clearly a huge exaggeration to claim that these amount to segregation. Despite existing problems, at least if we go by the data for Germany, integration has been more successful than is often believed, and in liberal society total integration is not necessary in any case. Durkheim for the immigrants, Weber for the indigenes: this formula does not work and demands of Muslims a form of hyperadaptation that goes way beyond anything expected of the indigenous population. Forms of dress, ties to social groups, public religiosity, political and social value conservatism—these are often attributes of Muslims in Europe, but they in no way contradict the *necessary* integration of Muslims (see also Öztürk 2007). Social theory must face the realities of multicultural society. Integration theory must distinguish between maximal and necessary integration. For its part, recognition theory should make a distinction between real and fictive differences within minority groups. From a historical perspective it is clear that all modes of social action are significant to the Muslims of Europe: integration alone is no antidote to racism, and segregation

alone will not destroy social solidarity in the European nation state. The search for recognition may strengthen dialogue and tolerance.

[2.197]   Let's hear once again from the Swiss Federal Commission against Racism (EKR):

[2.198]   The EKR criticizes the constant repetition of the claim that Muslims are not integrated, as this does not reflect the facts. Thousands of individuals of Muslim faith live, work and raise their families in Switzerland without in any way coming into conflict with the Swiss legal system. But they are unwilling to undergo a form of cultural assimilation imposed by the majority society. Only an integrated society that allows for difference, in which there is dialogue and mutual exchange between the various population groups, can avoid such exclusionary practices (Eidgenössische Kommission 2006, p. 38).

[2.199]   We must also ask whether the multicultural orientation of many Muslim immigrants shown by the major studies is a cultural enrichment of Europe that has gone unrecognized. It is not just a matter of recognizing liberties. Liberal society is based on the idea of pluralism and diversity, not just as an end in itself or because of a worldview that privileges individual self-realization. This insistence on pluralism also entails the belief that it can contribute to progress, development, skills, and the knowledge society. One example is the 1996 UNESCO report *Our Creative Diversity*. In essence, the report claims that while the classical national cultures contain values that both foster and hamper progress, it is only cultural pluralism that facilitates the creative optimization of human knowledge:

[2.200]   If the Pacific has emerged as the most dynamic region of the world, it is because it has drawn on the best practices and values from many rich civilizations, Asian and Western. If this fusion continues to work, there could be explosive creativity on a scale never before seen (UNESCO 1996, p. 23).

[2.201]   Even now it is evident what a long way the liberal view of society has come, leaving behind the racism and nationalism of earlier times to embrace cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. While there is a broad consensus in favor of liberal democracy in European democracies, as a social ideal multiculturalism is still rejected, not just on the fringes of the ideological spectrum but by the conservative center (ch. 1.3). At

first glance, the UNESCO vision seems like a naïve call for cultural relativism by a powerless international organization. The example of Muslims in Germany and Europe, however, shows that immigration is helping liberalize the kind of hegemonic concepts of culture that so often generate tensions within international relations and engender the kind of images of enmity that can lead to war. What is striking here—in contrast to the chapter on Europe's majority societies, in which the image of Islam stood center stage—is that while we have examined Muslims' social attitudes and action strategies, we have not scrutinized their cognitive prerequisites. Why is it that Muslims cultivate contact with non-Muslims more often than the other way around? The answer is fairly simple. In contrast to the public image of Muslims and Islam (ch. 3.1), on average they are more tolerant towards their social environment than vice versa. This finding is trivial in reality. The specific position of power(lessness) characteristic of a minority vis-à-vis a majority makes it far easier for notions of hegemony, phobia, and intolerance to recede into the background than in the case of the majority. Members of the majority often practice their Islamophobia in a context in which they have little or no contact with the minority in question, and their negative attitude towards a minority is not an important issue in their everyday lives. Instead, if it plays a significant role for them at all, it is as a way of letting off steam during periods of social crisis (scapegoat syndrome). The "image of the West" held by most Muslims in Europe, however, demonstrates that the process of immigration brings about a positive shift in their views. This is a consequence of their intensive contact with individuals and aspects of European culture that most Muslims, in contrast to the non-Muslim majority, cannot evade.

Like the study by Brettfeld and Wetzels (ch. 1.4), the Bertelsmann Foundation's "Religion Monitor" shows that a high level of religiosity cannot be equated with fundamentalist dogmatism or claims to power or superiority and that Muslims tend to be highly tolerant of Christianity in particular. Eight-six percent of the Muslims living in Germany agree that it is important to be open to other religions (Religionsmonitor 2008, p. 8).   [2.202]

> In sum, religion is central to the beliefs and practices of Muslims in   [2.203]
> Germany. But this centrality does not involve rigid dogmatism or
> fundamentalism. Highly religious Muslims in Germany are critical
> and self-aware and exhibit a high degree of acceptance of religious

pluralism and a generally pragmatic approach to the ramifications of
religion in everyday life (Religionsmonitor 2008, p. 20).

[2.204] So if religiosity is associated with cultural isolation (which, as we have
seen, is not the case for the vast majority of Muslims in Germany), this
has nothing to do with a lack of acceptance or recognition of non-
Muslims. Yasemin Karakaşoğlu-Aydın's survey of Muslim Turkish wom-
en training to become teachers in Germany concludes that there is
generally no contradiction between a high degree of religiosity, includ-
ing wearing a headscarf, and ideas of modernity, societal pluralism,
democracy, individual freedom of decision, and tolerance. On the
contrary, religiosity may foster and strengthen these attitudes and may
also go hand in hand with a willingness to integrate (Karakaşoğlu-Aydın
1999, see for example p. 413, 415, 424, 442). Muslims living in Germa-
ny are often more tolerant towards Christians and non-Muslims than
the other way around and are just as worried about terrorism as most
Europeans (Allen/Wike 2009, p. 145 f.). The pronounced Islamophobia
among Europeans, then, stands in sharp contrast to the tolerant view of
the West among most Muslims in Europe.

[2.205] What is behind this imbalance? Are Muslims and is Islam generally
more tolerant towards the West than vice versa or is it the specific
conditions of migration that endow Muslims with a more positive atti-
tude? We can find evidence for both arguments, but only in combina-
tion do they produce a plausible answer. On the face of it, it is far from
difficult to find prejudices towards Christians, Americans, or the West
in the Islamic world. Does an equivalent of Western Islamophobia,
namely "Occidentalism" or "Westophobia," prevail there? The collapse
of the Eastern Bloc and Yugoslavia in the 1990s fostered a nationalism
of an Islamic hue from Central Asia through Chechnya to Bosnia-Her-
zegovina. In the Middle East, including North Africa, where processes
of nation building are more advanced, no new Islamic supranationalism
has emerged. This is because the existing states are too deeply en-
trenched for majorities to support the re-establishment of the cali-
phate—which was abolished in 1924 and, among other things, united
Turks and Arabs. But in most Islamic countries the social climate has
been moving in the direction of an Islamic-traditionalist value conserva-
tism. While only a minority of Muslims support fundamentalism, many
show a proclivity for a nativistic emphasis on the traditional symbols,

rituals, and customs of Islam. The number of mosques and the rate of mosque attendance have increased in the last few decades. The head-scarf and veil have made a return to the public sphere in the Middle East. The intelligentsia's relative openness to the world has given way to an introverted stance, which has strengthened feelings of independence and difference vis-à-vis the West (K. Hafez 1999a).

Important triggers for the sense of alienation from the West were [2.206] twentieth-century political and military conflicts, which have kept alive fears of a Western threat in the Islamic world. The defeat at the hands of Israel and its Western allies in the Six-Day War of 1967 was a trau-matic experience for the Arab world. It undermined the ideology of Arab nationalism and lent strength to political Islam. In the Gulf War of 1991, the Arab public sphere was rife with the notion that the Crusad-ers had returned, despite the fact that a number of Islamic states partic-ipated in the military alliance against Iraq. Western dominance in the Middle East, whether in the form of colonial rule or the postcolonial Palestinian mandate, has fostered a discourse on the Crusades that reinterprets history by ignoring the strength of the Orient at the time and presenting it as victim. Muslims' sense of imperturbability and superiority vis-à-vis the medieval Crusaders, the *Frandji* (Franks), has given way to a defensive posture in light of the current military, politi-cal, and economic inferiority of the Islamic world (Sabbagh 1994). Is-lamic fundamentalists have succeeded in offering up *jihad* (which actu-ally means "inner struggle of faith" rather than "holy war") to Muslims, especially Muslim youth, as an alternative path that shows the way out of perceived oppression, at least in psychological terms. Rediscovery of the glorious "zero hour" of Islamic civilization becomes a moment of personal empowerment.

At the same time, the image of Western culture has been gravely [2.207] damaged among Islamic publics (K. Hafez 2000a, Institut für Auslands-beziehungen 2004). Acknowledged Western virtues such as education, the privileging of science, ambition, and initiative are increasingly being overlain with stereotypes of materialism and egotism, a decline in mo-rality, and a weak sense of community. The ethical and intellectual foundations of the West—Christianity, Enlightenment, humanism—are increasingly dropping out of the Muslim consciousness and giving way to a sweeping condemnation of the inhumanity of Western modernity. To mention just one example, over the last few decades the royal house

of Saudi Arabia has enlarged its radio and television empire in order to protect the Arab-Islamic world from being corrupted by the West. Stereotypical concepts of the other such as that of Arab historian Rifa'a Al-Tahtawi (1801–1873), who claimed that the West dominates the material realm while Islam prevails with respect to the inner world of spirituality, are increasingly popular in Islamic countries.

[2.208]   A number of large-scale surveys of public opinion in majority Islamic countries since the attacks of 11 September 2001 have shown that a negative image of the United States, and to a lesser extent Europe, has become firmly entrenched (Diner 2002).[53] Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit are right to state that there is an "Occidentalism" in the Islamic world that is the mirror image of Western Orientalism or Islamophobia (Buruma/Margalit 2004, p. 10, see also Carrier 1995). Against this background, it seems surprising that most Muslims living in Germany have such a tolerant attitude towards the West and Christianity. This can only be explained in light of two fundamental processes. Migration increases these Muslims' contact with Western culture, giving them a more nuanced view that impedes the development of sweepingly negative judgements. In addition, the social relations of power in Europe differ from those in the Islamic world. There the West is perceived as invader and usurper; Muslims are a power and territorially conscious social majority. In Europe the West is "at home" and the mechanisms by which people take their lead from the societal center, familiar from social psychology (the theory of authoritarianism or dogmatism, ch. 2.1), have a positive impact on the minority's perception of the majority, which helps privilege tolerance as a social value. It is true that Muslims often have more faith in the political systems of the West than in its peoples (ch. 1.4) because they perceive Islamophobia and racism. But most of them still have a very positive view of their "new home." So there are "Occidentalist" prejudices at large in the Middle East that might be considered the counterpart of Western Islamophobia and that have an impact in many countries, sometimes to the detriment of the Christians living there, but the new context of immigration to Europe brings about a more nuanced view. This changes nothing about the fact that Muslim youths in Europe are often subject to a radicalization that may engender hatred towards the West and result in terrorism. But such cases are exceptions that prove the rule.

There is some evidence, however, that this change of view does not come about *exclusively* through migration, that there is a basic predisposition in the Islamic world to view the West in more positive terms than applies in reverse. There are two key reasons why we must qualify the mirror image hypothesis put forward by Buruma and Margalit. First, as mentioned earlier, Islam has a long tradition of tolerance towards Christians. It is no surprise that there is no equivalent of the term Islamophobia such as "Christophobia." Islam sees itself explicitly as the successor to and perfection of Judaism and Christianity. Jesus Christ is a prophet in Islam and Muslims trace their ancestry back to the patriarch Abraham. So Islam is characterized by a quite different syncretic genesis than Christianity. While historically Christians often condemned Islam as a heresy, Islam originally regarded Christianity as a source of inspiration. So if we refer to an aversion to the West in the Islamic world, its foundation is a kind of secular Occidentalism. This seems more appropriate to the West, as the privatization of religion seems far advanced, particularly in Europe.   [2.209]

Second, even the secular image of the West as "the enemy" is neither very pronounced nor stable. Even a superficial personal knowledge reveals that in the Islamic world individuals from the West are very often treated with great courtesy and even fawning attention, which is not always the experience of people from the Middle East in Europe. But this does not make Middle Easterners better people—they are often far colder towards Africans, who are not held in the same esteem as Europeans. How are we to explain this imbalance? The likely culprit is a worldwide North-South gap. The West is seen as the center of global modernity. Many people long for a Western lifestyle and members of the bourgeoisie in North Africa and the Middle East seek to emulate it. A survey of 2,000 Arabs in countries such as Kuwait, Egypt, the United States, and Jordan confirms that the vast majority of Arabs have a positive attitude towards American values and American society, though they condemn America's foreign policies (Communique Partners 2006, p. 13 f.). There are quite different views of the United States and European countries, with France enjoying the greatest approval of all Western countries.   [2.210]

In all, though, it is fair to say that under the conditions of cultural hegemony that apply in Islamic countries, discriminatory attitudes towards Jewish, Christian, and other minorities may arise, attitudes that   [2.211]

show a structural affinity with European Islamophobia. However, if they have not already done so, individuals who migrate to the West tend to develop a greater knowledge of and respect for Western political and social systems.

[2.212]   To sum up the findings of this chapter: in reality, the two alarming scenarios envisaged by the integration theorists, racism and segregation, are not equivalent phenomena. While the Islamophobic majority generally refuses to grant social recognition to the Muslim minority, this minority itself emerges as largely tolerant of Christian and Western culture. Despite the existence of small fundamentalist groups, Muslim elites and most of the "silent majorities" of Muslims are inclined towards tolerance, and towards social contact with the majority society. Many views held by Muslims are informed by highly conservative values, and these views fuel their high level of religiosity—embedded in a traditionalist mindset—compared with non-Muslims. What every empirical study shows, however, is that Muslims, even the most religious, do not reject the West in a religious or cultural sense. It will be crucial for future programs intended to advance European society to identify and openly address the imbalances in real existing social recognition. It is not the case that Muslims are ruining the social climate and injecting it with racism by trying to seal themselves off from the rest of society. In fact the greatest cultural challenge for the future is Europeans' inability to overcome the epochal chasm between "Orient" and "Occident" and recognize Islam as part of Europe.

[2.213]   It is unlikely that multicultural nationalism on the American model is the way forward for Europe. In a Europe of numerous nation states, a new multiplicity of "Muslim-English," "Judeo-Germans," "Christian-French" and so on will at best lead to confusion, but not to a stable culture of recognition. Perhaps liberal society needs such neo-nationalisms in order to create a new sense of community. But it is doubtful that a multicultural liberalism must also be a multicultural nationalism. Alongside necessary integration, cultural and religious freedom and equality must prevail within the private, public, and state spheres. Most Muslims, at least in Germany, have already internalized this fact better than the majority society, which has some work to do here, and no policy of integration or assimilation should be allowed to obscure this fact. In historical perspective, as the example of the Jews shows, integration is no solution to the problem of racism, and we need a solution

because unlike some ethnic minorities, religious minorities do not simply "disappear" but persist over long spans of time.

Improved socioeconomic and cultural integration (education, work, and language) is certainly necessary. But it is neither the cause of nor the solution to the challenge of cultural-religious recognition. As social theories, however, theories of cultural recognition and social integration alone are not enough, which is why I now add a socioeconomically grounded excursus. Immigrants cannot integrate into economic and educational systems without the assistance of the indigenes who dominate these systems. Because of this, I now look at the whole conflictual constellation—majority Islamophobia and Muslims' integrational shortcomings—from a different perspective, namely in light of the economic critique of neoliberalism.

[2.214]

EXCURSUS—THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE SOCIAL DARWINISM OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

[2.215]

Frankfurt-based philosopher Axel Honneth has criticized social theory for its economistic and power-political determinism. For too long, he asserts, moral struggles for recognition have been relegated to the margins. At the same time, he concedes that whenever economic survival itself has been at stake, questions of recognition have become secondary (Honneth 1994, p. 264 ff.). According to Honneth, because of this the recognition theory model must not gloss over the struggle for resources and the utilitarian dimensions of society—it should instead provide complementary insights. When all is said and done, is there a socioeconomic logic underpinning the strained relations between European majority society and the Muslim minority? Is Islamophobia part of the calculus of a (neo-)liberal economic system that uses anti-Muslim sentiment to camouflage social Darwinist interests? As we will see, this thesis is overly economistic, though economic factors are undoubtedly influential.

[2.216]

One problem that emerges in this context is that since the Second World War *political* liberalism in Europe has been associated with small, prosperous milieus of the middle and upper classes. It is a striking fact that right up to the present the German Free Democratic Party (*Freie Demokratische Partei* or FDP) has taken its lead from classical

[2.217]

liberalism but rejects multicultural liberalism as a form of "collecti-vism," very much in line with the views of Amartya Sen. As a result, when it comes to party politics, multiculturalism has developed mainly within the Green party (*Die Grünen*). The Green party has moved ever further away from its left-wing origins and is in competition with the FDP for influence in the bourgeois middle ground of politics. The neoliberal FDP tends to have the conservative section of the bourgeoi-sie in its sights, and therefore takes a nationalistic and integrationist approach. The Greens, meanwhile, who are increasingly capitalism-friendly, seek a compromise between integration and recognition—thus defining the essence of a new bourgeois liberalism (ch. 1.3).

[2.218]   It is a common misunderstanding that liberalism focuses on the legal and political dimensions but is indifferent to problems of social justice. Influential pioneers of modern liberalism such as John Rawls have made it clear that the achievement of equality of opportunity is a pro-ject that a free society can agree on, within the framework of social contracts, in order to avoid unfair—because they are unearned—status advantages and the associated lack of freedom (ch. 1.2). Furthermore, Rawls reminds us that unequal pay in a society is tied to the overall social utility of an activity. It seems almost paradoxical that at an early stage a prominent liberal such as Ralf Dahrendorf, whose career has taken him from the FDP to leadership of the London School of Eco-nomics, expressed support for an idea now considered "left-wing," namely a guaranteed minimum income. According to Dahrendorf, alongside a minimum of equality before the law, the liberal idea in-cludes the "establishment of certain social rights of citizenship" (Dah-rendorf 1987, p. 111). For him, the new society of citizens that emerged after the Second World War in the democratic states of Europe has become a "new class society" that severely limits the individual's oppor-tunity to participate. A new poverty is on the increase in Western soci-eties. In light of these developments, the state has clearly become the guardian of middle class interests—which is why a growing number of people are turning away from the political system of democracy (Dah-rendorf 1987, p. 118 f.). Dahrendorf calls for a debate on the introduc-tion of a guaranteed minimum income, of the kind that is now occurring after a few decades' delay:

Can we really live with the fact that ten percent, perhaps more, are standing in front of this escalator, eyes wide with wonder or turning their backs, apathetic or full of resentment, because they are denied access even to the first step? If we want to avoid this, then the key lies in the pursuit of reforms that establish civil rights rather than poor people's rights. What is then at stake is a fundamental social settlement rather than alms-giving (Dahrendorf 1987, p. 152).

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But such ideas have been the exception within European political liberalism; the rule has been a neoliberalism based on the ideology of "small government" and economic "laissez-faire." We might regard European social democracy as a "social liberal" movement. Just as much as the Greens, however, the German Social Democrats avoid the term "liberalism" for reasons of political competition, as a result of which liberal social policy has remained poorly defined. About twenty years after Dahrendorf's call, German political scientist Christoph Butterwegge refers to a crisis of neoliberalism, which he also blames for increasing xenophobia. Because the crisis-hit European economy has less and less room for manoeuvre in terms of distributive economics, Butterwegge tells us, there is a growing tendency to exclude marginal groups from access to resources (Butterwegge 2008, p. 216 f.). Ethnicization has emerged as an effective mechanism of exclusion. Increasingly deprived social classes label immigrants as "welfare scroungers" as they scramble to hold on to their own privileges. Cultural difference becomes a charged issue and what begins to emerge, as Butterwegge might put it, is a culturally differentiated social Darwinism.

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It is interesting to note Butterwegge's emphasis on the fact that this affects the middle stratum of society as well. While most of its members are not yet struggling to get by, they are affected by the redistribution of wealth and fear a decline in their social position (Butterwegge 2008, p. 217 f.). It is precisely the shared xenophobia of the middle and lower classes that gives culturally differentiated social Darwinism its explosive social significance. Europe's eroding middle class is in a sense the historical reversal of the earlier "levelled-out middle class society," which was German sociologist Helmut Schelsky's term for the entry of many workers into the middle class during the twentieth century (Schelsky 1953). The middle class is reacting nervously to the present-day "crisis," not just by taking ever greater pains to prepare the next generation for a life of uncertainty, but also by drawing social boundaries. The sense of

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multicultural solidarity of years past is gradually eroding, while middle class xenophobia is on the rise. There is an increasing aversion to immigrants, and children are being removed from schools where there are "too many" of them. People are trying to distance themselves physically from immigrants and avoid contact with them by moving to other parts of town (Kloepfer 2008, p. 139 f.). What seems to many members of the public like the self-segregation of minorities in "ghettoes" is in reality a complex process of self- and externally imposed segregation.

[2.222]   In her book, *Das Ende der Gemütlichkeit. Strukturelles Unglück und mentales Leid* ("The Good Times are Over: Structural Misfortune and Mental Suffering"), Swiss sociologist Claudia Honegger has described similar processes. Neoliberal policies mean passing on the social costs of social upheaval and biographical ruptures. There is a great temptation to romanticize the past, as people mourn for the "good" order that has been lost, and concepts of the enemy and scapegoating flourish (Honegger 1998). Just as the Muslims who have immigrated to Europe experience their migration to some extent as a crisis of the lifeworld and react through increased religiosity, in times of socioeconomic crisis and declining prosperity, security, and social achievement, Europe's bourgeois majority are nurturing a traditionalism of their own. Neo-nationalism and culturally differentiated social conservatism are increasingly characteristic of the middle class worldview. What remains, at best, is a façade of liberalism and cosmopolitanism, as clearly evident in the opinion polls: people *generally* reject "racism," but Islamophobia is flourishing because it is packaged as a supposedly value-free stance emphasizing Islam's cultural incompatibility with Europe—a barely concealed form of culturally differentiated "new racism" (ch. 2.1).

[2.223]   We should not be too sweeping in our analyses. Surveys and studies do show that often half or more of European publics are antagonistic towards Islam and/or afraid of it. This extends deep into the European bourgeoisie, though the liberal educational networks and social movements that continue to exist demonstrate that the middle classes are not as one on this subject, but have carved out a number of different milieus (ch. 2.1). Quantitative empirical studies show that there is a certain connection between economic position, the crisis of the middle classes, and Islamophobia (O. Decker et al. 2010, Zick et al. 2011). People on middle incomes seem to be less prone to Islamophobia than those on low incomes, though in turn more susceptible than higher-

income groups. These correlations have been shown for such countries as the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Poland. This income-dependence also applies to other prejudices such as sexism, homophobia, and anti-Semitism, but it is Islamophobia that receives the greatest support. While anti-Semitism and xenophobia in particular generally enjoy less approval, many members of the European bourgeoisie are far less inhibited about unleashing their prejudice when it comes to Islamophobia.

Recent studies on the relationship of the middle class to outsiders and xenophobia are also interesting. The concept of middle class used here is a complex one that includes, alongside income, aspects of Bourdieuvian habitus and the interplay between prosperity and habitus (Nolte/Hilpert 2007, Hradil/Schmidt 2007). These studies also assume that in a country like Germany the middle class is steadily eroding in a way that is bolstering xenophobia. While the wages of the working and middle classes increasingly converged in the new world that emerged after the Second World War, structural economic crises have been a mounting problem since the 1970s, threatening the middle class and to some extent lowering its income. Upwardly mobile milieus are more tolerant than downwardly mobile ones (Hradil/Schmidt 2007, p. 212 f.). In the case of the latter, income is no longer a viable means of marking social difference. Differences in habitus, which had been whittled down by the improved social permeability of the education system (something governments at least officially claimed to encourage during the boom years), are becoming more important. Often, these differences are highlighted as marks of social distinction in times of crisis—it is no coincidence that many parents in the 1980s worried that their children would become "taxi-driving sociologists" and advised them to study business instead. Next came the "internship generation" who experienced a delayed and fragmented career: outstandingly educated, but not always easily absorbed by the labor market. As a result, habitus is being emphasized in downwardly mobile milieus, more education is viewed as the key to greater participation, and a new educated middle class is taking shape (Nolte/Hilpert 2007, p. 54), reinforced by popular assumptions about the "knowledge society," "globalization," and the future of late industrial Western society. Anything perceived as standing in the way of achieving this upward mobility is viewed antagonistically, such as "too many" children of an "immigrant background" in

school classrooms or in a given part of town, phenomena that factually or supposedly impair one's children's educational progress.

[2.225]   As yet these findings have not been sufficiently applied theoretically or empirically to Islam or the issue of Islamophobia. But this should provide a rich field of research, since in many ways Islam and Muslims provide an almost ideal "enemy" for the crisis-hit European middle classes. The growing tension between sinking incomes and stagnating or even increasing aspirations with regard to habitus may erupt into a new social Darwinism. This would deploy not material but "mental well-being" as a means of social distinction and might spark the development of a kind of educated middle class renaissance as crisis mechanism. Under these circumstances, it is easy to imagine the kind of provocation Islam is bound to represent. Islam stands in the way of a revival of traditional European-Western educational values because a) it has no connection with them, at least apparently, b) is supposedly hostile to education as a "backward" ideology, and c) having clearly metamorphosed into a kind of "anti-West," appears to contradict just about every value currently being emphasized by the troubled European middle class: above all individualism, knowledge, and a stress on learning. The victory of a fundamentalist version of Islam in the Iranian Revolution of 1978/1979 and the increasing visibility of mosques and headscarves in Europe occurred at the same time as the nascent crisis of the European middle classes—at least within the classical states of the "European Community." As a result of their delayed democratization, Southern and Eastern Europe have exhibited different cycles of economic development. Cosmopolitan values of tolerance continue to have an effect in downwardly mobile milieus, and they would engender conflicts over ideological objectives were there to be a return to the "old" racism. Because of this, Islamophobia also provides an opportunity to gloss over xenophobia. Within the framework of the "new racism" (ch. 2.1), Islam is not viewed as "worse" but merely as "different" and "incompatible." Ultimately, the "Islamic countries" form the backdrop to Islam, with their often aggressive, anti-Western rhetoric. This too makes it easier to reject Islam, because we can identify an "objective" danger without being xenophobic: we are merely rejecting a hostile ideology. The overall picture of political violence, of course, is that Western states clearly kill far more Muslims in wars than the other way around. They also use the concept of Islam as the "enemy" to legitimize cooperation with

dictators and involvement in numerous resource wars. In constructs of the "Islamic," "Iranian," and other threats, however, these facts only ever appear on the margins and in small critical circles and public spheres (K. Hafez 2010a, p. 141 ff.).

So Islam is the right enemy at the right time for a crisis-hit middle class. This is the only explanation for the fact that Thilo Sarrazin's Islamophobic ideas (ch. 2.1) found such approval within the ranks of the German Green party, which is supposed to have a multicultural ideology.[54] The Greens have not only developed into a party of the better-off, but have attracted many members of the threatened middle classes: party members are better educated than those of other parties, making it a stronghold of the new educated middle class habitus. Furthermore, the Greens have become *part* of this habitus, as they embody environmental awareness, progress, and modernity. We shall see later that the "serious" bourgeois media in particular often cultivate an image of Islam as the enemy (ch. 3.1) and that many public opinion leaders from the left-wing or liberal educated middle class are now among the most reactionary opponents of Islam (ch. 4.1). Though they themselves are not suffering in a material sense, they are clearly guided by the genesis of their audience. They embody what some of their recipients have experienced: a regression to intolerance and social Darwinist territorial defense with the old-new tools of "enlightened Islamophobia." Part of the appeal of modern analyses of the middle class that include factors like "habitus" is that their arguments are not based on economic determinism. The idea that Islamophobia arises in connection with income is too reductive. As we have already seen, factors such as ideology, values, education, and social contact play a substantial role. There are several problems with the idea that Islamophobia is generated by economic crisis:

- The concept of economic crisis is too vague, as the relevant authors agree that the *perception* of "crisis" is often more decisive than the crisis itself. Relative deprivation means dissatisfaction with one's material lot, which may mean barely getting by but may include the complaints of those on a relatively good income.

- The high rates of Islamophobia compared to other fields of prejudice show that there must be specific motifs within Islamic-Western relations that tarnish the image of Islam and foster selective

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perception. The fact that many middle class Westerners so quickly gleaned general reservations about Islam from the Iranian Revolution and were surprised by the democratic "Arab Spring" of 2010/2011 shows the virulence of factors that impair intercultural perception over the long term.

[2.229]   • Islamophobia did not develop only once Europe had been gripped by economic crisis. Though we have no relevant and persuasive surveys of public opinion from the economic "boom years" of the 1950s and 1960s, there is plenty of indication that xenophobia and Islamophobia already existed. What we know from public opinion research is that anti-Semitism was still widespread in Germany into the 1960s—long after the Holocaust (Wolffsohn 1984). The media of the day paid very little attention to Islam, but were full of Orientalist prejudices (K. Hafez 2002a, vol. 2, p. 235 ff.). We should be very skeptical about the assumption, inherent in the notion that Islamophobia is determined by crisis, that it diminishes when the economy is booming. Certain forms of Arabo-, Turko- and Islamophobia may take on changing forms but are ever present.

[2.230]   The critique of neoliberalism is certainly not sufficient to explain xenophobia and Islamophobia. Why can foreigners in Germany stay in the country for just one year after completing their studies and find lasting work and accommodation only after a difficult process of "priority assessment"? Migration expert Dieter Oberndörfer rightly answers that while the political sphere is by no means devoid of a sense of economic rationality, the cultural dimension, "fears of everything foreign," and a lack of "cultural pluralism" hold sway.[35] The idea that racism will disappear when there is greater distributive justice or—another variation—when Muslims have been fully integrated economically, is unsustainable. The classical factors in the emergence of racism also apply to Islamophobia (ch. 2.1). But social decline among the middle class certainly produces an important matrix for the activation of Islamophobia, its hegemonic spread, and its fusion with social Darwinism, social boundary marking, marginalization, and discrimination. Crisis, then, provides an opportunity to indulge in a latent, hegemonic conception of culture.

A more far-reaching question that arises from the critique of "neo-liberalism" is whether racism and Islamophobia are in fact the result of *crises* of the capitalist system, in other words exceptional, or whether they come about under normal conditions. Karl Marx himself worked on the assumption that capitalism was structurally prone to crisis, but even this profound critic of capital regarded capitalism as an advance on traditional forms of society such as feudalism. On this view, capitalism was an effective means of injecting social mobility into an estates-based society. What this analysis suggests is that when it comes to attitudes towards immigrants and Muslims in Europe, we should assume a conflict of interest between employers and workers. While employers will be fundamentally in favor of immigration as they are constantly looking for new workers and competition in the labor market improves their position, some workers facing crisis conditions associate immigration with unwelcome competition. So racism is certainly *not* a systemic feature of capital or business, and it is in fact European employers' associations that have adopted the most pro-immigration policies.

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Nonetheless, an increasing number of studies show that discrimination is also found in businesses and that Muslims especially suffer from this kind of structural discrimination. The integration of migrants into the labor market is not a success in the European Union and OECD countries, particularly in the case of Turks, Arabs, and other "Orientals." Some of them arrive with poor qualifications (see below), but even when we adjust the statistics, unemployment is unusually high among this immigrant group (Liebig/Widmaier 2009, p. 6 f.). Lack of education and qualifications does not explain all the differences in unemployment; discriminatory hiring practices are also significant (Open Society Institute 2007, p. 23). Muslim women who wear a headscarf face the worst discrimination in the European labor market (Amnesty International 2012). In Germany job applicants with Turkish names are at a disadvantage (Kaas/Manger 2010). There is ample evidence (Peucker 2010b) of the influence of collective cultural assumptions—"macho Turkish behavior," and so on—and of reservations about the Muslim headscarf that violate European antidiscrimination laws (ch. 1.2).

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Does this mean that Islamophobia is a product of a functioning capitalist system rather than of crises of this system? Such a conclusion would be too simplistic. A more realistic view is that capitalism has not developed adequate mechanisms for preventing discrimination. Busi-

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nesses are not ideal-typical organizations in which pro-immigration market and functional logics permeate every part of their structure. Businesses are "social systems." Alongside "decision processes" they consist of human beings who interpret their roles, "negotiate" with their colleagues, and make decisions. Employers behave in different ways, sometimes giving free rein to personal prejudices. With respect to racism, the application of a business ethics approach has hardly become standard practice. Even when there is no crisis there may be discrimination in the labor market and workplace. Even in the absence of any systemic function, social values of intolerance penetrate businesses via the action logics of individuals and groups, despite the fact that business associations are happy to promote multicultural diversity in their advertising. Again, what is evident here is that the most fruitful approach is a complex analysis of society that deploys the tools of both system *and* action theory.

[2.234]   If we look at the economic sector as a whole, we can discern the socioeconomic causes of Islamophobia at both the center and periphery of the European economic system. What is clear is that the problems of socioeconomic integration described above as real and pressing are caused not just by the refusal by some members of the Muslim minority to integrate (see below), but also by the obstacles erected by majority societies, during periods of both crisis and normality. The negative image of Islam is deployed as an argument about social isolation, which is in turn interpreted in cultural terms. What emerges is a kind of vicious circle of Islamophobic social Darwinism. The way in which such misattribution functions was evident during the unrest in the *banlieus* of Paris of 2005/2006. The French right, flanked by the conservative European press, blamed the Muslim Brothers, polygamy, and Islam for the neglect and rioting.[56] The left-liberal *Le Monde diplomatique* rejected this view:

[2.235]   Contrary to all conspiracy theories, neither gangsters nor Islamist groups instigated the unrest. Quite the opposite: every observer underlines that the unrest was a spontaneous occurrence. That the Islamists are not behind these events is evident in the simple fact that Muslim clerics often functioned as intermediaries. . . . It would be absurd to try to blame a few 'Muslim Brothers' for the consequences of the ghettoization of more than five million people in 752 'Zones urbaines sensibles' (social hotspots). Those interested in the

causes of the latest unrest need only open their eyes to the policy of urban apartheid—the negation of the 'French model of integration'—together with the racism and discrimination encountered by young Arabs and blacks. What the headscarf debate swept under the carpet is now coming out into the open.[57]

Of course, as the key studies have shown, many Muslim immigrants also arrive with poor educational skills and qualifications, and they often work in the low-wage sector (Hildebrandt/Bendel 2006, p. 15). Muslims have therefore been referred to, with some justification, as "Europe's underclass" (Cesari 2006, p. 17 f.). But despite the high risk of unemployment and low average income, even now Muslims make a positive net contribution to tax revenues and the social security system (Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 2006, Straubhaar 2007). Turkish businesses in Germany alone generate an annual turnover of €30 billion (Türkisch-Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammer 2006). The number of immigrant students is increasing (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2007). Yet Muslims continue to occupy a subordinate social position. As we have seen, however, the reasons for this are complex and partly determined by discrimination resulting from Islamo-, Turko- and Arabophobia.   [2.236]

Ultimately, the picture that emerges is a fairly simple one. Processes of social disintegration (among the majority) may contribute to Islamophobia just as much as Islamophobia (in businesses) may contribute to socioeconomic disintegration (among the minority). These mechanisms, however, are not a sufficient explanation in themselves. Islamophobia is influenced not just by socioeconomic realities, but also many other factors such as normative shortcomings, traditions of perception, lack of education, and social contact; and Muslims' socioeconomic problems are partly the result of self-marginalization through lack of qualifications. Clearly, it would be absurd to take a purely economic approach to the relations between European majority societies and Muslims. So we turn now to the influence of media, the academy, schools, and churches.   [2.237]

[2.238] **NOTES**

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survey), *schwaebische.de*, 26 September 2006.

[2n4]   4. Jeder dritte Deutsche hat Angst, *stern.de*, 8 February 2006.

[2n5]   5. Shell-Jugendstudie 2006 (abridged version), Universität Bielefeld, http:/
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[2n6]   6. Though the degree of religiosity is higher (see ch. 2.2).

[2n7]   7. This group does in fact show a somewhat greater susceptibility to certain
congenital disorders, though these are still extremely rare overall. This is the
result of a specific policy on marriage in parts of Turkey that has no influence
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[2n9]   9. Steffen Reiche, Die Herausforderung des Islams, *politik und kultur*,
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[2n11]   11. Annan warnt vor Islamophobie und Antisemitismus, *Spiegel Online*, 14
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[2n15]   15. Rechtspopulistische Parteien in Europa, RP Online (no date), http://
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bid_64950.html (12 August 2011).

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[2n17]   17. Abgeordneter der "Wahren Finnen" hält an rechtsextremen Thesen
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20. "Die Fortschrittspartei hat alles gemacht, um Brücken abzureißen,"   [2n20]
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26. http://www.christenundmuslime.de (14 August 2011); http://www.   [2n26]
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27. http://www.islam.de (14 August 2011).   [2n27]

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[2n45]   45. Muslims in Europe, Post 9/11, p. 6.

[2n46]   46. Ibid., p. 7.

[2n47]   47. Ibid., p. 6.

[2n48]   48. Relevant here, for example, are studies by Nils Feindt-Riggers/Udo Steinbach 1997 and by Wilhelm Heitmeyer et al. 1997, though in both cases their findings sparked considerable controversy.

[2n49]   49. Comment on the study *Zwangsverheiratung in Deutschland: Anzahl und Analyse von Beratungsfällen* ("Forced Marriage in Germany: Number and Analysis of Advisory Cases"), signed by advisory committee members Prof. Dr. Heiner Bielefeldt, Yildiz Demirer, Dr. Nivedita Prasad and Dr. Monika Schröttle, published by the network "Neue Deutsche Medienmacher" ("New German Media Makers"), 28 November 2011.

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[2n52]   52. Christian Rath, Verzerrte Wahrnehmung, *die tageszeitung*, 3 August 2011.

[2n53]   53. See the analysis of a number of public opinion surveys in: Faath 2006.

[2n54]   54. See my remarks on public opinion surveys in ch. 2.1.

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